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CONCEPTUALIZING LEGAL CHILDHOOD IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Clare Huntington* & Elizabeth S. Scott**
The law governing children is complex, sometimes appearing almost incoherent. The relatively simple framework established in the Progressive Era, in
which parents had primary authority over children, subject to limited state
oversight, has broken down over the past few decades. Lawmakers started
granting children some adult rights and privileges, raising questions about
their traditional status as vulnerable, dependent, and legally incompetent beings. As children emerged as legal persons, children’s rights advocates challenged the rationale for parental authority, contending that robust parental
rights often harm children. And a wave of punitive reforms in response to juvenile crime in the 1990s undermined the state’s long-standing role as the
protector of children.
We address this seeming incoherence by identifying a deep structure and logic in the regulation of children that is becoming clear in the twenty-first century. In our conceptual framework, the law’s central goal, across multiple
legal domains, is to promote child wellbeing. This unifying purpose has roots
in the Progressive Era, but three distinct characteristics distinguish the modern approach. Today, lawmakers advance child wellbeing with greater confidence and success by drawing on a wide body of research on child and
adolescent development and the efficacy of related policies. This is bolstered
by the clear understanding that promoting child wellbeing generally furthers
social welfare, leading to a broader base of support for state policies and legal
doctrines. Finally, there is a growing recognition that the regulation of children and families has long been tainted by racial and class bias and that a
new commitment to minimizing these pernicious influences is essential to
both the legitimacy and fairness of the regime. In combination, these features
make the contemporary regulatory framework superior to earlier approaches.
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Rather than pitting the state, parents, and child in competition for control
over children’s lives—the conception of family regulation since the 1960s—
our Child Wellbeing framework offers a surprisingly integrated regulatory
approach. Properly understood, parental rights and children’s rights, as well
as the direct role of the state in children’s lives, are increasingly defined and
unified by a research-driven, social-welfare-regarding effort to promote child
wellbeing. This normatively attractive conceptualization of legal childhood
does not define every area of legal regulation, but it is a strong through line
and should be elevated and embraced more broadly. In short, our framework
brings coherence to the complex legal developments of the past half century
and provides guidance moving forward for this critical area of the law.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................1373
I.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA FRAMEWORK ..1379
A. The Rise of Progressive Paternalism .....................................1380
B. The Framework Under Pressure ...........................................1385
1. Challenging the Progressive Era Model of Juvenile
Justice ...............................................................................1385
2. Children’s Rights: Conceiving of Children as Legal
Persons .............................................................................1390
3. Parental Rights Under Siege..........................................1394
II.
AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK: REVIVING CHILD WELLBEING ...1397
A. Juvenile Justice Reform: The Embodiment of the New
Framework ..............................................................................1398
1. Catalysts for Reform.......................................................1399
2. Modern Juvenile Justice Policy .....................................1401
B. Direct Regulation of Families: Nascent Glimmers of the
Child Wellbeing Framework .................................................1406
1. Policies of State Support ................................................1407
2. The Child Welfare System.............................................1409
3. A Blueprint for Reform..................................................1412
III.
CHILD WELLBEING AND PARENTAL RIGHTS ..............................1413
A. Interpreting Parental Rights in the Child Wellbeing
Framework ..............................................................................1414
B. The Framework in Practice ...................................................1418
1. Corporal Punishment ....................................................1419
2. Third-Party Contact and De Facto Parents ................1422
3. Decisions About Medical Care .....................................1426
4. Homeschooling...............................................................1429

May 2020]

Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century

1373

IV.

CHILD WELLBEING AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ............................1431
A. Interpreting Children’s Rights in the Child Wellbeing
Framework ..............................................................................1432
1. Child Wellbeing ..............................................................1432
2. Social Welfare..................................................................1434
3. Developmental Research ...............................................1435
4. Racial Equality and Children’s Rights..........................1438
B. The Framework in Practice ...................................................1439
1. Rights Granted to Minors..............................................1440
a. Healthcare Decisionmaking ....................................1440
b. First Amendment Rights in School .........................1444
c. Procedural Rights in Delinquency Proceedings.....1446
2. Rights Withheld from Minors ......................................1448
V.
ANTICIPATING CRITICISM ............................................................1451
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................1456
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the law’s treatment of children has become increasingly complex and uncertain in ways that can seem to verge on
incoherence. The problem stems from a breakdown of the Progressive Era
approach that governed for much of the twentieth century: in that framework, parents had authority to make most decisions about their children,
subject to state regulation of issues such as education and child labor. The
state also intervened directly with families to protect children from parental
abuse and neglect and to rehabilitate children engaged in wayward or criminal conduct. 1 Children in this regime were largely invisible as legal persons,
presumed to be vulnerable, dependent, and incapable of making selfregarding decisions. 2
Several developments in the second half of the twentieth century complicated this approach. Beginning in the 1960s, courts and legislatures started
treating children as rights-bearing legal persons for some purposes. 3 This

1. See infra Section I.A (detailing this approach and emphasizing that state intervention focused primarily on low-income, immigrant families).
2. See infra Section I.A (describing this legal framework and noting that to an extent, it
persisted for decades: parents continued to enjoy substantial control over their children, subject to state intervention or preemption when child welfare and social welfare demanded, and
for many purposes, children continued to be deemed dependent, vulnerable, and incapable of
self-determination).
3. See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2 (explaining how the children’s rights movement gained
momentum in a series of Supreme Court decisions that granted children a range of constitu-
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challenged the traditional view of children as lacking the legal capacity for
self-determination, while providing little clarity about the conditions under
which the law should confer rights and privileges. With the recognition of
children’s rights, legal questions increasingly were framed as a zero-sum
contest in which parents, children, and the state competed for control over
children’s lives. 4 Moreover, children’s rights scholars and advocates contested the parental authority prong of the Progressive Era approach as obsolete,
contending that parental rights were rooted in traditional notions of children
as property and threatened harm to children. 5
The overriding Progressive conception of the state as the defender of
vulnerable children also lost its way. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice virtually collapsed under a wave of punitive law
reforms that abandoned the long-standing goal of promoting the wellbeing
of young offenders. 6 In the twenty-first century, lawmakers retreated from
this punitive approach, and a new wave of more benevolent reforms is now
underway, but these pendulum swings have undermined the stability of the
state’s regulatory role. 7 In the child welfare system, scholars and advocates
challenged the myopic and ineffective focus on family crises rather than on
child abuse prevention and family support. 8 And critics argued convincingly
that both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems were highly racialized
and skewed against families in poverty. 9 Taken together, these disruptions to
the Progressive Era framework fundamentally challenge the rationality and
stability of the law’s conception of childhood.
In this Article, we show that the legal regulation of children is not incoherent. Indeed, in what we call the Child Wellbeing framework, there is a
tional protections, including procedural rights in delinquency proceedings, speech rights in
school, and the right of mature minors to consent to abortion).
4. See infra Sections I.B.2, I.B.3. The regulatory framework was often depicted schematically as a triangle. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist
Approach to Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 412 (2005).
5. See infra Sections I.B.2, I.B.3.
6. See infra Section I.B.1. As we detail, many youths were transferred to the adult justice system, and the use of incarceration increased for children who remained in the juvenile
system. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 94–
102 (2008). This trend toward criminalization was described by some lawmakers, including
Justice Scalia, as wholly consistent with the recognition of youths as rights-bearing persons. See
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 615–19 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
inconsistency in minors’-abortion and juvenile-sentencing opinions).
7. See infra Section II.A (describing the emergence of the Child Wellbeing framework).
There have been similar swings in the status-offense system, which addresses noncriminal misconduct by children. See infra notes 44, 164.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 85–99 (demonstrating that, despite policy swings,
family intervention and assistance has largely been limited to crisis situations; lawmakers have
eschewed an active state role in supporting families by promoting healthy child development,
with unsatisfactory results).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 182–183 (describing racial disproportionality at
every stage of the juvenile justice system); infra note 41 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 88–91 (describing racial disproportionality in the child welfare system).
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deep unifying structure and logic to the regulation of children that is emerging across multiple domains, including systems of state intervention, parental rights, and children’s rights, as well as, to a much lesser degree, policies of
state support for families. The core principle and goal of the legal regulation
of children is the promotion of child wellbeing. Three features distinguish
the contemporary approach from that of the Progressive era. First, twentyfirst-century regulation is increasingly based on psychological and biological
research on child and adolescent development, as well as growing evidence
about the effectiveness of policy interventions. This broad body of
knowledge makes it possible to advance child wellbeing with much greater
confidence, sophistication, and effect. 10 Second, lawmakers and the public
increasingly appear to recognize the social welfare advantages of promoting
child wellbeing, thereby broadening support for contemporary policies. 11
And third, a growing acknowledgment of embedded racial and class bias in
state regulation of children has led to tentative steps toward reducing these
pernicious influences, even if these efforts are at an early stage.
The goal of promoting child wellbeing shapes regulation and policy ex
ante and should not be confused with the best interest of the child standard,
applied in individual cases in some legal settings. 12 Indeed, in some contexts,
a rule of general applicability defined in accord with the Child Wellbeing

10. Emily Buss has argued that the law should function as a developmental agent with
the aim to promote healthy development in children. See Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 751–52 (2016). In many regards, her argument is compatible with
our framework. For cautionary notes about the use of social science evidence, see infra Part V.
11. In the juvenile justice system, for example, recent developmentally based reforms
have effectively reduced recidivism and are cost-effective. See infra Section II.A. See generally
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 181–222. Traditional Progressives often ignored the public interest in crime protection, with devastating consequences when apparent conflicts arose.
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 84–88; infra Section I.B.1. As we discuss throughout
the Article, sometimes social welfare concerns drive legal reform and other times a concern for
social welfare is implicit in the reasoning.
Social welfare in this article is calculated by weighing the costs of a policy or doctrine to
society against its benefits to society. This article describes doctrines and policies as advancing
social welfare when the benefits to society of a given doctrine or policy exceed the costs. Benefits vary in different contexts. In justice policy, for example, social welfare is advanced when
recidivism is reduced through cost-effective programs. See infra text accompanying notes 149–
150. In family intervention, social welfare is advanced when children develop healthily and
become productive adults through cost-effective interventions. See infra text accompanying
notes 256–260. Costs generally include financial costs and other harms incurred by the regulation. See infra note 387 and accompanying text (describing the social costs of withholding contraception from sexually active teens).
12. The best-interest standard is applied, inter alia, in child custody disputes. See Robert
H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226 (describing the best-interest standard and its indeterminacy).
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framework may result in a decision in an individual case that is contrary to
the child’s interest. 13
The elements of the Child Wellbeing framework—reliance on research,
recognition of social welfare benefits, and acknowledgment of systemic racism—are clearest in sweeping twenty-first-century juvenile justice reforms. 14
Rejecting the punitive reforms of the 1990s, which largely targeted youth of
color, lawmakers have acted to promote adolescent wellbeing, drawing on
developmental knowledge and focusing on the social welfare benefits of reducing recidivism and helping delinquent teenagers transition to productive
adulthood. With these goals in mind, lawmakers have closed institutional
facilities and expanded community-based programs tailored to the needs of
young offenders. Across the political spectrum, supporters have endorsed
these changes as cost-effective policies that serve the interests of both young
offenders and society. 15 The reforms are far from complete and have not
eradicated racial disparities, to be sure, but lawmakers have begun to recognize the harms of the system and the ways in which it disproportionately
impacts youth of color. 16
Identifying and crystallizing the core components of this framework
makes clear that it also undergirds other aspects of the regulation of children; 17 indeed, the central aim of this Article is to identify these common
themes across domains of legal regulation. The Child Wellbeing framework
is apparent, for example, in more nascent systemic reforms that expand the
obligation of the state to support parents in raising children to productive
adulthood. 18 These reforms reflect an understanding that research-driven
policies, such as universal prekindergarten, not only benefit children but also
promote social welfare. 19 And the framework is evident in a growing awareness that decisions about state intervention in families often are tainted by

13. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the rules governing third-party contact
with children and explaining that a legal rule deferring to parental decisionmaking advances
child wellbeing in the typical case and thus is consistent with the Child Wellbeing framework
even though this rule may, in some instances, result in a parental decision that is not in a particular child’s best interest).
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 183–184.
16. See infra Section II.A.2.
17. This Article focuses primarily on the traditional components of the legal regulation
of children: juvenile justice and child welfare regulation, parents’ rights, and children’s rights;
it also touches on policies of state support for families. Legal regulation of children could be
defined far more broadly to include almost every aspect of law and policy that has any impact
on children. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS 58–68 (2014) (defining family law broadly to include not only the traditional
areas but also criminal law, housing law, employment law, zoning law, etc.). In light of the ambitious scope of this Article, we cabin our analysis to the identified topics.
18. See infra Section II.B.1.
19. See infra Section II.B.1.
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racial and other biases. 20 The framework thus provides a contemporary rationale for state action under its parens patriae and police power authority.
At a structural level, the Child Wellbeing framework sheds light on the
current allocation of decisionmaking authority over children. Instead of a
zero-sum conception, with state authority, parents’ rights, and children’s
rights pitted against one another, the legal regulation of children is grounded
in the overarching goal of promoting child wellbeing, which knits together
the interests of parents, children, and the state. Understood this way, the regime of strong parental rights and the opaque pattern of children’s rights can
be unified and rationalized. In both domains, the law generally promotes
child wellbeing, is increasingly informed by developmental research, and
usually enhances social welfare. 21 Parental rights also serve a particularly important protective function for families of color and low-income families,
who have been the focus of zealous state intervention. 22
The approach we offer thus elevates the promotion of child wellbeing as
the key justification for parental rights—a rationale that is too often ignored
by children’s rights advocates. 23 Extensive research establishes that the stability of the parent-child relationship is essential to healthy child development,
and restricting the state’s authority to intervene in families promotes the
constancy of this core relationship. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and the modern rationale for parental rights is self-limiting, providing
a sounder basis for restricting parental authority than the Progressive Era
approach: in a regime in which parental rights are justified as protecting
child wellbeing, parents are not free to inflict serious harm on their children,
even on the basis of religious beliefs. 24
The Child Wellbeing framework also provides a logic for laws granting
some rights to young persons and withholding other rights. 25 Children, and
particularly adolescents, have an emerging interest in exercising agency as
they prepare for adult roles, so long as their choices do not threaten harm to
themselves or others. 26 First Amendment speech rights in school, for example, allow students to prepare for citizenship. 27 More urgently, withholding
rights sometimes threatens serious harm as individuals mature. For example,
denying young people the right to make decisions about contraception and
20. See infra Section II.B.2.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 88–91.
23. See infra Section III.A; see also infra notes 236–237, 241–242 and accompanying text
(explaining that advocates and scholars have long argued that parental rights can promote
child wellbeing, but further showing that children’s rights advocates often dismiss this rationale).
24. See infra Section III.B (discussing corporal punishment, third-party contact with
children, medical decisionmaking, and homeschooling).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89–90
(1982) (describing adolescence as a “learner’s permit”).
27. See infra Section IV.B.1.b.
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substance abuse treatment can directly harm minors’ wellbeing; conferring
these rights allays these harms. 28 Consistent with the logic of the Child Wellbeing framework, lawmakers increasingly rely on developmental and other
research when deciding which rights and privileges to extend or withhold,
distinctions that often serve to promote social welfare. 29 The recognition of
the potential for racial bias generally plays a muted role in the pattern of
granting and withholding of rights, but some rights, such as procedural protections in the justice system, are understood to particularly benefit youth of
color, who are disproportionately represented in the system. 30
In addition to elucidating current legal regulation, 31 our framework is
more normatively appealing than either the dyadic approach of the Progressive Era or the approach growing out of the 1960s, which tended to place
parents, children, and the state in competition. The framework clarifies the
core principle of legal regulation—promoting child wellbeing. The framework reflects the essential components of child and adolescent development,
such as the importance of a strong, stable relationship between a parent and
child. 32 The framework is sturdier and more comprehensive than the alternatives because it relies on a clear evidence base and accounts for social welfare interests. And the framework elevates the goal of promoting racial
justice as essential to a legitimate and just scheme of regulation.
Further, the Child Wellbeing framework guides law reform by highlighting areas that have yet to conform to this contemporary approach and offering direction for change. In particular, we are far from realizing the goal of
eradicating racial disparities in the juvenile justice and child welfare systems,
and lawmakers have focused little on how to address the structural inequalities that influence child outcomes. 33 Our framework recognizes that these
aspirations must be front and center. The child welfare system remains stubbornly problematic in other ways, continuing to focus on crisis intervention,
with little benefit for either children or society. 34 Our approach underscores
these deficiencies and identifies a path forward. The framework also points

28. Access to particular medical treatments under minors’ consent statutes and to procedural protections in delinquency proceedings are in this category. See infra Sections IV.A.1,
IV.B.1.a.ii, IV.B.1.a.iii, IV.B.1.c.
29. See infra Section IV.A.3.
30. See infra Section IV.A.4.
31. As we elaborate throughout the Article, in the domains of parental rights and children’s rights, lawmakers often do not explicitly invoke the rationales we articulate. Rather, our
claim is that the framework is implicit in modern doctrine and policy and that it provides a
more normatively appealing explanation for the current allocation of authority.
32. As we elaborate in Part V, we recognize that contested values underlie many aspects
of the legal regulation of children. In general, however, the values on which the framework
rests are widely endorsed and uncontroversial, such as the reduction of juvenile recidivism and
promotion of children’s physical health. See infra text accompanying notes 433–440.
33. See NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF
COLOR 9–50 (2018) (describing this failure).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 85–99.
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to areas of doctrine that potentially thwart child wellbeing, such as the limited regulation of homeschooling in many states. 35 The framework by no
means defines or informs all legal doctrines affecting children, 36 but it rationalizes much of contemporary law, identifies those areas in need of reform, and offers a blueprint for change.
The framework we propose grows out of the American Law Institute’s
new Restatement of Children and the Law, on which we are Reporters, 37 but
it does not simply recapitulate that project. Like a good Restatement, this Article clarifies an evolving area of law. 38 But, as we have emphasized, this Article also has normative ambition; and this ambition is beyond the appropriate
aims of a Restatement.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by sketching key developments that have complicated and destabilized the Progressive Era
framework of legal regulation of children. Part II describes the Child Wellbeing framework—a research-grounded understanding of child wellbeing motivated by the insight that advancing child wellbeing generally promotes
social welfare and that a just system of legal regulation must address racial
and class bias. This Part shows how the framework is embodied in recent reforms to the juvenile justice system and nascent efforts to support families; it
also contends that the child welfare system largely has not embraced the
framework. Parts III and IV demonstrate that the framework has both explanatory and normative power in the domains of parental rights and children’s rights. Taken together, then, Parts II, III, and IV establish that the
Child Wellbeing framework is reflected across multiple domains of legal
regulation of children. In Part V we anticipate and address several criticisms.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA FRAMEWORK

In a departure from the common law rule of near complete parental authority, the state began to play a more active role during the Progressive Era,
35. Infra text accompanying note 325.
36. See infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.4 (describing exceptions to the framework: some state
rules governing third-party contacts with children and homeschooling regulation in many
states); infra Part V (describing the limits of the framework).
37. Children and the Law, ALI ADVISER, http://www.thealiadviser.org/children-law/
[https://perma.cc/K473-P9L8] (describing the Restatement and listing the reporters, who include Elizabeth Scott, Chief Reporter, and Richard Bonnie, Emily Buss, Clare Huntington,
Solangel Maldonado, and David Meyer, Associate Reporters). This Article particularly has
drawn on the Restatement work of Solangel Maldonado, who drafted the sections on children’s
contact with third parties, including de facto parents, and medical decisionmaking, see infra
text accompanying notes 288–289, 292, 300, 306, 311–312, 314, and Emily Buss, who drafted
the sections on students’ free speech rights, see infra Section IV.B.1.b.
38. The goal of a Restatement, in part, is to provide coherence both by “restating” the
law with clarity and by identifying and amplifying underlying themes and emerging reform
trends. See How ALI Works, ALI ADVISER, http://www.thealiadviser.org/how-ali-works/
[https://perma.cc/C8F9-XKQL]. In contrast to some legal scholarship, Restatements aim to
guide judges on the state and direction of legal doctrine; they are not intended to represent the
aspirations of legal scholars. See id.
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intervening in family life to promote children’s welfare. This led to a dyadic
model of regulation, under which parents retained much of their traditional
authority but the state stepped in when perceived parental failures threatened harm to children. The Progressive state also preempted parental authority generally through statutes mandating school attendance and
otherwise limiting parental authority.
This dyadic framework persisted until the second half of the twentieth
century, when several developments significantly complicated and destabilized the approach. First, the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice came
close to collapse. Young offenders, usually youth of color, were condemned
as “superpredators” in the 1980s and 1990s and were subject to harsh punishment. Second, lawmakers began to recognize children as legal persons
and rights-holders, at least in some circumstances, transforming a dyadic
model of regulation into one in which the parents, children, and the state
competed for control over children’s lives. Finally, scholars and advocates
launched a broad attack on parental rights as inconsistent with child wellbeing. This Part traces this historical arc, demonstrating that the legal regulation of children has become extremely complex and seemingly less comprecomprehensible.
A. The Rise of Progressive Paternalism
Before the Progressive Era, the state’s involvement in family life was limited. 39 The rights of nineteenth-century parents, particularly fathers, over
their children were often described as property-like, 40 and for most white
families, the description was apt. 41 Parental authority was not absolute, but
parents determined almost every aspect of their children’s lives. Parents decided whether and to what extent their children were educated and when
children should begin to contribute to family income. 42 They also had broad

39. For a description of the state’s limited role, which dates to the colonial period, as
well as a description of the few exceptions, see 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 27–29 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970). See also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 995, 1036–37 (1992). But see The Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (D. Me. 1838) (No.
4542) (removing child from parental custody and noting “[if the child] cannot be safely left in
[the father’s] custody . . . the protecting justice of the county will interpose and deprive” the
father of custody).
40. See Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1041–50.
41. Not all parents received robust protection. Enslaved parents had no parental rights,
and in the first half of the nineteenth century, the state occasionally removed poor white children and freed Black children from their homes and either auctioned them off as involuntary
apprentices or placed them in children’s institutions. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 263–68 (1985); Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820–1935, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 6–19 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
42. Further, children’s income belonged to parents. E.g., Woodhouse, supra note 39, at
1063–65.
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authority to discipline their children and to guide their religious upbringing. 43
Progressive reformers aimed to change this state of affairs and, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, achieved a remarkable transformation in the state’s relationship to children and families. In a brief twenty-year period beginning in 1899, almost every state established a juvenile
court with jurisdiction over maltreatment of children, status offenses, and
juvenile delinquency cases. 44 Reformers zealously invoked the state’s authority as parens patriae to fashion a new government role as protector of
children from parental abuse and neglect and from the consequences of their
own wayward behavior. 45 Most youths charged with crimes were removed
from the criminal justice system and dealt with in this new court with the
goal of rehabilitation rather than punishment. Juvenile court judges, popularizers of the movement, cast themselves as benign parents whose only concern was to ensure that children received the care and guidance they
needed. 46 On the legislative front, states across the country enacted compulsory school attendance and child labor laws, which, in tandem, went far to
guarantee that children received a basic education, while preempting parents’ authority to send them to work in factories. 47
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, states also began to pass laws
prohibiting child abuse, and by the end of that century, reformers founded
private child-protection societies that began to work in tandem with the
newly created juvenile courts. 48 By the early decades of the twentieth centu-

43. See, e.g., id. at 1014; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2153–55 (1996) (describing the “rule of thumb,” under which
a man might discipline his wife and children with a switch as long as it was no thicker than his
thumb).
44. See, e.g., David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 41, at 42, 67. Historically, juvenile courts did not differentiate among types of cases
and instead the state invoked its parens patriae authority to exercise jurisdiction over children
who had been abused and neglected, who had committed crimes, and who engaged in noncriminal but undesirable behavior, such as running away from home or drinking alcohol. This
latter group of cases came to be known as status offenses—conduct that was unlawful only because of the child’s age. See, e.g., id. at 42, 46–50.
45. As one Progressive reformer put it, “the child of proper age to be under jurisdiction
of the juvenile court is encircled by the arm of the state, which, as a sheltering, wise parent, assumes guardianship and has power to shield the child from the rigors of common law and
from . . . [the] depravity of adults.” MIRIAM VAN WATERS, YOUTH IN CONFLICT 9 (1925).
46. See BEN B. LINDSEY & RUBE BOROUGH, THE DANGEROUS LIFE (photo. reprt. 1974)
(1931); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909) (arguing that
when a child has committed the crime, the question is not guilt or innocence but rather
“[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career”).
47. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 17, 32–37 (5th ed.
2014).
48. For a description of this nineteenth-century approach to child welfare and its extensive reach into the lives of low-income and particularly immigrant families, see LINDA
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ry, a child-protection network had been constructed that included public
and private agencies, juvenile courts, and government probation officers. 49
In truth, although the Progressive reformers accomplished important
institutional changes, their goals for protecting children were limited. Reformers aimed their reforms primarily at poor and immigrant children,
whose behavior, or that of their parents, the reformers perceived as evidence
that parents were failing to raise their children to be law-abiding American
citizens. 50 To be sure, any child could be charged with an offense in juvenile
court, and abusive middle-class parents could be subject to juvenile court
supervision. Further, school attendance and child labor laws categorically
preempted parental authority. But supervision of middle-class families and
restriction of parental rights generally were not key to the Progressive agenda, and the impact of school attendance and child labor laws fell largely on
working-class families. 51
The upshot is that although Progressive Era reforms resulted in expanded state authority over families, parental rights continued to be robust in the
twentieth century. 52 In the 1920s, the Supreme Court issued two iconic opinions clarifying that parents’ authority to make decisions about their chil-

GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE:
BOSTON 1880-1960, at 8, 14–15 (1988), and ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT 69–87 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2004) (1987). For a description emphasizing the complexities of the child-protection movement, explaining that it cannot be told as a simple story
of either benevolence or social control, and neither is it a uniform story of external control of
families (because family members sometimes sought out state intervention), see Michael
Grossberg, “A Protected Childhood”: The Emergence of Child Protection in America, in
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 213 (Wendy Gamber et al. eds.,
2003).
49. See Tanenhaus, supra note 44, at 46–50 (describing the blurred lines between delinquency, status-offense, and child abuse and neglect cases in the juvenile court).
50. Historians propose that although Progressives generally acted on benign motivations, the movement was in part an effort to retain social control over working-class and immigrant families, whose numbers were rapidly expanding. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xx–xxii, xxxi (Rutgers Univ. Press, Expanded 40th
Anniversary ed., 2009) (1969). Progressives did not focus their efforts on Black families, see
ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK
CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 34–38, 76–80 (1972), at least in part because during the early Progressive Era, reformers were predominantly in the North and the migration of
Blacks from the South to the cities of the North did not begin until the late 1910s, see ISABEL
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS 8–15 (2010). A more complex account of the role
of class is presented by Mary Odem. See infra note 52.
51. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 32. Middle-class children were already attending
school and not working in factories. For more information on this Common School Movement, see id. at 32–37; Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1062–63.
52. Indeed, some Progressive reforms actually aimed to reinforce parental control over
their children. Mary Odem has argued that Progressive reformers had parental support in
seeking to control teenage girls’ sexual activity by bringing it within the juvenile court’s delinquency jurisdiction. MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885-1920 (1995).
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dren’s education was constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment; the opinions underscored that the new muscular role of the
state in children’s lives had not greatly diminished parental authority, at least
for most parents. 53 The Court rationalized the right of parents to raise their
children in terms of individual liberty—the freedom of citizens (i.e., parents)
from excessive state intrusion in their private lives. 54 Although the opinions
did not explicitly endorse the position that parents “owned” their children,
scholars have offered substantial evidence that this assumption shaped the
justices’ views. 55 The Court did not consider the implication for children’s
welfare of strong parental rights protection. Parental rights were not absolute, of course, and as the Court noted, these rights were joined with the responsibility of parents to care for their children and to raise them to
adulthood. 56 State authority to intervene in families was legitimately invoked
if and when parents failed to fulfill their obligations or their conduct harmed
children. 57
In the wake of the newly active role of the state in family life in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a framework of regulation was established that persisted for decades. In this framework, authority over children resided either in their parents, grounded in parents’ constitutionally
protected liberty interest, or in the state, acting as parens patriae to protect
individual children or under its police power authority to promote children’s
(and society’s) interest generally. 58 The interests of parents and the state were
understood to conflict; disputes were zero-sum, centering on whether the
state, in seeking to override parental authority on a particular issue, exces-

53. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923). Not surprisingly, the Court’s announcement that parental rights deserve special
protection came in response to Progressive reforms; it would have been unnecessary in an earlier era. The Oregon and Nebraska statutes challenged in Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, and Meyer, 262
U.S. 390, expanded state authority to require compulsory school attendance—which the plaintiffs did not challenge.
54. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399
(“Without doubt, [the liberty interest guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes . . . the right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1041–50.
56. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”).
57. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (holding that parents’ authority to choose their child’s religious upbringing does not include the “liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death”).
58. See id.; Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1038 (“Influential courts in the mid-1800’s,
however, began to articulate a theory that parental control was not an absolute power conferred by God, but a civic duty conferred and regulated by the state, in the interests of children
and of the public.”).
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sively burdened parental authority in light of the state’s purpose. 59 In making
this determination, courts balanced the importance of the state’s interest in
protecting children from harm and promoting child wellbeing against the
extent of the intrusion on parental rights. 60
In this dyadic framework of regulation, the interests of children were assumed to be furthered either by parents or the state; children themselves
were not thought to have independent interests. This assumption, which was
relatively uncontroversial for decades, reflected a conventional understanding of childhood as a period of innocence, vulnerability, and dependence, in
which immature individuals are incapable of making self-interested decisions. 61 This conception applied to toddlers and teenagers alike, and parental
or state control was presumed appropriate for all legal minors. The Progressives insisted that older youths, like young children, deserved the state’s benign concern. 62 In this scheme, it followed that children were entitled to
parental care and support and were not held to adult standards of accountability—and also were not granted adult rights and privileges. 63
This conception of childhood fit comfortably for younger children, and,
in some legal contexts, for adolescents as well. Many legal protections and
restrictions directed at minors continued to be uncontroversial—the right to
parents’ financial support, protection from abuse and neglect, and restrictions on child labor, for example. But in some areas, the fit was awkward. Progressive reformers insisted that youths charged with criminal
violations were innocent children who bore no responsibility for their offenses and that the state’s only interest in a delinquency proceeding was to
further the youth’s best interests by providing rehabilitation. Judge Ben
Lindsay, an early leader of the juvenile court movement, made the point in
language jarring to modern ears: “[O]ur laws against crime were as inapplicable to children as they would be to idiots.” 64 This characterization of delinquent teenagers as children served the political purposes of juvenile-court
proponents aiming for transformative institutional change in the sanctioning of young offenders, 65 but ultimately, as we discuss in the next section, it

ty).

59.

Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–66 (describing the state as competing with parental authori-

60. See id.
61. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547,
550–51 (2000).
62. This approach advanced the Progressive objective of expanding the age boundary of
childhood. Thus, reformers evoked images of children working under horrendous conditions
in factories to generate support for child labor and school attendance laws. SCOTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 62–65.
63. Id. at 64–65. An exception to this was criminal responsibility; juveniles could be
punished as adults for serious crimes in every state. See id. at 84–85.
64. BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O’HIGGINS, THE BEAST 133 (Doubleday, Page & Co.
1910) (1909).
65. See VAN WATERS, supra note 45; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 85.
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contributed to the near collapse of the rehabilitative framework of juvenile
justice.
B. The Framework Under Pressure
The Progressive project made far-reaching changes to the regulation of
children. By the 1920s, the reformers firmly established an institutional
model that assured an active role for the state in family life that endures to
this day. But despite laudable ambitions, this approach ultimately was not
successful. Reformers lacked an understanding of how to achieve the goal of
promoting child wellbeing, and both the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice and the “child saving” approach that motivated the child welfare system
were ultimately revealed to be deeply flawed.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Progressive era’s simple dyadic framework
of regulation was challenged from several directions. First, the well-defined
role for the state proposed by the Progressives functioned far less successfully than the optimistic early reformers envisioned. Critics on the left and right
assailed the juvenile justice system. This led to fundamental reforms, including procedural due process rights for juveniles in delinquency proceedings,
but also, subsequently, to sweeping punitive changes in the 1980s and 1990s.
In both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems, critics challenged the
harmful impact of state intervention on families and children of color. Second, courts began recognizing children as rights-bearing persons with autonomy interests independent of their parents and the state. Finally,
advocates and scholars challenged parental authority, arguing that strong parental rights are inimical to the emerging personhood of children and to
child wellbeing. In combination, these legal developments have undermined
the relatively simple Progressive Era framework of family regulation.
1.

Challenging the Progressive Era Model of Juvenile Justice

The Progressive Era model of juvenile justice began to decline in the
mid-twentieth century, and beginning in 1967, the Supreme Court responded by extending procedural protections to youths facing delinquency adjudication. In several opinions, the Court identified and sought to remedy what
it deemed a serious defect in the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice. 66
The Progressive reformers who established the juvenile court system had insisted that delinquency proceedings were not adversarial in nature because
the state’s only purpose in responding to youth crime was to act in the
child’s interest; therefore, young offenders had no need for defense counsel
or for other protections enjoyed by criminal defendants. 67 This was always a
shaky premise. Young offenders cause social harm through their conduct;
66. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. See generally LINDSEY & O’HIGGINS, supra note 64 (articulating the rehabilitative
model of juvenile justice).
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thus, the state’s interest is not always aligned with that of delinquent youths.
Instead, the state’s interest inherently includes public safety—a reality that is
well understood in the adult criminal justice system. 68 By the 1960s, liberal
activists vigorously challenged the fairness of informal juvenile delinquency
proceedings, arguing that the interests of many youths, and particularly
youth of color, were harmed by a system purportedly committed to their
welfare. 69 Despite the insistence that the only purpose of delinquency proceedings was rehabilitation, many youths were sent to secure facilities more
like prisons than treatment programs. 70
In In re Gault in 1967, the Court acknowledged that youths in delinquency proceedings had “the worst of both worlds,” receiving neither the
treatment promised under the rehabilitative model, nor the procedural protections that adult defendants enjoy. 71 In Gault and subsequent opinions,
juveniles were accorded the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses,
the right to receive notice of charges, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and other due process protections. 72 The Court insisted that the juvenile
court could continue in its purpose of serving the interests of delinquent
youths but must provide them with procedural rights as defensive tools
against a state that, at best, had mixed goals in responding to youth crime.
The challenge from the right, which reached full force in the late 1980s
and 1990s, posed a far more serious threat to the rehabilitative model than
did the earlier wave of procedural reforms. Conservatives attacked the rehabilitative model itself and its core premise that promoting the interests of delinquent youths was the juvenile court’s sole aim. These critics argued that
the system coddled young offenders, failing in its only legitimate goals of
punishing criminals and protecting the public. 73 An increase in violent youth
crime triggered a wave of public fear and hostility toward young offenders.
What ensued can fairly be described as a moral panic, in which politicians, the media, and the public joined in attacking a system that was perceived to be far too lenient and insufficiently concerned about public
safety. 74 A new group of reformers, eager for radical change, embraced the

68. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 91–92.
69. See id. at 89–91; Kristen Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 530
(2004).
70. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 89–91.
71. 387 U.S. at 18 n.23 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
72. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
73. See Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away With Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System
Needs an Overhaul, POL’Y REV., Fall 1985, at 65; Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdown on Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at A12 (quoting a Maryland legislator to have said that, “[i]f they want to do adult-type crimes, we’re going to treat
them like adults”); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 94–95 & nn. 26–27 (describing
this view).
74. One 1989 study found that 70 percent of those questioned believed leniency in the
juvenile system was a contributing factor to violent youth crime. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
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mantra “adult time for adult crime.” 75 In response, many state legislatures
enacted laws expanding the category of youths eligible for adult prosecution
and punishment. 76 In the juvenile system, the use of institutional placement
increased dramatically. 77 The core premise of the Progressive era system—
that young offenders were children and not criminals, and that they should
be treated in a separate justice system tailored to their needs—seemed to be
forgotten.
Many factors contributed to this punitive legal response. Juvenile recidivism rates generally were high, 78 providing strong evidence that the system
was failing in its promise of rehabilitation. This opened the door to critics
who argued that the naïve premise at the heart of the rehabilitative model
had resulted in a system that failed to recognize or accommodate society’s
interest in public safety and crime prevention. 79 Moreover, when these
youths (especially older teens) caused serious harm, the narrative of wayward children in need of guidance rang hollow, contributing to widespread
disparagement of the system. To be sure, the state’s interest included reforming young offenders so that they might become productive adults, and if correctional interventions had been effective, dissatisfaction likely would have
been muted. But because the lenient approach often was not effective, the
failure to acknowledge society’s interest in public safety corroded confidence. 80

SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS — 1990, at 157 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy
J. Flanagan eds., 1991); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future
of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 537–41 (2013) (discussing moral panic surrounding juvenile crime).
75. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 9.
76. During the three-year period between 1992 and 1995, eleven states lowered the age
for transfer, and ten states added crimes to judicial waiver statutes. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3–8 (1996); see also SCOTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 96–99 & nn.33–50.
77. See Bradford Smith, Children in Custody: 20-Year Trends in Juvenile Detention, Correctional, and Shelter Facilities, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 526, 533 (1998) (documenting a 45 percent increase in juvenile detention from 1975 to 1995).
78. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR
TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 10–13 (2009),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/charting-a-newcourse-a-blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-new-york-state/legacy_downloads
/Charting-a-new-course-A-blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-New-York-State
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z62G-DXFD] (describing the high recidivism rate in New York as one
of the factors influencing the decision to move away from juvenile detention and instead invest
in more effective and cost-efficient community-based programs).
79. See, e.g., New Juvenile Code Would Come Down Hard on Teens, LUDINGTON DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 13, 1995, at 1 (quoting Thomas Ginster, Michigan Governor John Engler’s criminal
justice advisor, suggesting that the current juvenile justice system was designed “for kids stealing hubcaps in the ’50s, not for some of the things we see today”).
80. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17–23 (1967).
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Racial bias and fears also played a key role in the moral panic surrounding youth crime—and in the legal reforms. By the 1990s, the image of wayward children had been supplanted by frightening depictions of young
“superpredators” prowling inner-city streets in gangs, bent on murder and
mayhem. 81 These racialized images suggest a particularly ugly aspect of the
attitudes fueling the moral panic surrounding youth crime. The push for punitive reforms was infused with racist assumptions about the identity of the
youths threatening society. 82 Research indicated that the public and legal actors perceived youth of color as more mature, threatening, and deserving of
harsh punishment than their white counterparts. 83 In this racialized environment, politicians and the public viewed teenagers involved in crime not
as children but as criminals, who should be punished as such. 84
The second challenge to the Progressive rationale for state intervention
arose in the child welfare system. In that context, the goal of protecting children from harm has been constant since the Progressive Era, but the state
generally has been ineffective in attaining this goal, and intervention has focused disproportionately on low-income families of color. Parental abuse
and neglect pose significant dangers to children, 85 but it is far from clear that
the child welfare system has improved outcomes, 86 particularly for the
437,000 children in foster care. 87 Consistent with its historic practice of fo-

81. See John DiLulio, The Coming of the Super—Predators, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27,
1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-thesuper-predators [https://perma.cc/MW2D-PHSR].
82. See id. (describing inner-city youth in threatening terms); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV.
379, 410 (2017) (describing the extent to which imagery and fear of youth crime were racialized). Ads aimed at generating public support for a California referendum to increase the category of youths eligible for transfer to criminal court were criticized as racist. SCOTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 102–108.
83. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes
About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 491–502 (2004).
84. The status-offense system faced similar pressures to the juvenile justice system in the
1980s and 1990s. See Lee Teitelbaum, Status Offenses and Status Offenders, in A CENTURY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 159, 159–72.
85. Preventing Child Abuse & Neglect, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/consequences.html
[https://
perma.cc/BRU7-A63L].
86. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES i–iii (2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T899-UA26]; Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Causal Effects of Foster Care: An InstrumentalVariables Approach, 35 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1143 (2013). A recent case underscores
this ongoing problem. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 243, 271–88 (5th
Cir. 2018) (upholding much of trial court’s determination that Texas had violated the constitutional rights of the approximately 12,000 children in foster care, including by exposing them to
abuse and neglect while in care; further, upholding much of a sweeping remedial order to address the systemic problems).
87. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. 26, THE
AFCARS REPORT 1 (2019), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport26.pdf
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cusing on low-income immigrant families, 88 Black, Native American, and
Native Alaskan families are overrepresented in the child welfare system today, and these children have worse outcomes once they are removed from
their homes. 89 The causes of the disproportionality and disparate outcomes
are disputed, 90 and numerous factors likely play a role, 91 but this concern has
led critics to challenge the legitimacy and fairness of state regulation in this
realm. 92
The child welfare system thus remains stubbornly problematic and, as
detailed in Part II, currently does not embody the Child Wellbeing framework. An emerging consensus holds that the failures are due in large part to
the system’s focus on crisis intervention rather than on broad-based prevention and family support. 93 This reactive approach has marked the modern
[https://perma.cc/B89K-VCEJ]; CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 18 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb
/cm2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ6T-XC3A].
88. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
89. For an overview of the racial disproportionalities in the child welfare system, see
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD
WELFARE 3–5 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/racial_disproportionality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZ3U-28K4], which documents the racial disproportionality index (RDI)
for Black children as 1.8 and Native American and Native Alaskan children as 2.8, as compared
with 0.9 for Latino children, 0.8 for white children, and 0.1 for Asian children, and describes a
reduction in the RDI for Black children, “from 2.5 in 2000 to 1.8 in 2014,” but an increase for
Native American and Native Alaskan children, “from 1.5 in 2000 to 2.7 in 2014.” For an overview of the racial disparities in the child welfare system, see id., which shows that Native American and Native Alaskan children, as well as Black children, exit foster care and are adopted at
lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups but further shows that this RDI is somewhat
lower than the foster-care-entry RDI.
90. See id. at 5–6 (describing the competing accounts and the evidence for each).
91. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY & THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
DISPARITIES AND DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH
(2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-DisparitiesAndDisproportionalityInChild
Welfare-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M89-3U7L]; ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., SUPPLEMENTARY
ANALYSES OF RACE DIFFERENCES IN CHILD MALTREATMENT RATES IN THE NIS-4 (2010).
Although most low-income parents do not abuse or neglect their children, there is substantial evidence that abuse and, especially, neglect are strongly correlated with poverty.
ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2010)
(reporting that “[c]hildren in low socioeconomic status households . . . [are] more than 3 times
as likely to be abused and about 7 times as likely to be neglected” as children in other socioeconomic brackets).
92. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 267–
76 (2002). But see Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 899–923 (2009) (arguing that
racial disproportionality for Black children reflects the underlying rate of child maltreatment of
Black children, not racial bias, and thus the solution is to address the risk factors present in
Black families rather than the child welfare system).
93. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 185 (2005);
Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1489–
505 (2007).
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child welfare system since Congress first considered federal funding in the
early 1970s. 94 Cognizant of the growing unpopularity of anti-poverty programs, Congressional supporters of a strong federal role strategically and effectively framed child maltreatment as a problem of bad parenting,
obscuring the strong correlation between poverty and child maltreatment. 95
Substantial federal funding followed, 96 but the problematic framing became
embedded and is still firmly in place. 97 Instead of preventive efforts to address poverty and promote family functioning, most state intervention occurs only when maltreatment is suspected—responding with either late-inthe-day family preservation services or the removal of children, at substantial
cost to taxpayers, child wellbeing, and family autonomy. 98 This orientation
has persisted across multiple policy swings; in each iteration, federal and
state policies dealing with child maltreatment have emphasized crisis intervention, while subordinating proactive strategies aimed at supporting families in need. 99 In short, the Progressivist rationale for state intervention—
protecting children from harm—has led to policies that most observers agree
have not promoted child wellbeing.
2.

Children’s Rights: Conceiving of Children as Legal Persons

In the 1960s and 1970s, a children’s rights movement emerged, inspired
in part by the civil rights movement. 100 Advocates began to argue for recognition of children as rights-bearing persons, with independent legal interests
not represented by their parents or the state. 101 In re Gault, the landmark
94. This approach has even deeper roots, beginning with the Progressive Era childsavers. See supra note 48.
95. See supra note 91 (describing the correlation between socioeconomic status and
child maltreatment); see also BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE:
POLITICAL AGENDA SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 15 (1984).
96. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93–247, § 5, 88 Stat. 4, 7
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5104 (2012)).
97. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 93, at 184–85.
98. See Emily Buss, Parents’ Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 440
(1996); Clare Huntington, The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no.1, 2014, at 221, 231–48.
99. See Huntington, supra note 98, at 226–29, 231–34 (describing these swings, from the
1970s to the mid-1990s, with some statutory schemes prioritizing family preservation and others child permanency, but arguing that neither approach is a meaningful attempt to prevent
child abuse and neglect and both reflect a crisis orientation). Most recently, as the opioid crisis
created another influx of foster children, Congress adopted legislation again prioritizing family
preservation and the provision of mental health and drug treatment services for parents. See
Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018).
100. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 606–07.
101. E.g., Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 343, 356 (1972). This Article focuses on children’s rights under American law, but the
movement has been global, with many other countries embracing children’s rights—both autonomy rights and affirmative rights to state support—to a far greater degree than the United
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1967 Supreme Court opinion granting procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings, 102 heralded the movement. After Gault, the Court issued a series of opinions granting constitutional rights to public school
students. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
the Court proclaimed that students do not “shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” in upholding the right of
students to engage in silent, symbolic protest against the Vietnam War as an
exercise of free expression. 103 Although the Court qualified this pronouncement in later opinions, restricting certain forms of student speech in some
contexts where the speech is found to undermine important educational
purposes, 104 pure political expression in public schools continues to receive
substantial protection. 105 Students also enjoy a right of religious exercise in
school, generally protected to the extent that other expression is protected,
and modest due process protection when facing school discipline. 106
Mature minors today also have the right to consent independently to a
range of medical treatments. The mature minor doctrine authorizes minors
States, which is the only country not to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child. See G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
102. 387 U.S. 1, 30–31, 41 (1967).
103. 393 U.S. 503, 506, 514 (1969).
104. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (“[S]chools [may] restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988) (holding that educators may exercise editorial control
over the style and content of a student newspaper “so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986) (holding that “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the
school’s basic educational mission” and distinguishing Tinker because the penalties were unrelated to a political viewpoint).
105. See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 322, 330 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that the First Amendment protected a student wearing a shirt that mocked President
George W. Bush and contained images of cocaine); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978
F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that students wearing “scab” buttons to support a teachers’ strike were engaging in protected speech). Some courts have allowed schools to regulate
speech if it is deemed offensive. See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 731–33 (Wis. 2001)
(holding that the content of a student’s story about the murder of their English teacher gave
the school sufficient reason to discipline the student).
106. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001); Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990). The Court granted other constitutional rights to
students, although in a limited form. Thus, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held that public
school students have a legitimate expectation of privacy against unreasonable searches by
school officials but concluded that this interest is more limited than that of citizens outside of
the school context. See 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985) (justifying school search based on reasonable suspicion that it would produce evidence of an infraction or crime by the student). The
Court also held that a student facing a suspension from school of ten or fewer days is entitled
to limited procedural due process protection, an easily satisfied requirement. See Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). As a matter of statutory law and school district policy, some
states and localities provide for more substantial procedural protections in the school disciplinary context than are required by Goss. See, e.g, RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW
§ 8.20 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
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to consent to routine, beneficial treatment, and under Minors’ Consent Statutes, teenagers have access to treatment for substance abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, and some reproductive health treatments. 107 But the most
radical departure from the law’s conventional view of childhood and of parental authority was the recognition by the Supreme Court that a mature
minor has a right of access to abortion without parental involvement or state
interference. 108 To be sure, minors’ reproductive rights are qualified as compared to those of adults. The state can require parental consent, but it must
provide an alternative means of access: a minor who chooses not to involve
her parents can demonstrate her maturity in a legal proceeding and can thus
legally consent to the procedure. 109 But as a consequence of the Supreme
Court’s abortion decisions, parents are disqualified from participating in, or
even knowing about, this decision unless their mature child chooses to inform them. 110
The granting of rights to children over the past half century has unsettled the early Progressive framework and raised many questions. First, it
made children more visible as legal persons, with interests not necessarily
aligned with those of their parents or served by the state’s paternalistic oversight. This complicated the dyadic framework of family regulation, introducing the child herself as a party whose autonomy interest and authority to
make some decisions was acknowledged. Indeed, children’s rights were understood conventionally as liberty interests that inevitably compete with parental and state authority. 111 On this view, children, like other groups who
have struggled for civil rights, represent a disadvantaged class of persons that
has been subject to wrongful subordination. 112 Some advocates and scholars
embrace this characterization and view the trend toward recognition of children’s rights as a battle against the authority of traditional entities with power over children’s lives. 113 To an extent, of course, this view of children’s
rights is correct. When the law recognizes a minor’s liberty interest—the

107. See infra Section IV.B.1.a.
108. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979); see also infra Section IV.B.1.a.
109. Baird, 443 U.S. at 643.
110. Id.
111. See Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond
the Supreme Court’s Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (1982) (“The claimed right of a child
to privacy in individual matters inevitably clashes with the longstanding parental right of authority in directing the child’s life.”)
112. See Foster & Freed, supra note 101, at 343, 356–57 (arguing that the rights of children are subject to “the same arguments that were advanced over the issues of slavery and the
emancipation of married women”).
113. See, e.g., Christopher D. Berk, Children, Development, and the Troubled Foundations
of Miller v. Alabama, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 752 (2019); Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1456–57 (2018); James G. Dwyer, Parents’
Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
1371, 1426–39 (1994); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection,
34 FAM. L.Q. 421 (2000); Keiter, supra note 111.

May 2020]

Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century

1393

right to make a reproductive health decision or engage in political speech,
for example—the control of her parents or the state over this decision is diminished.
Second, the logic by which lawmakers extend some rights and privileges
to minors and withhold others until adulthood seems quite opaque. Minors
enjoy the right to consent to some medical decisions, but other healthcare
decisions require parental consent. 114 Public school students are granted the
First Amendment right of free expression, but this right often is restricted
when school officials suggest the state’s educational purposes might be undermined. 115 And youths enjoy many procedural rights in the justice system
but sometimes are restricted in exercising those rights. 116 Also, adult privileges are extended to minors with minimum age requirements that sometimes seem puzzling. 117 Further, many adult rights and privileges are simply
off the table. Minors cannot execute a contract, lease an apartment, sign a
will, vote, or (in many states) marry. 118 Why are some rights conferred on
minors and others withheld? The law has not yet articulated a rationale to
guide the determination of when children will be recognized as rightsbearers and when they will continue to be subject to parental and state authority.
Third, granting legal rights eroded the conception of childhood as a
nearly monolithic category. Legal regulation is now tailored based on age
and maturity for some purposes, while for others, all minors continue to be
subject to uniform treatment. This points to a more complex understanding
of childhood itself as a legal construct, suggesting that the interests and status of adolescents sometimes differs from those of younger children. Rights
and privileges implicating an individual’s interest in self-determination usually apply formally or functionally only to adolescents, 119 but what determines when, during children’s minority, particular rights are conferred? And
even adolescents depend on their parents for support and care, require special state protections, and are not fully independent, responsible citizens.
Thus, although some advocates have favored categorical recognition of children as citizens entitled to the rights enjoyed by adults, 120 this move strikes
most observers as impractical. In short, there is considerable uncertainty
about the contours of legal childhood.
114. See infra Section IV.B.1.a.
115. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Section IV.B.1.c.
117. See infra Section IV.A.3.
118. See infra Section IV.B.2.
119. This is true of reproductive rights and rights to make other medical decisions, and,
in practice, it is also true of procedural rights in delinquency proceedings and even of free
speech rights in school, where litigation has involved almost exclusively middle- and highschool students. See infra text accompanying notes 381–383, 397.
120. E.g., JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18–19 (1974) (advocating for equal
legal treatment for children in all areas); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585, 1593–99 (1995).
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Finally, the absence of a clear principle for extending and withholding
rights opened the door to criticism. Conservative detractors of children’s
rights have disparaged the notion that the law deems minors to be mature
enough to make independent abortion decisions without informing their
parents while coddling them as children when they commit crimes. 121 These
critics, including Justice Scalia, have dismissed the law’s stance as illogical
and chastised child advocates as hypocrites, whose depiction of the attributes
of legal minors shifts to suit their political purposes. 122 To Scalia and others,
it made no sense to treat minors as adults in one context and as children in
need of protection in another.
3.

Parental Rights Under Siege

The recognition of children as legal persons has been an important catalyst for critical scrutiny of parental rights, adding further instability to the
regulatory framework of the late twentieth century. Some critics have argued
that the law’s excessive deference to parental authority is an outdated vestige
of an era when parents effectively owned their children. 123 On this view,
strong parental rights give parents a license to act in ways that further their
own interests and not those of their children. 124 Moreover, parental rights
continue to be grounded primarily in biology, adoption, or marriage, often
affording little protection to the relationships between children and adults
who do not fall into these categories but who nonetheless have a parent-child
relationship with the child. 125
A modern understanding of the family rejects the view of the legal family as a social entity in which members’ interests are aligned and represented
by parents. Instead, scholars often depict the contemporary family as a loose
association of self-interested individuals. 126 When the family is constructed
in this way, parental control and authority over children become problemat-

121. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and
Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester in Support of Petitioner at 15, Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1144) (arguing that parental involvement in decisionmaking on abortion is critical due, in part, to the Court’s comments as to
the susceptibility and impetuousness of adolescents in Roper). See generally Laurence Steinberg
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death
Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009).
122. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–21 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing fellow justices and the American Psychological Association for selective use of research in
opinions holding that minors were as capable as adults to make abortion decisions, but too
immature to be held fully responsible for a capital crime).
123. See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 113, at 1457–58; Dwyer, supra note 113, at
1373; Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1113–17.
124. Woodhouse, supra note 39, at 1114–15.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 139–141.
126. See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 22 (2011); William A. Galston, Liberal Virtues, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1277, 1282 (1988).
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ic. James Dwyer, a particularly vocal critic of parental rights, has questioned
why the subjugated legal status of children continues to be acceptable in a
country in which the idea of one person’s ownership of another should be
highly offensive. 127 Dwyer observes that outside of the parent-child relationship an individual is seldom subject categorically to the control of another
person; 128 for example, he notes that legal guardianship of an incapacitated
person is highly regulated and only permissible under narrow circumstances. 129
A recent critique by Anne Dailey and Laura Rosenbury also targets parental rights as a core element of legal regulation that privileges state and parental control over children. 130 On their view, this “authorities framework”
reduces the question of legal regulation to a battle between parents and the
state, with children’s interests portrayed simply as dependency and the attainment of autonomy. 131 Dailey and Rosenbury expand the range of children’s interests and propose a tripartite framework for legal regulation
focusing on relationships (between the child and a range of other persons),
responsibilities (of adults to provide for children and satisfy their needs), and
rights (of both children and parents, but mostly affirmative rights of children
to relationships, goods, and services). 132 Their approach de-emphasizes parental rights, except for very young children, and elevates children’s interests. 133
Some legal contexts have generated particular concern about parental
authority over their children’s lives. For example, parents have broad authority to make medical decisions for their children and the obligation to provide
necessary treatment. 134 But parents are protected when they decline to seek
medical treatment for religious reasons: in the 1970s, in response to a lobbying campaign by Christian Science groups, most states enacted religious accommodation statutes that protect parents from findings of medical neglect
when they decline medical treatment for their children on religious

127. See Dwyer, supra note 113, at 1373.
128. Id. at 1406.
129. Id. at 1416–17.
130. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 113, at 1470, 1506–07.
131. See id. at 1467–77.
132. See id. at 1506–36.
133. See id. at 1471–72, 1508–11 (arguing that parental rights are an important protection for the stability of the parent-child relationship during a child’s “early years,” but more
generally contending that parental rights “are a circuitous and unreliable means” of furthering
children’s interests). As we show in Part III, critics, including Dailey and Rosenbury, fail to
acknowledge that restricting parental rights means that the state will have an expanded role as
decision maker when a surrogate is required, a move that we argue is unlikely to promote child
wellbeing.
134. See infra Section III.B.3.
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grounds. 135 These laws were enacted with little opposition, a testament to the
lack of controversy surrounding parental rights when asserted by parents
with social and political clout. 136 Controversy arose only when children with
treatable medical conditions died due to lack of treatment, and some courts
held that these civil statutes protected parents from criminal liability for the
deaths. 137 These cases and others in which children suffered harm due to
their parents’ failure to provide necessary treatment became a catalyst for intense criticism of the law’s protection of broad parental authority. 138
A different critique of parental rights flows from the significant changes
in family form over the last several decades, particularly the growing number
of families with same-sex parents. Strong parental rights protect a parent
who has either a biological or legal relationship to the child, but these rights
have also allowed that parent to exclude a coparent who is not biologically or
legally related to the child but who functions as a parent. 139 Thus, scholars
have contended that the traditional legal definition of parent grounded in
biology, marriage, or adoption is unduly restrictive, excluding relationships
in families headed by same-sex parents from full legal protection and thereby
sacrificing child wellbeing. 140 Scholars have also criticized legal rules that
treat unmarried fathers differently from married fathers. 141
Despite these challenges, parental rights continue to receive substantial
deference in American law. In 2000, the Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville affirmed the constitutional status of parental rights, citing the founda-

135. Allison Ciullo, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to Recognize
Christian Science Spiritual Healing and a Shift Towards Legislative Action, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV.
155, 169–174 (2007).
136. See Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the
American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 278 (2003); Scott St. Amand, Protecting
Neglect: The Constitutionality of Spiritual Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Statutes, 12
RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 139, 147–48 (2009).
137. See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 782–83 (Fla. 1992) (holding that allowing prosecution was a violation of due process).
138. See Dwyer, supra note 113, at 1399–1400; Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of
Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child’s
Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 352 (1991). For a discussion of compulsory
vaccination laws and the criticism that religious and philosophical exemptions endanger public
health, see infra notes 312–315 and accompanying text.
139. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1212–29 (2016). As we explain below, see infra Section III.B.2, many states have
addressed this through the recognition of de facto parents, but this is a relatively recent development.
140. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 394–409 (2008); Douglas NeJaime, The Nature
of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264 (2017); Nancy D. Polikoff, Essay, Concord with Which
Other Families?: Marriage Equality, Family Demographics, and Race, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 99, 101 (2016).
141. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 224–31 (2015) (arguing that unmarried fathers should have
similar default rules for both parentage and custody as married fathers).
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tional opinions from the 1920s. 142 Moreover, many scholars and advocates
defend parental rights as a shield against excessive state intervention based
on racial and cultural biases against parenting practices that offend middleclass sensibilities but do not threaten serious harm to children. 143 And proponents who seek the protection of the relationship between de facto parents
and their children challenge only the definition of “parent,” not parental
rights per se. 144 But advocates of parental rights today do not justify those
rights by arguing parents own their children; and the libertarian rationale,
while valid, does not adequately account for children’s interests or establish a
limit on parental authority. The legitimacy of robust parental rights depends
on a comprehensive rationale that is compatible with contemporary values.
*

*

*

Legal developments in the late twentieth century have destabilized the
Progressive Era dyadic framework governing legal regulation of children and
families and generated uncertainty about assumptions and principles that at
one time were seldom challenged. First, although the state’s role of promoting child wellbeing continues to have strong intuitive appeal, the failures of
both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems have made clear that benign intentions can falter and are inadequate as the foundation for law and
policy. Moreover, in both systems, racial and class bias have infected policies
and practices and undermined the legitimacy of the state’s role. Parental authority, the other pole supporting the framework, is under attack and appears to stand on weaker ground than in earlier times. Finally, the children’s
rights movement has complicated the law’s conception of childhood, and no
clear principles have guided the process of extending some rights and privileges to children while withholding others until adulthood. In sum, by the
dawn of the twenty-first century, the regulation of children since the Progressive Era had become more complex, less stable, and in need of comprehensive revision.
II.

AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK: REVIVING CHILD WELLBEING

In this Part, we demonstrate that a new legal framework governing the
regulation of children and families has begun to emerge—what we call the
Child Wellbeing framework. We identify and explicate the core elements of
this framework in twenty-first-century juvenile justice reforms, and we note
that it has also begun to influence family-support policies. Ultimately, however, the importance of this framework is far broader. As we show in Parts
III and IV, it brings a measure of coherence to the complex legal develop-

142. 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000).
143. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 93, at 175–212; ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 51–67;
Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1073–76 (2015) (book review).
144. See supra note 140.
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ments of the past half century, uncovering a deep structure and logic of
modern regulation of children across multiple domains.
The animating principle of the framework is that the goal of legal regulation is to promote child wellbeing. This may seem unpromising as a starting
point—a naïve and nostalgic revival of the Progressive Era ideal that continues to be widely endorsed but has proved to be fragile as a governing principle for regulation. But three features of the contemporary framework distindistinguish it from its predecessor and reinforce its stability. First, modern
child-centered attitudes do not rest on the simplistic view of childhood that
shaped, and ultimately undermined, the Progressive Era’s goals. 145 Instead,
twenty-first-century regulation increasingly is based on a large body of psychological and biological research on child and adolescent development, as
well as research on effective policies. This empirical knowledge makes it possible to further child wellbeing with much greater sophistication and effect
than was possible during the Progressive Era. Second, lawmakers and the
public increasingly have embraced laws and policies that promote child
wellbeing on the ground that these policies also promote social welfare. This
recognition that effective policies not only promote children’s interests but
also advance social welfare seems unremarkable, but historically, society’s
interests received surprisingly little attention. Early Progressives focused optimistically on children’s welfare in advocating for reform, often ignoring the
public interest, with devastating consequences when apparent conflicts
arose. Today it seems clear that a foundation reinforced by collective selfinterest is more solid than one based on benign paternalism alone. Third, the
Child Wellbeing framework recognizes the serious threat of racial and class
bias to the fairness and legitimacy of state regulation of children. Although
we are far from eradicating these insidious influences, there is a growing
awareness of the ways that the law has failed children and families of color.
The Child Wellbeing framework thus underscores the need to address systemic bias and structural inequality.
A. Juvenile Justice Reform: The Embodiment of the New Framework
This section sketches the emergence of the Child Wellbeing framework
in juvenile justice reforms in the early twenty-first century. We first describe
the now-familiar factors that contributed to the dramatic legal changes in the
juvenile justice system during this period and then elaborate on how the reforms embody the elements of the Child Wellbeing framework: incorporation of developmental knowledge, convergence of adolescent wellbeing and
social welfare, and recognition of the pernicious role of racial bias.

145. The Progressives embraced the new science of adolescence, but the state of
knowledge was rudimentary and speculative a century ago. See G. STANLEY HALL, 1
ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY,
SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1916). Progressives also lumped adolescents with younger children for strategic purposes in furtherance of their goal of expanding the
boundary of childhood. See VAN WATERS, supra note 45, at 4; Mack, supra note 46, at 107.
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Catalysts for Reform

The moral panic surrounding juvenile crime in the 1990s began to subside in the early years of the twenty-first century, as juvenile crime rates declined steadily. 146 This calmer climate, in turn, made possible the
reemergence of more benign attitudes toward youth and an openness to reform of punitive policies. Observers pointed to the offensive racist underpinnings of the response to youth crime in the 1990s, when the youth of
juvenile offenders was largely ignored in a climate of fear and outrage. 147
Other factors also contributed to the trend away from punitive policies. First,
economic developments played a key role; as the recession of 2008 strained
state budgets, lawmakers were forced to confront the high cost of incarceration-based policies, which diverted funds from education and other critical
state services. 148 Second, evidence mounted that costly punitive policies were
ineffective at reducing recidivism in juvenile offenders, one of their primary
objectives. Many studies showed that youths sent to institutions were more
likely to reoffend than those who remained in their communities. 149 Moreover, a substantial body of research showed that not only were some community-based correctional programs for juveniles very effective at reducing
recidivism, but they did so at a fraction of the cost of incarceration. 150
Another important catalyst for reform was the Supreme Court, which
signaled powerfully in a series of opinions that lawmakers should attend to
differences between youths and their adult counterparts. Most important
were four Eighth Amendment opinions, beginning in 2005, dealing with
challenges to harsh adult sentences (the death penalty and life without pa-

146. The decline in juvenile crime began in the mid-1990s but was acknowledged only
after the trend was well established for several years. In 2000, for example, California voters
approved a referendum facilitating prosecution of juveniles as adults, despite the fact that
crime rates in the state had been declining for several years. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra
note 6, at 105–06, 109–12.
147. See generally OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly KempfLeonard eds., 2005).
148. Secure placement in juvenile institutions was expensive; in some states upward of
$215,000 a year for each youth subject to placement, while community-based programs were
far less expensive, often $5,000 per youth. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social
Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 45, 77 (2010).
149. See COMM. ON ASSESSING JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 414–29 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Be Careful What
You Wish for: Legal Sanctions and Public Safety Among Adolescent Offenders in Juvenile and
Criminal Court (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 03-61, 2004),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2304&context=faculty_schol
arship [https://perma.cc/WT79-QP6Z].
150. See PETER W. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS
CRIME-CONTROL POLICY (2006); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 183; see also supra note
148.
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role) imposed on juvenile offenders under state laws. 151 The Court held that
these laws violated the Constitution as applied to juveniles, finding that a
sentence that might be appropriate for an adult criminal was disproportionate for a juvenile, due to the youthful immaturity of young offenders. 152
These opinions directly affected only a small category of young offenders convicted of the most serious crimes, but their impact on justice system
reform has been far broader. Our nation’s highest court announced that
“children are different” from adults, 153 signaling a changed view of teenagers
involved in crime than the dominant trope a decade before; under “evolving
standards of decency,” 154 young offenders are not incorrigible criminals but
immature and reckless adolescents. 155 Moreover, the Court increasingly
drew on scientific research to explicate how developmental factors influence
teenage offending and explained that because of these differences children in
the justice system should be subject to more lenient sanctions than adults. 156
Courts and legislatures across the country have cited the sentencing
opinions and the underlying developmental research in support of a broad
range of reforms that recognize the special status of young offenders: these
include general restrictions on sentences imposed on juveniles, 157 reforms of

151. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 472 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 573 (2005). The Court also recognized the immaturity of youth in a different justice system context. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held that the age of a youth questioned by
police must be considered to determine whether he or she is in custody, requiring Miranda
warnings. 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011).
152. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736–37; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Graham, 560 U.S. at
74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. On the basis of this proportionality analysis, the Court identified
three differences between juvenile and adult offenders: First, the criminal choices of juveniles
are less culpable than those of adult counterparts because they are driven by developmental
influences associated with adolescence. Second, because much adolescent crime is a product of
youthful immaturity, juvenile offenders have a greater potential for reform than do adults, and
they should be given the opportunity to do so. Sentences of death or life without parole foreclose any such opportunity. Third, the Court observed that the harsh sentences received by the
petitioners might be due to juveniles’ more limited ability to navigate the justice process, as
compared to adults. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at
573.
153. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480.
154. Id. at 469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (plurality opinion))
(applying the Eighth Amendment test).
155. Id. at 471. For an in-depth analysis, see ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., JOHN D. &
CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND., MODELS FOR CHANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING (2015), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publi
cations/778/The_Supreme_Court_and_the_Transformation_of_Juvenile_Sentencing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LC24-DFSL].
156. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–76; Roper, 543 U.S. at 616–19.
157. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014).

May 2020]

Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century

1401

conditions in correctional facilities, 158 protections for youths in police interrogation, 159 and exclusion of juveniles from sex-offender registries. 160
Fortuitously, the Supreme Court’s use of developmental research in the
Eighth Amendment opinions directed lawmakers’ attention to empirical
studies on adolescence at a time when the research was expanding dramatically. This growing body of behavioral and biological research on adolescence has profoundly influenced the direction and shape of justice system
reforms in the early twenty-first century. 161 Developmental brain research
seems to be more compelling to regulators and the public than behavioral
research, perhaps because differences between adult and adolescent brain
functioning and structure can be observed physically. 162 In any event, neuroscience research is often invoked by politicians and courts in support of differential treatment of juvenile offenders. 163
2.

Modern Juvenile Justice Policy

In the twenty-first century, a new conceptual framework has begun to
define juvenile crime regulation. Youth justice policy today embraces adolescent wellbeing as a central goal, but with particular attention to the relationship between youth welfare and social welfare, a commitment to reducing
racial bias, and with an insistence that these objectives will be promoted
most effectively by grounding regulation in developmental knowledge. This
Section shows how the contemporary framework has shaped the legal response to youth crime, reducing institutional placement and tailoring programs to the needs of adolescents. 164
158. See V.W. v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing sentencing opinions in granting preliminary injunction against use of solitary confinement with juveniles).
159. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011).
160. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012).
161. The MacArthur Foundation was an important catalyst for the developmental juvenile justice reforms, sponsoring the influential Research Network on Adolescent Development
and Juvenile Justice from 1995 to 2005, followed by its Models for Change program, initiating
reforms in several states. See Models for Change: Systems Reform in Juvenile Justice, MODELS
FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/SJT9Q86D]; Research Network on Adolescent Development & Juvenile Justice, MACARTHUR
FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/networks/research-network-on-adolescent-developmentjuvenil/ [https://perma.cc/M22V-82GR]. The Foundation later supported developmental brain
research through its Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. Research Network on Law
and Neuroscience, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/networks/researchnetwork-on-law-and-neuroscience/ [https://perma.cc/JD53-ZN45].
162. See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive
Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549, 550, 559–60 (2016).
163. See Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 160 (2013); Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions About Adolescents’
Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 513, 514 (2013).
164. Significant shifts in the status-offense system also reflect the Child Wellbeing
framework. States reformed the system based on research demonstrating the effectiveness of
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To begin, developmental brain research has played a pivotal role in justice policy in several ways. First, the research has reinforced the premise that
juveniles are less culpable than their adult counterparts because much teenage offending is influenced by developmental factors beyond the control of
the individual youth. 165 Courts and other regulators have pointed to several
mitigating influences on adolescent criminal choices linked to interrelated
features of brain development. Adolescents are more inclined toward sensation seeking and have a reduced capacity to control impulses or to regulate
emotions as compared to adults. 166 They also are far more susceptible to the
influence of peers than are either children or adults. 167 These tendencies are
strongly correlated with the inclination to engage in crime (and other risky
activities). 168
Second, developmental research confirms that typical adolescent offenders have the potential to reform. 169 Because juvenile crime is usually a product of immaturity, most young offenders are likely to desist as they mature to
adulthood. In fact, the age-crime curve consistently shows that crime rates
peak at age seventeen and sharply decline thereafter, 170 debunking the 1990s

offering services to adolescents rather than bringing youth into the court system, an understanding that promoting adolescent wellbeing furthers social welfare, and a concern about racial disproportionality. MICHAEL P. BOGGS & CAREY A. MILLER, REPORT OF THE GEORGIA
COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2018), https://dcs.georgia.gov/document/publication
/2017-2018-criminal-justice-reform-council-report/download [https://perma.cc/XF6S-UKB7];
see also J. Russell Jackson & John Sumner, C.H.I.N.S. Status Offender Reform in Georgia,
EMORY U. BARTON CTR. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.slideshare.net/bartoncenter/children-inneed-of-services (on file with the Michigan Law Review). States regularly use diversion programs to keep potential status-offense petitions out of court and provide the services needed to
address the issues underlying the behavior. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-380 (2015); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39E (West 2018). Another change reflecting the Child Wellbeing
framework is the federal reform in 2018 that sought to limit detention of status offenders. See
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–385, § 205(1)(H), 132 Stat. 5123 (2018)
(codified at 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A) (2018)). The new approach has led to a sharp decrease
in the population of status offenders over the past decade. See Statistical Briefing Book, OJJDP,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/court/qa06701.asp?qaDate=2017
[https://perma.cc/ZU94EFH8].
165. See Steinberg, supra note 163, at 516.
166. See Cohen et al., supra note 162, at 550, 559–60.
167. See id.; Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, DEV. SCI., March 2011, at F1–F2 (describing developments
in the social brain).
168. Elizabeth Scott et al., Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 16–17 (2018); Steinberg, supra note 163, at 516–16. Neuroscientists
also have found an imbalance between changes in brain development in early adolescence that
encourage impulsivity and the slower development of the parts of the brain that govern executive functions, such as emotional regulation, which mature into early adulthood. Cohen et al.,
supra note 162, at 559–60.
169. See LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE
OF ADOLESCENCE 18–45 (2014).
170. Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 370
(2003).
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assumption that a large percentage of delinquents are incipient career criminals. Modern lawmakers have recognized that most delinquent youths have
reasonable prospects of becoming productive adults. 171 This realization has
focused attention on the importance of correctional responses that facilitate
the transition to noncriminal adulthood.
Reinforcing this response is another body of developmental research
that confirms (unsurprisingly) that biology alone does not determine the
course of adolescent development. Social development is a process of reciprocal interaction between the individual and her social context. 172 A healthy
social context provides the conditions for attaining skills and capacities that
are important to successful adult functioning, in relationship and employment roles and generally as an independent responsible individual. 173 Of
course, social context can also impede healthy maturation. The teen whose
social context consists of neglectful or abusive parents, antisocial peers, and a
lack of engaging educational or extracurricular activities is far less likely to
make a successful transition to adulthood. 174
For young offenders, correctional programs and facilities constitute
their social context, and modern justice system regulators increasingly have
embraced the lessons offered by this research. One key lesson is that prisonlike institutional settings constitute toxic developmental contexts; and in
most states, policymakers have reduced incarceration of juvenile offenders
dramatically. 175 The combination of hostile adult custodians, antisocial peer
and adult role models, limited educational and other programs, and a highly
restrictive setting together undermine healthy maturation. 176 Instead, lawmakers across the country have shifted resources to localities to support
community-based programs that seek to provide the conditions and inter-

171. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–48 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
172. See Leah H. Somerville et al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of
Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive and Aversive Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION
124, 130–31 (2010).
173. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Reentry of Young Offenders from the Justice System: A
Developmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21, 23–26 (2004). These conditions include an authoritative parent figure, contact with prosocial peers, and opportunities for
autonomous decisionmaking and critical thinking. See Urie Bronfenbrenner & Pamela A.
Morris, The Bioecological Model of Human Development, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY: THEORETICAL MODELS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 793, 822 (Richard M. Lerner
ed., 2006); B. Bradford Brown & James Larson, Peer Relationships in Adolescence, in 2
HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT 74, 95 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 3d ed. 2009); Laurence
Steinberg, We Know Some Things: Parent–Adolescent Relationships in Retrospect and Prospect,
11 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 1, 13 (2001).
174. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 58.
175. See COMM. ON ASSESSING JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ET AL., supra note 149, at 134,
235, 242.
176. Id. at 134–35.
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ventions that support healthy development. 177 These programs allow young
offenders to remain in or close to home and, thus, are far more humane than
placement in institutions far from young offenders’ communities. 178 In
short, modern correctional programs are tailored to provide what has been
missing from many delinquent youths’ lives—a social context that can assist
them in attaining maturity and pursuing prosocial goals.
Social welfare is also advanced by the recent justice system reforms.
Contemporary juvenile correctional programs have been shown to be more
effective in reducing recidivism at a lower cost than other interventions in
the 1990s, which often involved incarceration and did little to reduce offending. 179 Several evidence-based programs have repeatedly been found to reduce recidivism when compared to both incarceration and traditional
probation programs. 180 Further, cost-benefit analyses of the most popular
programs have shown that investments produce a substantial return in dollars saved through crime reduction. 181 The success of these programs confirms that justice policies aimed at furthering the wellbeing of teenage
offenders also promote the interests of society in reducing crime and conserving public resources.
Finally, the intersection of race and juvenile justice policy has become a
more salient focus of policy concern in the twenty-first century than it was in
earlier times. Research has found disproportionate treatment of youth of
color at every stage of the justice system process. They are more likely than
their white counterparts to have police contact and to be arrested, charged,
and subject to delinquency proceedings; once formally adjudicated, they are
more likely to be confined and removed from their communities. 182 Moreover, youth of color disproportionately enter the justice system from school
under tough school discipline policies, sometimes mandated under state

177. The most effective programs seek to empower parents to fulfill their role more effectively and when that is not possible to substitute other adult parent figures who can provide
structure and support to delinquent youths. See Steinberg, supra note 173, at 15–16. These
programs facilitate prosocial peer interactions as well, providing youths with the tools to avoid
the influence of antisocial peers in school and in the community setting. See, e.g., VERA INST.
OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 49–51.They also provide a range of other interventions that support youths, respond to their needs, and assist them in acquiring the skills they need to make
the transition to adulthood.
178. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 49–51.
179. See STEVE AOS ET AL., THE COMPARATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROGRAMS TO
REDUCE CRIME 8 (2001).
180. See id.
181. Studies of Multisystemic Therapy, one of the most established and successful correctional programs for youth, have found savings of six dollars for each dollar invested. See id.
182. See JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH
COMMITMENTS AND ARRESTS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racialdisparities-in-youth-commitments-and-arrests [https://perma.cc/QJA9-PCRM]; see also J.L.
Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR
CHILDREN, supra note 147, at 83.
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law. 183 In recent years, lawmakers and advocates have sought to reduce racial
and ethnic disparities through training and the use of decision models that
expose and reduce racial biases in deliberations and choices by system actors
and school officials. 184
At this point, progress has been limited. The modern period has seen
dramatic reductions in the numbers of youth who are subject to justice system intervention and less punitive treatment of most youth in that system. 185
These trends have benefited youth of color, who were disproportionately
represented in the justice system of the 1990s. 186 But patterns of racial disproportionality continue to exist, despite the reforms. 187 The aspiration to
reduce racial disparity and the commitment to finding the means to attain
this goal define a critical challenge that lies ahead. For now, the problem is
increasingly front and center, amplified by advocates and demanding the attention of lawmakers, system actors, and the public. 188
In these ways, youth justice policy today increasingly embodies the essential elements of the Child Wellbeing framework, promoting the interests
of youths in the justice system more effectively than the Progressive Era ap-

183. See, e.g., Allison R. Brown, Federal Spotlight on School-to-Prison Pipeline, 32 CHILD
L. PRAC. 31, 31 (2013) (“The school-to-prison pipeline is a cacophonous mash-up of numerous
factors, including zero-tolerance student-discipline policies, that contribute to (1) in the short
term, the exclusion of children, disproportionately children of color, from the regular classroom environment as a means of punishment; and (2) in the long term, the entanglement of
children, disproportionately children of color, in the criminal-justice system.”); Danielle
Dankner, No Child Left Behind Bars: Suspending Willful Defiance to Disassemble the School-toPrison Pipeline, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 577, 577 (2018) (similarly describing impact of harsh
school discipline policies); Judith A.M. Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison
Pipeline: Strategies for a Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REV. 959, 959–60 (2016) (describing how
school disciplinary policies push youth of color into justice system and out of public school).
184. To reduce racial bias in decisions about preadjudication detention, for example,
some states have adopted protocols aimed to reduce detention, with particular impact on
youth of color. See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES
INITIATIVE: INSIGHTS FROM THE ANNUAL RESULTS REPORT (2017) [hereinafter JDAI]; see also
NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2014), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/RED-Policy-Update0914-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LCJ-4ACG]. The Obama administration issued a directive
that schools monitor and record the race of youths subject to discipline. This directive was reversed by the Trump administration. See infra note 366.
185. See JDAI, supra note 184, at 3.
186. See id. at 1.
187. See id. at 6–7; see also COMM. ON ASSESSING JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ET AL., supra
note 149, at 211–40.
188. See, e.g., Youth in the Justice System, JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/youth-justice
[https://perma.cc/MZ45-M3NK] (“Racism pervades our justice system, leading to the arrest,
prosecution, adjudication and incarceration of disproportionately greater numbers of youth of
color than white youth, even while youth offending patterns are relatively similar. Moreover,
fines and fees imposed on youth create an unfair system of ‘justice by income,’ where children
in poverty face an increased risk of incarceration, while more affluent youth receive effective
community-based treatment. Justice should not be based on the color of a child’s skin, where a
child lives, or the family’s income.”).
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proach or the punitive response of the 1990s. Current law and policy also offer the promise of greater stability than earlier regimes because they achieve
two social welfare goals essential to long-term viability—crime reduction
and cost-effectiveness. It is not surprising that the Koch brothers and groups
such as Right on Crime have lined up in support of developmentally-based
policies. 189 Responses to youth crime that attend to the realities of adolescence offer the best prospect of attaining social goals that have broad appeal
across the political spectrum—reducing crime and facilitating the transition
of delinquent teenagers to productive adulthood. Finally, the reality that racial disproportionality in the justice system exists and must be addressed is
no longer obscured. In the current climate, the message that racial justice is
an essential component to a fair and legitimate response to juvenile crime is
being heard, even if it has not yet been successfully effectuated. 190
The upshot is that reforms have resulted in substantial improvements
and in a shrinking of the justice system, but some sobering notes must be
sounded. Youths continue to receive harsh sentences in the adult system in
some jurisdictions, and, in the juvenile system, many states have undertaken
only modest reforms. 191 Finally, the racialized character of the modern justice system represents the most intractable failure of reform efforts and its
greatest challenge. 192
B. Direct Regulation of Families: Nascent Glimmers of the Child Wellbeing
Framework
Although most evident in reforms to the juvenile justice system, the
Child Wellbeing framework is also embodied in other areas of regulation in
which the state plays a direct role in the lives of children: state policies supporting families and child welfare regulation. As this section describes, recent investments in children and families are consistent with the Child

189. See Juvenile Justice, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/category/priorityissues/juvenile-justice/ [https://perma.cc/SYX4-YEBS]. Koch Industries is a member of the
Coalition for Public Safety. Alex Altman, Criminal Justice Reform is Becoming Washington’s
Bipartisan Cause, TIME (Feb. 19, 2015), https://time.com/3714876/criminal-justice-reform-isbecoming-washingtons-bipartisan-cause/ [https://perma.cc/8G5W-DHY5]. The Coalition’s
Policy Priorities include alternatives to incarceration and increased focus on community supervision. Policy Priorities, COALITION FOR PUB. SAFETY, https://www.coalitionforpublicsafety
.org/policies [https://perma.cc/9F8Y-GJNK].
190. See Future Interrupted: How Juvenile Records Disproportionately Affect Youth of Color, JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-04/FutureInterrupedYouthofColor.pdf [https://perma.cc/98SQ-QWQB].
191. See, e.g., Failed Policies, Forfeited Futures: A Nationwide Scorecard on Juvenile Records, JUV. L. CTR., https://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/#!/map [https://perma.cc
/9EX2-ZCN8] (showing disparities across states in protection of juvenile records).
192. See ROVNER, supra note 182; see also JDAI, supra note 184, at 6–10. Similarly,
CHINS petitions for Black children have declined at a slower rate than other groups. See
SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE
COURT STATISTICS: 2015, at 72–75 (2018).
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Wellbeing framework, as are a few modest reforms to the child welfare system. As with juvenile justice, ample research points to the individual and societal benefits of supporting families and preventing child abuse and neglect,
but in contrast to juvenile justice regulation, the state has done little to fundamentally alter its approach. Formidable obstacles have impeded beneficial
legal changes, creating greater challenges to reform than exist in the juvenile
justice system. In these areas, then, much work remains to be done, and the
Child Wellbeing framework offers normative guidance more than explanatory power.
1.

Policies of State Support

Despite an overall lack of state support for families, 193 a few promising—
albeit modest—recent investments show the influence of the Child Wellbeing framework. The clearest example is the dramatic increase in funding for
early childhood education. 194 States across the political spectrum—from Oklahoma to Vermont—have embraced prekindergarten as an effective and efficient strategy for boosting academic achievement and addressing
inequality. 195 States and the federal government have thus increased spending substantially, 196 significantly boosting preschool enrollment rates. 197

193. See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213,
220–48 (2017) (describing how the United States assumes a limited role in supporting families,
unlike other wealthy nations, which use public funds to invest in universal programs such as
lengthy paid parental leave, no-cost or low-cost childcare, healthcare, child allowances, and
much more); see also DOWD, supra note 33, at 9–50 (arguing that the lack of state support particularly disadvantages low-income children and children of color). There are some exceptions,
of course, notably public education and basic safety-net programs, but overall state spending
on family support lags far behind other countries. See Eichner, supra, at 221–26.
194. The federal government has funded preschool through the Head Start program
since 1965, see Head Start Timeline, HEAD START: ECLKC (last updated Feb. 16, 2019),
https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-timeline, but this funding has not
come close to meeting the need for subsidized early childhood education, see ALLISON H.
FREIDMAN-KRAUSS ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, THE STATE OF
PRESCHOOL 2017, at 14 (2018), http://nieer.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/State-ofPreschool-2017-Full.5.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V6H-VVYL]. For other examples of state investments in family support, see Paid Family Leave Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/paid-family-leaveresources.aspx [https://perma.cc/S6EY-QJ4A] (describing paid parental leave legislation in
California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island).
195. For a description, see Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Replication of Poverty, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 130 (Ezra Rosser
ed., 2019).
196. See LOUISA DIFFEY ET AL., EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, STATE PRE-K FUNDING
2016-17 FISCAL YEAR: TRENDS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2017) (reporting that, in 2017, states
spent $7.5 billion a year, a 47 percent increase from 2012). Congress appropriated $9.8 billion
for Head Start in 2018, Head Start Program Facts: Fiscal Year 2018, HEAD START: ECLKC (last
updated Oct. 1, 2019), https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-program-factsfiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/JQL9-Z8KT], which was a significant increase from the $6.2
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These investments were the result of abundant research demonstrating the
effectiveness and economic efficiency of preschool, which in turn generated
widespread and bipartisan support for preschool spending. 198
Also compatible with the Child Wellbeing framework is Medicaid expansion under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 199 The expansion does not dramatically increase the number of children receiving
healthcare because most low-income children were already covered, 200 but it
benefits children and promotes their wellbeing by supporting parents. Research demonstrates that Medicaid expansion improves parental access to
mental health services and substance abuse treatment, two conditions linked
to child abuse and neglect as well as poor family functioning generally. 201
Further, Medicaid expansion has improved the finances of low-income families, 202 increased employment rates, 203 and promoted housing stability, 204 all
of which benefit children. Like investments in preschool, Medicaid expansion has been shown to be cost-effective. 205 Despite initial resistance in politbillion appropriated in 2001, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30952, HEAD START: BACKGROUND
AND FUNDING 21–22 (2014).
197. See FREIDMAN-KRAUSS ET AL., supra note 194, at 25–26 (reporting that 44 percent of
four-year-olds were enrolled in publicly funded preschool in 2016–2017 school year, a significant increase from previous years).
198. See DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 76–92 (2007) (describing the numerous forces leading to the state-level investments, including empirical research, foundation
funding for pilot programs and evaluation, and state-level political leadership); Charles
Joughin, See Just How Much Congress Increased Funding for Early Childhood Education, FIRST
FIVE YEARS FUND (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.ffyf.org/see-just-much-congress-increasedfunding-early-childhood-education/ [https://perma.cc/36R7-VWEZ] (describing the bipartisan support for the 2018 increase in Head Start spending).
199. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
200. See Health Insurance Coverage of Children 0-18, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/children-0-18 [https://perma.cc/H7P6-NLEM].
201. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
202. See Jesse Cross-Call, Medicaid Expansion Continues to Benefit State Budgets, Contrary to Critics’ Claims, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/health/medicaid-expansion-continues-to-benefit-state-budgets-contrary
-to-critics-claims [https://perma.cc/S2DB-CRJB].
203. See OHIO DEP’T OF MEDICAID, 2018 OHIO MEDICAID GROUP VIII ASSESSMENT: A
FOLLOW‐UP TO THE 2016 OHIO MEDICAID GROUP VIII ASSESSMENT (2018),
http://medicaid.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Resources/Reports/Annual/Group-VIII-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2QA-ATZ4]; Kara Gavin, Medicaid Expansion Helped Enrollees Do Better
at Work or in Job Searches, MHEALTH LAB (June 27, 2017, 10:20 AM),
https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/industry-dx/medicaid-expansion-helped-enrollees-do-betterat-work-or-job-searches [https://perma.cc/4KFZ-REX3].
204. See Emily A. Gallagher et al., The Effect of Health Insurance on Home Payment Delinquency: Evidence from ACA Marketplace Subsidies, 172 J. PUB. ECON. 67 (2019).
205. See Cross-Call, supra note 202; see also Hefei Wen et al., The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Crime Reduction: Evidence from HIFA-Waiver Expansions, 154 J. PUB. ECON. 67
(2017); Jacob Vogler, Access to Health Care and Criminal Behavior: Short-Run Evidence from
the ACA Medicaid Expansions (unpublished manuscript) (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042267 [https://perma.cc/BJ9E-PZ3Q].
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ically conservative states, all but fourteen states have now expanded Medicaid, including several states adopting the expansion through ballot initiatives. 206
These are promising investments, but there are significant obstacles to
further reform. Entrenched libertarian values define the relationship of the
state to the family in the United States, valorizing family privacy and placing
on parents the weighty responsibility of rearing children. 207 Reforms to the
juvenile justice system do not implicate these values; a social and political
consensus exists that children’s criminal conduct necessitates a state response. Further, the social welfare benefits of family support are both subtler
and more remote than those of effective justice policies. The average citizen
is likely attuned to the costs of juvenile crime but not the costs of kindergarten unpreparedness. Finally, the public understands that state resources will
be devoted to youth crime policy and thus is readily persuaded that these investments should be economically efficient. By contrast, investments in children are politically vulnerable. 208
Notwithstanding these challenges, the reforms described in this section
are some evidence that lawmakers are beginning to redefine the state’s role,
reflecting a nascent understanding that promoting child wellbeing furthers
social welfare and equality and that research on effectiveness and cost efficiency can help drive reform. The Child Wellbeing framework thus is embedded in these emerging reforms and provides a solid blueprint for future
efforts.
2.

The Child Welfare System

In contrast to the significant reforms to the juvenile justice system and
the modest investments in family support, the child welfare system largely
does not embody the Child Wellbeing framework. Population-based prevention efforts, such as Medicaid expansion, can help prevent child abuse and
neglect, but the child welfare system itself continues to focus primarily on
crisis management rather than preventing abuse and neglect. 209

206. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaidunder-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/6PCC-CJTE]. But see Letter from Brian Neale,
Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BC5Q-PX3V] (allowing states to impose work requirements on some recipients).
207. See Eichner, supra note 193, at 220–48.
208. See NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS: AT LEAST 46
STATES HAVE IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE JOB LOSS
(2011), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc
/VA7L-DZ6D] (documenting the state-level budget cuts following the 2008 recession, including cuts to health insurance for low-income children and K-12 educational spending).
209. See Clare Huntington, The Child Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2014, at 221 (describing the durability of the crisis orientation
across multiple policy swings); Funding Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Programs, CHILD
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The negative consequences for children that follow state intrusion can
be acute. Most concerning, state intervention can lead to the placement of
the child in foster care, temporarily or permanently disrupting the parentchild relationship. 210 Substantial evidence demonstrates that state custody
does not generally improve child wellbeing, 211 yet many children are currently in foster care, 212 and the number is growing rapidly, largely as a result of
the opioid epidemic. 213 Given their overrepresentation in the child welfare
system, 214 Black and Native American children are disproportionately affected by the failures of the system.
Despite the wide gap between the Child Wellbeing framework and the
child welfare system, two counterexamples should be noted. First, some
child welfare funding is dedicated to family-support programs, intended to
serve the wider community in an effort to strengthen families. 215 These programs offer parenting education, social support, case management and referral services, healthcare, adult education, and so on. 216 Research shows that
these efforts improve children’s cognitive development and social and emotional wellbeing, and they improve parenting, although the impact on child
maltreatment is not clear. 217 Second, the Affordable Care Act authorized federal funds for home-visiting programs, to supplement existing state funding. 218 These programs improve outcomes for both children and mothers,
and there is some evidence that they help reduce child maltreatment. 219

WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/management/funding
/program-areas/prevention/ [https://perma.cc/E9B3-SAVW] (describing the limited available
funding for prevention efforts).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 86–99.
211. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 87.
213. See Child Welfare and Substance Use, OFF. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING &
EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/child-welfare-and-substance-use [https://perma.cc/59U2765Z].
214. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
215. See Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 629
(2012).
216. JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., ABT ASSOCS. INC., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF FAMILY
SUPPORT PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT VOLUME A: THE META-ANALYSIS, at A3–9 (2001),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/fam_sup_vol_a.pdf [https://perma.cc/43DZGBN2].
217. See id. at A5–2, A5–8.
218. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43930, MATERNAL, INFANT, AND EARLY CHILDHOOD
HOME VISITING (MIECHV) PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 3 (2018). For a description of the original model, see About Us, NURSE-FAM. PARTNERSHIP,
https://www.nursefamilypartnership.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/2XRM-BJD7].
219. See Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
ADMIN. CHILD. & FAMS., https://homvee.acf.hhs.gov/effectiveness [https://perma.cc/L3WYLNQA].
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The child welfare system has also taken some small steps towards reducing racial disproportionality and disparities. 220 Given their disproportionate
representation in the system, children of color benefit from overall prevention programs, as from other reforms such as more effective models of legal
representation for parents. 221 More specifically, child welfare system reforms,
such as alternative decisionmaking processes to counteract potential bias,
have targeted each stage in the process. 222 For Native American and Native
Alaskan children, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) provides statutory
protections for families, including a higher bar for the removal of children
and procedural protections to promote tribal decisionmaking, 223 but the foster care–entry rate of these children remains troublingly high. 224
Taken together, these minimal reforms fit within the modern Child
Wellbeing framework: they improve child wellbeing, they are based in research, they have clear social welfare benefits, including cost efficiency, and
they attempt to address racial and economic inequality. But at this point, the
investments reach a small fraction of those families who would benefit, 225
and the reforms have had only a marginal impact on racial disproportionality. 226 In sum, there has been little fundamental change in the child welfare
system. It continues to operate largely as a regime of crisis intervention, and
racial disproportionality is still a hallmark of the system.

220. See supra note 89 (describing the reduction in the racial disproportionality index
(RDI) for Black children entering foster care but not for Native American or Native Alaskan
children, and further noting that the RDI is lower for outcomes in care than for entry into
care).
221. See Lucas A. Gerber et al., Effects of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Parental Representation in Child Welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 42, 50 tbl.4, 51, 53 (2019) (studying the effect of providing parents with representation through an interdisciplinary law office,
which includes social workers, parent advocates, and attorneys, and finding that such representation significantly reduced the amount of time a child spent in foster care without compromising safety).
222. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 89, at 7–17.
223. For a description of ICWA, including the historical injustices towards Native American families that led to the law, the current constitutional challenges to it, and an explanation
of the legal principles establishing that “Native American” is not considered a racial category,
see Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional
Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 501–17 (2017).
224. See supra note 89.
225. See NAT’L HOME VISITING RES. CTR., 2018 HOME VISITING YEARBOOK 20–24
(2018),
https://www.nhvrc.org/wp-content/uploads/NHVRC_Yearbook_2018_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U262-ZN9X]; Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program
FY 2017 Formula Funding Awards, U.S. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.: MATERNAL & CHILD
HEALTH, https://mchb.hrsa.gov/maternal-child-health-initiatives/home-visiting/fy17-homevisiting-awards [https://perma.cc/4U3L-TQV2] (showing that less than $342 million was allocated for home visiting in 2017).
226. See supra note 89 (describing the modest improvement in racial disproportionality
for Black children but worsening disproportionality for Native American and Native Alaskan
children).
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A Blueprint for Reform

If the state fully embraced the Child Wellbeing framework, it would do
far more to support families and to prevent child abuse and neglect. The
starting point is research. Scholars in multiple fields, from psychology 227 and
neuroscience 228 to economics 229 and education, 230 have established that early
childhood development lays an essential foundation for future learning and
growth and that a child’s development during this period turns on the interaction between the child and a parent or other caregiver. 231 Extensive research also shows that supportive programs during this period—such as
home visiting for young, low-income, first-time mothers and early childhood education for children—improve children’s long-term outcomes, including better academic achievement, higher adult earnings, and lower rates
of criminal justice involvement. 232 These programs are also are economically
efficient. 233
Drawing on this research, the Child Wellbeing framework encourages
the state to invest in family support generally and especially during early
childhood. The framework supports paid parental leave, subsidized childcare, and child allowances, and it emphasizes evidence-based programs that
are cost-effective. In the child welfare system, the framework favors evidence-based policies that protect children from maltreatment, with the understanding that these policies also further social welfare and address racial
disproportionality. Any strategy to prevent child abuse and neglect must be
multifaceted, and substantial available research can guide investments in
prevention. Broad-based efforts to address the risk factors for child abuse
and neglect—including poverty, parental youth, single parenthood, domestic

227. For several of the foundational texts, see ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND
SOCIETY 219–34 (reissued 1993); 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT
265–349 (2d ed. 1982); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN 3–4, 21–22 (1979).
228. For a summary of the neuroscientific literature, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL &
INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000) [hereinafter FROM
NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS]; Resource Library, CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD HARV. U.,
https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/ [https://perma.cc/92LY-A4TM].
229. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Childhood Environment and Gender Gaps in Adulthood,
AM. ECON. REV., May 2016, at 282.
230. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich
and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING
INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91, 92, 104–05 (Greg J. Duncan &
Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011).
231. For a summary, see FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 228 passim.
232. See LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS: PROVEN RESULTS,
FUTURE PROMISE 55–78, 128–29 (2005); Home Visiting Evidence of Effectiveness, supra note
219.
233. See JAMES J. HECKMAN, GIVING KIDS A FAIR CHANCE 3–43 (2013); KIRP, supra note
198, at 76–92.
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violence, substance abuse, and mental health—are effective at reducing the
rate of maltreatment; 234 and more targeted programs that teach parenting
skills and provide support for parents also have some success. 235
This is the vision. But the reality is far from this ideal, and thus the Child
Wellbeing framework remains largely a guide for future reform.
*

*

*

This Part has identified and explicated a framework of state regulation
of children taking shape in the twenty-first century, a framework based on a
revitalized commitment to child wellbeing. The framework incorporates the
sophisticated use of empirical evidence, recognizes that promoting child
wellbeing also promotes social welfare, and is committed to eliminating racial bias. The framework is most evident in reforms in the juvenile justice
system and is also reflected in a few recent investments in family support and
marginal changes to the child welfare system.
Our analysis in this Part demonstrates how the framework is defining
and clarifying the state’s role in directly regulating children and families. As
we show in Parts III and IV, the framework also extends to the domains of
parental rights and children’s rights. The framework thus reveals the logic of
the regulation of children across the legal landscape, illuminating developments over the past half century and integrating legal regulation into a more
coherent and comprehensive body of law.
III. CHILD WELLBEING AND PARENTAL RIGHTS
Beyond the realm of direct regulation, the Child Wellbeing framework
also has explanatory heft in the domain of parental rights. The framework
elevates a rationale for parental authority that some scholars and lawmakers
have endorsed 236 but that has been discounted by child advocates challeng-

234. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILD MALTREATMENT PREVENTION: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 5–11 (2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cm_prevention
.pdf [https://perma.cc/96JZ-WST6].
235. See id. at 6–8; see also Michael S. Wald, Beyond Child Protection: Helping All Families Provide Adequate Parenting, in IMPROVING THE ODDS FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 135, 138–46 (Kathleen McCartney et al. eds., 2014) (describing the importance—and challenges—of improving parenting as a strategy to prevent
child abuse and particularly neglect).
236. For an early formulation of the argument that parental rights promote child wellbeing, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979).
For more recent articulations, see, for example, GUGGENHEIM, supra note 93, at 35–39;
ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 16–25; Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After
Troxel v Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 285–90; Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91
IOWA L. REV. 431 (2006); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401 (1995). These scholars have not, however, integrated parental rights into a larger
framework reaching across multiple domains of legal regulation.
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ing parental rights. 237 Analyzed in the framework, it is clear that the continued robustness of parental authority in the twenty-first century is justified
on child-wellbeing grounds. As we show, modern doctrine reflects an understanding—sometimes explicit, but more often implicit—that deference to
parental decisionmaking typically furthers child wellbeing, serves society’s
interests, and provides an important shield against state intervention for
low-income families and families of color. This rationale for strong parental
rights, which rests on considerable empirical evidence about the importance
of stability in the parent-child relationship, reinforces the traditional libertarian justification for parental rights, but it also supplies a self-limiting
principle for parental rights that is missing in the libertarian justification.
Moreover, in contrast to that justification, which assumes that parents and
the state compete for authority over children, the modern rationale clarifies
that parental rights are compatible with the state’s interest in child wellbeing.
As we demonstrate in this Part, the framework elucidates recent developments in the law of parental rights, and it offers guidance to lawmakers aiming to calibrate doctrine and policy to further child wellbeing.
A. Interpreting Parental Rights in the Child Wellbeing Framework
In recognizing that parental rights enjoy constitutional protection, the
Supreme Court in the 1920s grounded the doctrine in the rights of citizens in
a liberal society to privacy and freedom from undue state interference. 238 The
Court reasoned that state deference to parental decisionmaking safeguards
pluralism, because numerous and competing visions of appropriate childrearing coexist in our diverse society, and many approaches are rooted in
religious beliefs and cultural, social, and political values. As the Court stated,
it is not for “the State to standardize its children” because “[t]he child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.” 239 The Court’s commitment to liberal principles thus
supported constitutional protection of parental decisionmaking.
These principles continue to support parental rights. Protection of family privacy and of parental freedom to make childrearing choices is as important today as it was a century ago. But these traditional justifications
cannot fully explain the continued robustness of these rights, nor do they
supply a limit to parental authority, giving weight to the claim that parental
rights can threaten child wellbeing. 240

237. See supra text accompanying notes 123–136.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
239. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
240. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court recognized a limit to parental rights
based on harm to a child, see 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944), but the Court did not articulate a
principle for drawing this line, id. at 171. Indeed, the intervention upheld in Prince (against a
Jehovah’s Witness guardian distributing religious literature with her child), id. at 160–63, 170,
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The Child Wellbeing framework fills this gap. Analysis of modern parental rights doctrine in our framework underscores the importance of child
wellbeing as a reinforcing rationale for the law’s continued deference to parental authority as well as a self-limiting mechanism for these rights. Courts
in affirming parental rights are sometimes explicit about the values underlying the framework, but these values are often implicit.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize a point that is
sometimes obscured in children’s rights discourse and seldom acknowledged
by advocates such as Dwyer, Dailey, and Rosenbury 241: children, particularly
younger children, are often incapable of making decisions on their own behalf about healthcare, education, and other critical matters. Thus, a surrogate
decisionmaker will be required—and that surrogate will be either the child’s
parents or a state actor. If parents’ authority is withdrawn or seriously restricted, the state necessarily will have a larger role regulating families than
under current law. 242 To be sure, in some contexts, as we discuss in Part IV,
adolescents have the right to make their own decisions. But in those situations, which are relatively limited, the minor makes the decision, and thus
the state’s role is not expanded. Appreciating that children typically need a
surrogate decisionmaker, the question facing lawmakers becomes whether
the promotion of child wellbeing is better served by deferring to parental decisionmaking or expanding the state’s role by restricting parental rights. 243
The contemporary framework emphasizes two important reasons parental rights usually promote child wellbeing and expanding state authority

supports the concern that Prince’s broad articulation of the principle fails to restrict biased decisionmaking by state actors.
241. See JAMES G. DWYER & SHAWN F. PETERS, HOMESCHOOLING: THE HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF A CONTROVERSIAL PRACTICE 194 (2019) (dismissing the argument that parental rights further children’s interests because “[i]f the ultimate justification for a right is the
welfare of a child, then logically the right should belong to the child” but not addressing the
problem of vindicating these rights through a nonparental surrogate); see also Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 113, at 1471–72, 1510 (arguing that parental rights play an important protective role for very young children but, beyond this period, proposing to limit parental rights by
“situating the parent-child relationship within a larger web of children’s relationships and interests” and weighing more heavily “children’s interests in maintaining close ties to other children and adults, in being exposed to new ideas, in expressing their identity, in protecting their
personal integrity and privacy, and in participating in civic life,” but not specifying who will
vindicate these interests in court-based disputes and not addressing the concern about an expanded state role).
242. See Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J.F. 942,
947 (2018) (critiquing Dailey and Rosenbury because “in too many places, their fix for current
failings in the law is to shift ultimate decision-making authority from parents to judges. In my
view, this shift is deeply flawed, if for no other reason than there is insufficient correspondence
between giving judges authority over children’s lives and making good decisions for the individual children affected by the court order”).
243. See id.; Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights?: Why Less is More, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101, 1104–14 (2003).
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does not. 244 First, deference to parental authority protects the stability of the
parent-child relationship. 245 To be sure, some indeterminacy exists about
how to define and promote child wellbeing, given the complexity of children’s lives and empirical uncertainty about the impact of different childrearing approaches. 246 But there is no controversy about the importance of
the child’s relationship with her parent. Based on a large body of research, it
is clear that a strong, stable parent-child relationship is critical for healthy
child development, 247 and the disruption and destabilization of this relationship threatens serious harm to the child. 248 A regime of robust parental
rights is likely the best means of satisfying this fundamental need of children
because it restricts state intervention in the family and thus reduces the
child’s exposure to the accompanying risks, 249 particularly removal of the
child from the home. 250 Protection from state intervention is especially important for children of color and low-income families in light of racial disproportionality and disparities in the child welfare system. 251 Parental rights
provide an essential shield against excessive state intrusion driven by bias. 252
Second, deference to parental decisionmaking also promotes child wellbeing because parents are generally better positioned than state actors, such
as judges, social workers, or other third parties, to understand their child’s
needs and make decisions that will further that child’s interests. 253 This advantage is rooted in the parent’s superior knowledge of and association with
the child as compared with outsiders to the family. Moreover, the legal system is not well equipped to determine what will promote the wellbeing of a

244. See infra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing the work of other scholars
who have made this argument).
245. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit developed this rationale. See supra note 236. For an
extended discussion of this justification for parental rights, see GUGGENHEIM, supra note 93, at
174–212.
246. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part V.
247. As this research demonstrates, nearly every important aspect of child development
turns on a consistent and caring relationship between a parent and child. 1 JOHN BOWLBY,
ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT (1969); 2 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS:
SEPARATION (1973); 3 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: LOSS (1980).
248. For the foundational work on the importance of attachment and the harms from
disruption, see 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT 27–30, 209, 326, 330
(1969); 2 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: SEPARATION 4–16, 245–57 (1973); 3 JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: LOSS 7–14, 397–411 (1980).
249. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 236, at 10–28.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 210–211.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 88–91.
252. See Bach, supra note 143, at 1073–76.
253. This argument has been well developed by scholars. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra
note 93, at 35–39; Buss, supra note 236, at 284–90; Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA.
L. REV. 635, 647–50 (2002) [hereinafter “Parental” Rights]; Scott & Scott, supra note 236, at
2430–52.
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particular child. 254 Deference is further justified by the well-founded assumption that parents are intrinsically motivated to care for their children
due to powerful affective bonds. 255 The child-serving benefits of parental decisionmaking has been recognized on occasion by the Supreme Court 256 and
by scholars. 257
In addition to promoting child wellbeing, robust protection of parental
rights also advances society’s interests. In a country in which family-state relations are governed by libertarian principles, parents are burdened with the
weighty responsibility of raising the next generation of citizens. 258 Having
placed this burden on parents, with only limited support from the state, society has an interest in ensuring that parents discharge their obligations adequately. Strong protection of parental rights shows respect for and deference
to parents for the important job they undertake. This deference reinforces
parental commitment to undertake the duties of parenthood and facilitates
their ability to do so without excessive interference. 259 Society then benefits
when parents perform their duties satisfactorily and children mature to
healthy adulthood; otherwise the state itself must assume responsibility at
substantial cost. Even in a society in which the state provided greater support
for families, 260 respect for parental authority would further social welfare because parents would be even better equipped to provide for their children’s
needs. Given the current allocation of responsibility, enhancing parents’ role
satisfaction and facilitating adequate performance of their child-rearing duties takes on a special urgency.

254. For the classic account, see Mnookin, supra note 12. State decisionmaking that
preempts parental authority across all families, such as school attendance and child labor laws,
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 47, can be more easily rationalized than individualized intervention.
Widely applicable preemption of parental authority imposes costs on parental decisionmaking,
but broad-based rules are typically grounded in social consensus and, increasingly, in research
on child development. Further, these generally applicable rules are less susceptible to the concerns of bias and indeterminacy that accompany individual intervention. See Mnookin, supra
note 12, at 268–70.
255. The altruistic conception of a parent’s love for a child is at least as old as Aristotle.
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 290 (J. E. C. Welldon trans., MacMillan & Co. 1892)
(describing that a mother “wishes and does what is good, or what seems to be good” for her
child’s sake); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *435 (“The municipal laws of
all well-regulated states have taken care to enforce [parental duties]: though providence has
done it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breast of every parent that natural . . . or insuperable degree of affection . . . .”).
256. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979) (upholding a presumption that parents
make medical decisions to further their children’s welfare because “natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children” and that “pages of human experience . . . teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests”).
257. See supra note 253.
258. See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.3 (describing and critiquing this approach).
259. See Buss, supra note 236, at 290–94; Scott & Scott, supra note 236, at 2430–52.
260. This is the position we argue in Section II.B.3.
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Analysis in the framework justifies strong protection of parental rights,
but the framework also provides a more compelling rationale for restricting
parental authority than the traditional justification. The constitutional
grounding of parental rights in liberal principles, supporting family privacy
and parental freedom, provides no defined boundaries. With child wellbeing
as the polestar, our framework clarifies that parents are not free to inflict serious harm on their children or to create a serious risk of such harm. Such
actions do not further child wellbeing and thus are not protected under this
rationale for parental authority. This is true even if the parent’s decision is
motivated by deeply held values or religious beliefs. When a parent’s action
seriously threatens the child’s welfare, state intervention overriding parental
authority is justified. 261 In this way, the child-wellbeing justification for parental rights is self-limiting. 262
In sum, the Child Wellbeing framework rationalizes a regime of strong
parental rights, emphasizing a legal justification for these rights. This approach recognizes that sometimes a parent may not act in the child’s interest,
but only if serious harm is threatened can we be confident that state intervention is warranted. This rationale for parental rights is largely compatible
with the liberal justification that undergirds constitutional doctrine but also
ensures that children’s wellbeing is at the center of the analysis.
B. The Framework in Practice
Four doctrinal examples illustrate the descriptive and normative power
of the framework we identify. Although lawmakers may not explicitly invoke
a child-wellbeing rationale for parental rights, current doctrine is compatible
with the framework, providing a normatively appealing contemporary justification. Of course, the goal of promoting child wellbeing does not inform
contemporary parental rights doctrine in every context or in every jurisdiction. In some states, lawmakers discount children’s interest in defining doctrine on issues such as homeschooling, while other lawmakers fail to recogrecognize that diluting parental authority undermines child wellbeing. 263 But
overall, as the examples demonstrate, parental rights can be justified on
child-wellbeing grounds, as well as on the basis of more abstract liberal principles.

261. The Child Wellbeing framework thus supplies a rule of decision for state intervention—no intervention unless there is serious harm—which courts then apply in individual cases.
262. See supra note 240 (arguing that although the Supreme Court recognized harm to
the child as a limit on parental rights in Prince v. Massachusetts, that decision did not establish
a line for determining when the harm would be sufficient to overcome parental rights and in
practice did not provide meaningful protection for vulnerable families).
263. See infra Section III.B.4 (contending that homeschooling regulation in some states
fails to ensure that children receive an adequate education); infra Section III.B.2 (arguing that
the use of a best-interest standard to determine whether a court can order contact between a
third-party and a child is potentially harmful to children).
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Corporal Punishment

We begin with an example that is perhaps counterintuitive, showing that
the modern privilege to use reasonable corporal punishment is consistent
with the Child Wellbeing framework. The law has long recognized a parental
privilege to use reasonable corporal punishment, but the justification rested
on deference to parental rights, together with the notion that physical punishment benefitted the child. 264 By contrast, the modern privilege, which applies in both criminal and civil proceedings, 265 does not endorse corporal
punishment as beneficial to children and instead is justified as a limit on
state power in light of the dangers that accompany state intervention. 266 Further, the modern privilege restricts the understanding of reasonable corporal
punishment: a parent’s use of corporal punishment is not privileged if, in the
criminal context, the punishment inflicts serious harm or grossly degrades
the child, or, in the child-protection context, the punishment inflicts physical
harm beyond minor pain or transient marks. 267
Although it may seem counterintuitive, we contend that the Child Wellbeing framework supports the privilege, primarily because the privilege places a critical constraint on state intervention. Without the privilege, the state
could initiate either a criminal prosecution or a child-protection petition
whenever a parent used physical punishment, bringing the full force of the
state to bear on the family and potentially resulting in the incarceration of a
parent or the placement of the child in foster care—both serious disruptions
to the core parent-child relationship. By maintaining the privilege and tailoring the reasonableness requirement to the form of state action, the privilege
recognizes the trade-off between protecting children from harm inflicted by

264. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 255, at *440 (“[A parent] may lawfully correct his
child, being under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education.”
(footnote omitted)).
265. For sample criminal statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403(1) (2010); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (2019); and MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.136b(9) (LexisNexis
2014), and for sample civil statutes see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(3)(C)(i) (2015) and 325
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 3(e) (West 2018).
266. In retaining the privilege, lawmakers weigh potential harm to a child from a parent’s
use of corporal punishment against the significant risks that accompany state intervention. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 868 (Mass. 2015) (“[T]he parental privilege defense must strike a balance between protecting children from punishment that is excessive in
nature, while at the same time permitting parents to use limited physical force in disciplining
their children without incurring criminal sanction.”); In re J.A.J., 225 S.W.3d 621, 629–31 (Tex.
App. 2006) (noting that the court should not hold parents to an ideal standard, and instead
should focus on the child’s welfare).
267. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018) (stating that in a civil child-protection proceeding, reasonableness is “determined in part by whether the corporal punishment caused, or created a substantial risk of
causing, physical harm beyond minor pain or transient marks”); id. § 3.24(a) (stating that in a
criminal proceeding, reasonableness is “determined in part by whether the corporal punishment caused, or created a substantial risk of causing, serious physical harm or gross degradation”).
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parents and protecting children from harm inflicted by state intervention.
The privilege thus promotes the child’s interest in the stability of the parentchild relationship and shields the child from the risks that accompany state
intervention by limiting it to truly necessary circumstances.
Abolishing the privilege would greatly expand state power, posing a
threat to all families but particularly those who are already subject to excessive state intervention. Parental use of physical discipline is declining, but
many parents, particularly in low-income families and families of color, still
turn to corporal punishment to discipline children. 268 In light of this disproportionate use of corporal punishment, particularly by Black parents, 269 the
danger of intervention is particularly acute for families at already serious risk
of family disruption through both the criminal justice and child welfare systems.
The privilege thus integrates the interests of parents, children, and the
state in avoiding unnecessary state intervention and unwarranted removal of
a child from the home. The child also has an interest in not being struck, but
the state can further this interest through less intrusive means, as discussed
below. By clarifying that the privilege does not give parents a license to use
harsh physical punishment but also restricts the state from intervening when
parenting may be suboptimal but not seriously harmful, the privilege exemplifies the self-limiting constraint on parental rights in the Child Wellbeing
framework. 270
The framework also provides a response to the claims of children’s
rights advocates who seek to outlaw corporal punishment, citing evidence
that it is harmful to children. 271 To be sure, there is considerable evidence

268. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA: OUTLOOK, WORRIES,
ASPIRATIONS ARE STRONGLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SITUATION 45–48 (2015),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/12/2015-12-17_parentingin-america_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7AJ-BYY2]; Regina A. Corso, Four in Five Americans Believe Parents Spanking Their Children Is Sometimes Appropriate, HARRIS POLL (Sept. 26,
2013), https://theharrispoll.com/new-york-n-y-september-26-2013 [https://perma.cc/8JWVVK6P].
269. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 268, at 12 (stating that in a survey of 1,807 parents,
55% of white parents reported never spanking a child, 28% reported rarely spanking a child,
and 14% reported often or sometimes spanking a child; of the Black parents, 31% reported
never spanking a child, 32% reported rarely spanking a child, and 32% reported often or sometimes spanking a child).
270. This justification explains why the Child Wellbeing framework supports the parental privilege but condemns corporal punishment in schools. Most (but not enough) states ban
corporal punishment in the educational setting. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE
LAW § 8.10 Reporters’ Note cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (listing statutes). In the school context, there are no family integrity concerns, and instead the child’s interests in dignity and bodily integrity are paramount and support a complete ban on corporal
punishment.
271. See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 113, at 1523–24; Cynthia Godsoe, Redefining Parental Rights: The Case of Corporal Punishment, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 281, 284 (2017);
see also Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to
Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, U.N.
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that harsh forms of corporal punishment harm children. 272 The law thus
properly treats this conduct as child abuse, and it is the basis for state intervention through a child-protection proceeding or criminal prosecution. 273
By contrast, there is not clear evidence that spanking is harmful to children, 274 and thus any potential benefit to children from withdrawing the
privilege must be weighed against the dangers associated with state intervention. The privilege does protect some corporal punishment beyond spanking, 275 but by drawing the line at reasonableness, the privilege protects
children from harsh forms of corporal punishment and the harms of unnecessary state intervention. Scholars who endorse the abolition of the privilege
typically do not account for this latter harm. 276
Maintaining the privilege on child-wellbeing grounds does not represent
an endorsement of corporal punishment. 277 To promote a no-hitting norm,
the state can use noncoercive methods such as public education programs
and parenting programs that teach parents alternative methods of discipline. 278 But the new framework highlights the risks of prohibiting corporal
punishment through coercive intervention.

Doc. CRC/G/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007) (interpreting the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child to prohibit all forms of corporal punishment, partly due to the potential harm to the
child but primarily because of the child’s dignitary interest).
272. See Diana Baumrind et al., Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It Harmful? Comment
on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 581 (2002) (describing the consensus among social scientists that harsh forms of corporal punishment that amount to abuse are detrimental to
children).
273. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2) (West 2019) (distinguishing civil child abuse
from reasonable corporal punishment); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.136b(9) (2019) (distinguishing criminal child abuse from reasonable corporal punishment).
274. Compare Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes: Old Controversies and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 453, 457 (2016) (analyzing prior research studies to show that spanking is associated with a greater likelihood of
detrimental child outcomes), with Baumrind et al., supra note 272, at 586 (criticizing the underlying studies supporting Gershoff’s conclusions for failing to distinguish between instances
of extreme and excessive punishment and normative spanking that did not cause injury beyond mild pain), and Robert E. Larzelere et al., The Intervention Selection Bias: An Underrecognized Confound in Intervention Research, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 289, 290 (2004) (discussing
how selection bias can affect the outcome of studies analyzing the effects of spanking).
275. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24 cmts. e & g (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
276. See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 113, at 1523–24; Godsoe, supra note 271, at
284.
277. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Laskey, 15 Pa. D. & C.4th 416, 420–21 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1992) (explaining that “[w]hile the court frowns upon the use of corporal punishment upon
any child” the court also recognizes that “the Pennsylvania Legislature clearly intended to permit parents to use corporal punishment in disciplining their children for misconduct without
putting them in jeopardy of having criminal charges filed against them”).
278. Private parties can also play a role in promoting this norm. See Robert D. Sege &
Benjamin S. Siegel, Effective Discipline to Raise Healthy Children, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, Dec.
2018, at 5, https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/142/6/e20183112.full.pdf
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Traditional constitutional values and principles also support the privilege. 279 Many families who use corporal punishment do so because it comports with religious or cultural beliefs. 280 The privilege thus protects family
privacy and religious views by restraining courts and other legal actors from
imposing their own values and judgments about appropriate childrearing,
while simultaneously protecting children from serious harm. 281 This constraint on state intervention in the lives of citizens embodies a respect for
liberal values and promotes pluralism, also a core commitment in liberal society. Unlike the traditional rationales, however, the child-wellbeing rationale supplies a critical self-limiting mechanism to parental authority.
2.

Third-Party Contact and De Facto Parents

The law governing third-party contact and de facto parents provides another example of the explanatory power of the Child Wellbeing framework.
Most parents reach informal agreements with other individuals about contact with children, but when a parent refuses to allow contact, two kinds of
plaintiffs may seek court orders overriding a parent’s decision. The first is a
third party, such as a grandparent or sibling, and the second is an individual
who has functioned as a parent to the child, often called a de facto parent.
The law has developed in seemingly divergent ways to address claims by
third parties and de facto parents, affording considerable deference to parents in third-party cases, and much less deference in de-facto-parent cases.
The Child Wellbeing framework clarifies that although lawmakers’ responses
appear inconsistent, they are coherent and justified as promoting child wellbeing.
We start with third-party contact. Beginning in the 1960s, state legislatures enacted statutes authorizing third parties to seek contact with children
over parents’ objections, 282 diluting parents’ absolute right at common law to

[https://perma.cc/MKB4-M8DN] (advising pediatricians to help parents use noncorporal
methods of discipline).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 53–58 (describing libertarian and family privacy
justifications for parental rights).
280. See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Shaakirrah R. Sanders, By Faith Alone: When Religious
Beliefs and Child Welfare Collide, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 308,
318–20 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 54 M.J. 489, 491 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“In this area of
law there is an inherent tension between the privacy and sanctity of the family . . . and the interest of the state in the safety and well-being of children. The affirmative defense of parental
discipline resides at the crossroad of these two significant interests.”); Paida v. Leach, 917 P.2d
1342, 1349 (Kan. 1996) (“[I]t would be undesirable to have each judge freely imposing his or
her own morality, own concept of what is acceptable, own notions of child rearing . . . on the
circumstances of the litigants.”).
282. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2 (LexisNexis 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West
2016); IND. CODE § 31-17-5-1 (Supp. 1997). For an overview, see Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the
Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 2–3, 3 n.11 (2013).
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control a child’s associations. 283 Every state now grants standing to grandparents to make these claims, 284 and some states give standing to other third
parties, including non–family members. 285 Although these statutes implicate
a parent’s right to make decisions about a child’s upbringing, the U.S. Supreme Court, in reviewing a broadly worded statute, has held only that
courts must accord “at least some special weight” to the parent’s decision. 286
Despite the absence of clear guidance from the Court, lawmakers increasingly have adopted a standard that is highly deferential to parents, identifying only limited circumstances in which a court is authorized to override
a parent’s decision about a child’s contact with third parties. 287 Under the
deferential standard, a court can order contact only if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that denying the contact would pose a substantial risk
of serious harm to the child. 288 By contrast, some states have adopted a less
deferential standard, authorizing courts to override the parent’s decision if
the court determines contact is in the child’s best interest. 289
Analysis in the Child Wellbeing framework demonstrates that the deferential standard promotes child wellbeing more effectively than the bestinterest standard. 290 First, court-ordered contact with a third party overrides
283. See, e.g., Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 645–46 (Ala. 2011).
284. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 233301 (Supp. 2018); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West 2006); see also Atkinson, supra note
282 at 20–23 app. 1.
285. These include siblings, former stepparents, and other persons. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-3 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (LexisNexis 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-7.1 (West 2013 & Supp. 2019).
286. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 76–77 (Souter,
J., concurring) (finding the statute sweeps too broadly because it authorizes a suit by any person at any time). The case generated multiple opinions, and most justices did find that the
Constitution protects the right of a parent to make associational decisions for a child, but the
plurality and concurring opinions did not determine the extent of this protection and did not
find that the Constitution requires a state to adopt the more demanding harm standard. See
Buss, supra note 236, at 282–84 (describing the multiple opinions). As Emily Buss has argued,
the Court’s decision is deeply problematic because it invites courts to second-guess parental
decisions without any evidence that this will benefit children or families. See id. at 284–87,
302–16.
287. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–409 (2017 & Supp. 2018); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3104 (West Supp. 2019); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 870–71, 874 (Ky. 2012); Roth v.
Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 450 (Conn. 2002).
288. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.80(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2019) (listing other elements). A court cannot override a parent’s objection simply
because contact with the third party would benefit the child or because the child might experience some distress at the loss of the contact. See id. § 1.80(b) cmt. g. Twenty-one states have
adopted this highly deferential standard. See id. § 1.80(b) Reporters’ Note cmt. g.
289. See id. § 1.80(b) Reporters’ Note cmt. g. These states do, however, require that the
third party rebut the presumption that the parent’s decision is in the child’s best interest. See
id.
290. This discussion relies on the work of Emily Buss, who has set forth in detail the reasons favoring the highly deferential standard. See Buss, supra note 236, at 287–98; see also Buss,
“Parental” Rights, supra note 253, at 647–50.
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the decision of the adult who bears full child-rearing responsibility, with little reason to believe that the court will make a better decision. A parent is
better positioned than a judge to assess what third-party contact, if any, is
best for the child. In the typical case, a parent’s knowledge of the child and
affective bonds of attachment will lead to a decision in the child’s interest. 291
Further, allowing ongoing contact over the parent’s objection likely will
strain the parent-child relationship, the stability of which is central to
healthy child development. 292 Separate from the substantive outcome, the
deferential standard protects the child from the predictable stress of a protracted and high-conflict legal dispute. 293 Finally, if the intrusion allows contact with a third party (who lacks any responsibility for the child’s care) over
the parent’s objections, the parent may understandably feel resentment, potentially affecting the parent’s enthusiasm for fulfilling those obligations that
society has imposed on her; in this way, the social welfare benefits of encouraging parents to fulfill their obligations is compromised. 294
This analysis makes clear that child wellbeing is served by the deferential
standard, which overrides the parent’s objection only when the decision
threatens serious harm to the child. Of course, parents are not always correct
in their decisions, and in some situations the deferential standard may deprive the child of the benefits of contact. But the standard’s self-limiting
mechanism provides protection if the child will be seriously harmed by the
lack of contact; then the court can override the parent’s judgment. In granting standing to third parties, lawmakers generally aim to promote the child’s
wellbeing, but the contemporary framework clarifies that paradoxically this
goal is far more likely to be attained under a standard that is deferential to
parents than under the permissive alternative that purports to further the
child’s best interest.
The traditional liberal justifications for parental rights also support deference to parents in these contests. A deferential standard reinforces the
principle of family privacy and promotes the value of pluralism in our society. Many parents choose to shield their children from certain influences and
values or to expose their children only to those views that are consistent with

291. See Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 253, at 647; Scott & Scott, supra note 236, at
2433–35.
292. When a third party petitions for contact, the parent has already decided that the
child should not have contact with the third party. Overriding this decision empowers a third
party to insert him or herself into the family. See Major v. Maguire, 128 A.3d 675, 687 (N.J.
2016); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (noting that “the burden of litigating
a domestic relations proceeding can itself be ‘so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that
the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the
child’s welfare becomes implicated’ ” (quoting 530 U.S. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting))).
293. Litigation may include interviews by mental health professionals, judges, and other
experts, and the proceeding can create a loyalty conflict for the child, who may be asked to
choose whether to side with the parent or the third party. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND
THE LAW § 1.80 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
294. See Buss, supra 236, at 293–94; Scott & Scott, supra note 236, at 2414–15.
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the parents’ values. A pluralist society respects such decisions. And again, the
self-limiting principle ensures that if the parent’s decision poses a substantial
risk of serious harm to the child, then the court can override the parent.
In responding to claims by de facto parents, in contrast, lawmakers have
typically not deferred to the objections of legal parents—and, perhaps counterintuitively, this response also fits comfortably in the Child Wellbeing
framework. The common law did not distinguish among third parties and
instead treated all nonparents as legal strangers to the child. 295 Beginning in
the 1980s, however, as same-sex couples began to have and raise children together, advocates sought legal recognition for nonbiological, nonmarital
adults acting as parents in these relationships. 296 Courts began to adopt equitable and common-law remedies to recognize individuals who were parents
in all but name, concluding that they were de facto parents. 297 Legislatures
recently followed suit, enacting statutes to protect the relationships between
children and adults who live with the child and assume substantial responsibility with the consent of the legal parent. 298
This trend toward widespread recognition of de facto parents promotes
child wellbeing, despite the costs imposed on legal parents. From the child’s
perspective, the adult who has been acting as a parent is a parent. 299 Allowing

295. See, e.g., In re C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 216 (Colo. App. 2007); In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d
400, 404–05 (Iowa 1993). Legal parents included biological and adoptive parents and parents
pursuant to the marital presumption.
296. For a history of these efforts, see NeJaime, supra note 139, at 1193–230.
297. See id. at 1222–29 (describing this judicial recognition and noting the other names
courts used, such as functional parent and psychological parent).
298. Today, approximately half of the states treat de facto parents the same as legal parents. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201, 1101 (1974 & Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.270 (LexisNexis 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-60 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C,
§ 501 (LexisNexis 2018); NeJaime, supra note 140, at app. C at 2370–72; see also UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT 2017 § 609 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
Individuals claiming this status must satisfy a demanding standard. See, e.g., In re Custody of
B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 478 (Wash. 2013).
299. Courts recognize this difference and thus distinguish the concerns set forth in
Troxel. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011) (noting that “[t]his is not a case,
like Troxel, where a third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship (e.g., the child’s
grandparents) seeks visitation rights” and that petitioner who sought contact with her former
partner’s adopted child was “not ‘any third party.’ Rather, she is a . . . de facto parent” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion))); McDermott
v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 772 (Md. 2005) (distinguishing “pure third parties” from psychological parents and defining “psychological parents” as “third parties who have, in effect, become parents”). For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of recognizing de facto parparents, see Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261 (2020), for
an argument that the protection of parents under the Due Process Clause should not turn solely on biology (or adoption) and that nonbiological parents also have a constitutionally protected liberty interest; Gregg Strauss, What Role Remains for De Facto Parenthood?, 46 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 909 (2019) for an argument that the de facto parent doctrine may be constitutionally
defensible as applied to adults who have truly acted as functional parents but the doctrine allows for a broader application, which raises serious constitutional concerns; and Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 253, at 654–68 for an argument that the Constitution does and should
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a legal parent to exclude a de facto parent would disrupt one of a child’s central relationships, which robust research shows would create a risk of serious
harm to the child. 300 Thus, the de facto parenthood doctrine is supported by
the same evidence that supports strong parental rights generally. 301 Unlike a
third party seeking contact with the child over a parent’s objection, the de
facto parent has fulfilled parental responsibilities and will do so in the future. 302 Further, the recognition of de facto parents encourages individuals
living with partner-parents to assume the significant responsibilities of raising a child, benefitting both children and society. Finally, the recognition of
de facto parents is particularly important for children in families that do not
fall into the traditional norm of two married parents. 303 For all these reasons,
it follows that a de facto parent need not show serious harm to the child if
their relationship is severed: the test presumes that disruption of a child’s relationship with a person acting as a parent will harm the child. 304
In short, the interpretive and normative framework we offer clarifies
that child wellbeing is furthered by strong protection of parental rights in the
third-party-contact context but by less deference to legal parents in the defacto-parent context. These outcomes are wholly consistent: both rules draw
on substantial research demonstrating the harm to children of disrupting
core family relationships, and both allow state intervention only when the
legal parent’s decision poses a substantial risk of serious harm to the child.
3.

Decisions About Medical Care

Contemporary doctrine regulating parental authority to make medical
decisions for children provides a third example of the explanatory power of
the Child Wellbeing framework. Here again, contemporary law defers to parental authority but limits that authority if the parent’s decision poses a risk
of serious harm to the child or, in some instances, to public health. This ap-

protect parental authority when the identity of a parent is clear but that the state has a proper
role to play in deciding among claims to legal parenthood.
300. The stringent test for recognizing an individual as a de facto parent, see supra note
298, ensures that only those individuals who have truly functioned as parents will be placed on
a similar plane as legal parents. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82(d) cmt. k
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
301. See supra notes 247–248 and accompanying text.
302. A court may require a de facto parent to pay child support. RESTATEMENT OF
CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
303. Marriage rates differ by both race and income. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON VIEWS
OF RACE AND INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE WORLDS APART 28–29 (2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ST_2016.06.27_RaceInequality-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UZT-SZCA] (describing marriage rates by race and
education and noting that Blacks are the least likely to marry, even after controlling for education).
304. There are costs to the de facto parent doctrine, such as the potential for litigation to
determine whether an adult satisfies the standard, but the Child Wellbeing framework tolerates
these possible costs considering the importance of the relationship to the child.
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proach represents a recent reform of common-law doctrine, under which
parents had near-complete authority to make medical decisions for children,
including the right to decline medical treatment. 305 Today, a parent is not
free to make decisions that seriously threaten the child’s health, 306 and social
welfare considerations are also at play. As with the earlier examples, the
Child Wellbeing framework illuminates the current approach of the law and
provides a guide to courts deciding these cases in the future.
Parental authority to make medical decisions is justified largely for the
same reasons that parental authority generally is justified. 307 Restricting the
ability of the state to second-guess parents in this context protects children
from the disruption of state intervention and allows parents, with their
greater knowledge of their children’s needs, to make these decisions. 308 Absent evidence to the contrary, a parent’s decision can be assumed to further
the child’s wellbeing because parents are motivated by love and concern for
their children. And the parent will often play a central role in ensuring the
child follows the treatment, and thus the parent’s agreement is critical. Deference to parental authority to make healthcare decisions supports parents
and may enhance role satisfaction as they undertake the substantial responsibilities of raising a child. Finally, this protection from state intervention is
particularly important for low-income families and families of color, who are
at a heightened risk for state scrutiny and oversight. Thus, legal doctrine on
this issue demonstrates the convergence of the interests of parents, children,
and the state because, in the typical case, parental authority promotes the interests of both the child and the state.
As in other decisionmaking contexts, parents do not have absolute authority to make these decisions. Parental authority grounded in the principle
of child wellbeing is self-limited; parents do not receive deference if their decision to pursue or refuse treatment poses a substantial risk of serious harm
to the child. For example, courts will order a blood transfusion over the parent’s objection when the treatment is necessary to prevent serious harm to
the child, even though the parent’s decision is based on religious belief. 309
305. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115–16 (Del. 1991) (describing the
common law rule).
306. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.30(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018) (“A parent does not have authority to consent to medical procedures or
treatments that provide no health benefit to the child and pose a substantial risk of serious
harm to the child’s physical or mental health.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979)
(recognizing parents’ broad authority over medical decisionmaking for children but also noting that the “state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized”).
307. See supra Section III.A.
308. See supra Section III.A; see also Maxine Eichner, Bad Medicine: Parents, the State,
and the Charge of “Medical Child Abuse,” 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 228–39 (2016) (describing the significant risks involved with allowing state intervention in parents’ medical decisionmaking).
309. See, e.g., In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991); In re Guardianship of L.S. &
H.S., 87 P.3d 521 (Nev. 2004).
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While the law is solicitous of medical decisions based on parents’ religious
beliefs, 310 the state can intervene if the parent’s refusal to provide medical
treatment poses a threat of serious harm to the child’s health. 311
Similarly, concerns about public heath can limit a parent’s medical decisionmaking authority, particularly the decision whether to vaccinate a child
against communicable diseases. Every state has adopted compulsory vaccination laws, 312 which the Supreme Court has long upheld. 313 Although
nearly every state has enacted a religious exemption to these requirements,
and a significant minority has enacted philosophical exemptions, these exemptions do not apply if there is an epidemic and the refusal to vaccinate the
child creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the public health. 314 Moreover, in light of recent outbreaks of communicable diseases, particularly
measles, some states have repealed their religious or philosophical exemptions—further evidence of the adoption of the Child Wellbeing framework. 315
Other justifications reinforce the child-wellbeing rationale for parental
authority to make healthcare decisions. Deference to parental authority
promotes pluralism and family privacy by respecting parents’ choices that
are rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs or cultural practices. But unlike
traditional rationales for parental rights, the contemporary framework con310. Most states have enacted spiritual treatment exemptions from the obligation of a
parent to seek medical care for a child. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.01(A)(1)
(2016); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 2016).
311. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). Pursuant to these exemptions, the state cannot initiate a child-protection proceeding for the sole reason that the parent
is treating the child with prayer alone. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, 63.2-100(2) (West
2017). But if the parent’s decision to use only spiritual healing results in or threatens harm to
the child that satisfies the harm threshold, the state can intervene and order medical treatment
against parental wishes. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.26 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
312. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.30 Statutory Note on Compulsory Vaccination (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
313. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (rejecting equal protection and due process
challenge to ordinance that prohibited a child from attending school without proof of vaccination even though there was no threat of an epidemic); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
25 (1905) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Massachusetts’s compulsory vaccination law
and holding that such laws are within the state’s police power to enact legislation “as will protect the public health and the public safety”).
314. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.30 cmt. d, Statutory Note on
Compulsory Vaccination (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
315. See Act of June 30, 2015, ch. 35, 2015 Cal. Stat. 1438 (repealing religious and philosophical exemptions); An Act Relating to Reportable Disease Registries and Data, 2015 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 341 (repealing philosophical exemption); Soumya Karlamangla & Rong-Gong
Lin II, Vaccination Rate Jumps in California After Tougher Inoculation Law, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
13, 2017, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-vaccination20170412-story.html [https://perma.cc/GGV7-U7UU] (describing a measles outbreak as the
impetus for California’s repeal); Michael Specter, Vermont Says No to the Anti-Vaccine Movement, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/vermontsays-no-to-the-anti-vaccine-movement [https://perma.cc/33N4-B7DX].
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strains parental authority and provides a workable limit, prohibiting
healthcare decisions that risk serious harm to the child or public.
4.

Homeschooling

The legal regulation of homeschooling 316—a widespread practice in the
United States—provides a final example for analysis in the Child Wellbeing
framework. 317 In this context, however, the framework provides more normative guidance than interpretive clarity. In every state, parents may educate
their children at home, 318 but the law’s general endorsement of homeschooling is controversial. While it has many passionate advocates, 319 homeschooling also has many critics, with some opponents arguing that it should be
prohibited or significantly restricted. 320
States differ greatly in the extent to which homeschooling is regulated to
ensure that the child receives an adequate education. The new framework
rationalizes and supports the approach of the small minority of states that
authorize homeschooling subject to substantial regulation, including curricular requirements, teacher qualifications, and regular evaluation and report316. This section addresses homeschooling, but a similar analysis applies to state regulation of nonpublic schools, supporting substantial regulation of these schools. In New York, for
example, an ongoing controversy centers on state regulation of yeshivas. See Eliza Shapiro, Do
Students in Yeshivas Learn Secular Subjects? Inquiry May Settle Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2018,
at A22. In response to concerns about inadequate secular education, New York issued a guidance document in 2018 imposing far greater oversight on all nonpublic schools, including yeshivas. See N.Y. EDUC. DEP’T, SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCY REVIEW AND DETERMINATION
PROCESS (2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ny-guidance
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP4N-Tb7U].
317. Approximately 1.7 million children learn primarily at home—3.3 percent of all
school-age children. Digest of Education Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. tbl. 206.10,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_206.10.asp
[https://perma.cc/LN7Z9PLV]; Fast Facts: Homeschooling, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov
/fastfacts/display.asp?id=91 [https://perma.cc/UUM5-GFPY] (defining homeschooled students
as “school-age children (ages 5–17) in a grade equivalent to at least kindergarten and not higher than 12th grade who receive instruction at home instead of at a public or private school either all or most of the time”).
318. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2016 & Supp. 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
14, § 2703 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388D.020 (LexisNexis 2016); Current Homeschool
Law, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE HOME EDUC., https://www.responsiblehomeschooling.org
/policy-issues/current-policy/ [https://perma.cc/5PCE-BKC6].
319. See, e.g., About HSLDA, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://hslda.org/content
/about/ [https://perma.cc/6VAW-D7VZ].
320. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 136–37 (2010) (arguing that if homeschooling means children
“do not have adequate opportunity to develop liberal democratic dispositions,” then the state
should begin with a minimal intervention, such as requiring children to attend afterschool
programs, and then, if this is ineffective, the state could prohibit homeschooling completely);
Robin L. West, The Harms of Homeschooling, PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q., Summer/Fall 2009, at 7,
9–12 (describing the potential benefits of homeschooling but arguing that it should be regulated to ensure the education is adequate, children are safe, and a broad range of subjects are
taught).
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ing. 321 Allowing parents to choose to homeschool their children promotes
child wellbeing because parents are well positioned to determine the educational setting that best meets the needs of a particular child. Motivations to
homeschool are varied and include a desire to provide religious or moral instruction as well as concerns that available schools provide a substandard
education or that a child faces significant social challenges or physical danger. 322 Absent evidence to the contrary, a parent’s decision should be trusted
because of the parent’s intrinsic motivation to make decisions that promote
the child’s wellbeing. And deference to parental decisionmaking encourages
parents to assume the significant responsibilities that accompany childrearing by allowing parents to inculcate their values into the child’s education.
In the Child Wellbeing framework, the right to homeschool, like other
aspects of parental authority, is subject to a self-limiting mechanism. Thus,
parents are free to choose homeschooling only if the decision does not inflict
serious harm on children by providing them with an inadequate education.
This condition is satisfied in states with rigorous oversight of homeschooling, ensuring that predetermined educational standards are met by placing
obligations on both parents and the state. The cost imposed on parental decisionmaking is justified by the serious harms to both the child and society
that accompany a lack of education. 323
Homeschooling presents a harder case for deference to parental authority than the other examples. Even in states with rigorous oversight, homeschooling may pose a risk to children as future citizens. Forgoing the diverse
social influences that school attendance often provides allows parents to inculcate illiberal values more effectively than if the child were in school. 324 A
state can take some regulatory steps to mitigate this harm, such as imposing
321. These states are in the distinct minority. The Home School Legal Defense Fund
identifies only five states that it categorizes as having “high regulation”—Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Homeschool Laws in Your State, HOME
SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N, https://hslda.org/content/laws/ [https://perma.cc/6H9C-RCTA]. For
one example of this regulatory approach, see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10
(2019) (setting forth the requirements for “home instruction,” including the submission of an
individualized homeschooling plan that details the syllabi, course materials, and more; required review of the plan by the superintendent; required courses for each grade level; teaching
of certain subjects including citizenship and alcohol and drug education; and regular submission of progress reports and standardized testing). For a defense of state oversight and regulation, framed from the perspective of children’s rights, see DWYER & PETERS, supra note 241, at
197–99.
322. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2005, at 110 (2005) (reporting results of survey of parents and finding these as the
top three reasons for homeschooling).
323. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., ANNUAL EARNINGS OF
YOUNG ADULTS (2016) (“In 2014, the median earnings of young adults with a bachelor’s degree ($49,900) were 66 percent higher than the median earnings of young adult high school
completers ($30,000). The median earnings of young adult high school completers were 20
percent higher than the median earnings of those without a high school credential ($25,000).”).
324. See EICHNER, supra note 320, at 136–37; West, supra note 320, at 10. To be sure, not
all schools provide diverse social influences.
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curricular requirements. But ultimately the framework tolerates this cost to
child wellbeing and social welfare because of the intrusiveness of the state
evaluating parents’ worldviews to decide which are sufficiently illiberal to
justify greater state intrusion than, say, broad-based curricular requirements.
In contrast to the states that rigorously regulate homeschooling, many
states have limited or rarely enforced regulation. 325 These states can be
charged with grounding legal policy in a discredited conception of parental
rights—the notion that family privacy and pluralism justify parental decisions that seriously harm children. To be sure, some homeschooling in these
states may meet or exceed educational standards, but no regulatory oversight
ensures that it does. This highly deferential regulatory stance is not compatible with the child-wellbeing rationale for parental rights. It sacrifices a core
need of children, compromises the future lives of homeschooled children,
and imposes substantial costs on society, which has an important interest in
educated citizens. In these states, the interests of parents, children, and the
state do not converge. The framework clarifies these deficiencies and provides guidance to lawmakers formulating homeschooling regulation that is
compatible with the child-wellbeing rationale for parental rights.
*

*

*

Applying the Child Wellbeing framework to the domain of parental
rights strengthens the rationale for these rights, while integrating parental
rights into the larger regulatory framework governing children’s lives. Parental rights continue to be robust under contemporary law, for good reason.
Today, parental authority can be justified on the ground that it promotes
child wellbeing, which in turn promotes social welfare. In this way, the
framework demonstrates that strong parental rights are consistent with—
indeed, integral to—the state’s overriding purpose in regulating children and
families. Largely integrating the interests of parents, children, and the state
resolves important challenges confronting regulation in this area and provides a normative basis for deciding future questions.
IV. CHILD WELLBEING AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Children’s autonomy rights are understood conventionally to compete
with the state’s and parental authority. 326 In this Part, we challenge this con-

325. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-6-204(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019) (granting parents complete control of curricular choices, evaluation, and “the time, place, and method of
instruction”; prohibiting education officials from requiring parents to maintain records, obtain
credentials, and give standardized tests). The Home School Legal Defense Association identifies sixteen states as “low regulation.” See Homeschool Laws in Your State, supra note 321.
326. See supra Section I.B.2. The rights and privileges discussed in this Part do not include rights that inhere in children’s dependency, such as a right to financial support, or entitlements such as the right to education. Instead, this Part focuses on rights and privileges that
involve choices by minors.
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ventional wisdom, analyzing in the Child Wellbeing framework the pattern
of granting and withholding autonomy rights that has emerged over the past
half century. More specifically, we demonstrate that the view of children’s
rights as liberty interests that are inherently in competition with parental
and state authority is incomplete, in that it fails to recognize the importance
of child wellbeing in the selective conferral of particular legal rights and privileges on children (and withholding of others). Autonomy rights are conferred on minors, we argue, either when granting the right directly enhances
the young person’s wellbeing, or when the law’s restrictive stance toward
children threatens the child with serious harm as she matures. The framework also clarifies that the granting and withholding of rights often aims to
promote social welfare as well. Moreover, judgments about children’s maturity (important in many contexts to the decision of whether and when
conferring the right will benefit minors) are increasingly informed by developmental and other research. Finally, although concern about racial fairness
has not been front and center in this legal context, it has become an important subtext, particularly in juvenile justice, where the granting and withholding of rights functions to protect youth of color from state power. 327
Although the modern framework crystalized in twenty-first-century juvenile
justice reforms, we show that many late twentieth-century children’s rights
doctrines embody features of the framework that more recently has become
prominent.
Of course, decisions about granting and withholding rights are not always optimal and not all rights and privileges can be neatly analyzed in the
framework. Rights that might benefit minors are seldom conferred when
lawmakers and the public assume social welfare costs will follow. 328 But to a
far greater extent than has been generally recognized, the implicit, and sometimes explicit, basis for conferring particular rights and privileges on minors,
and the “schedule” on which rights are conferred, is to promote child wellbeing and, often, to benefit society as well.
A. Interpreting Children’s Rights in the Child Wellbeing Framework
As this Section demonstrates, the core elements of the Child Wellbeing
framework are at work in modern children’s rights doctrine.
1.

Child Wellbeing

Although advocates have challenged the withholding of rights and privileges from minors, it seems uncontroversial that children (particularly
younger children) may sometimes be incapable of self-interested exercise of
327. See infra text accompanying notes 412–416.
328. Restriction of the right to vote to citizens age eighteen and older may reflect a view
that younger teenagers will make immature choices, although many teenagers are likely as capable of exercising the right of political participation as are adults and could benefit from enfranchisement.
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particular rights—and granting these rights would threaten harm to the child
or to others. Some level of maturity is required to drive a motor vehicle safely or make a medical decision, for example, and it is assumed that both children and society benefit from the law’s protective stance. Thus, the
withholding of a right or privilege until an age at which the child is presumed sufficiently mature can reflect the assumption that the restriction
promotes his or her wellbeing. Of course, many adult rights and privileges
are not granted until children reach the age of majority and sometimes beyond. 329 But some of these restrictions are also justified on the ground that
child wellbeing is advanced. 330 Restrictions on the right to marry and on access to alcohol belong in this category.
When rights are granted to minors in contemporary law, one of two interwoven rationales, both implicating child wellbeing, appears to be salient.
First, some rights directly enhance child wellbeing. The benefits to minors in
holding rights, exercising voice, and enjoying adult privileges increase as
they mature; not surprisingly, most rights and privileges conferred on minors are limited to adolescents, either expressly or functionally. 331 The wellbeing of older minors is enhanced, for example, by having the privilege to
operate motor vehicles, the right of political expression, the presumption favoring their preferences in child custody disputes, 332 and the ability to make
routine medical decisions when parents are unavailable. These rights and
privileges would have little meaning for young children. Second, in some
contexts, lawmakers recognize that the law’s paternalistic rights-withholding
approach itself inflicts harms on children as they mature. 333 For example, the
Supreme Court in granting procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings acknowledged that the law’s traditional approach failed in its prom329. Two examples include access to alcohol, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 307 (West
2014) (criminalizing the sale of alcohol to anyone below the age of 21), and the right to consent
to sterilization, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 20-102(c)(5) (LexisNexis 2015) (“A
minor has the same capacity as an adult to consent to . . . [t]reatment for or advice about contraception other than sterilization . . . .”).
330. See infra Section IV.B.2.
331. As we show in Section IV.B, many examples support this rationale for granting
rights and privileges. Only mature minors are authorized to make medical decisions independently, for example, and often the right applies to decisions that involve conditions for
which only adolescents need treatment (the decision to terminate pregnancy, for example).
Assumptions about maturity and judgment also guide minimum-age requirements for various
privileges, such as those regulating motor vehicle operation and access to alcohol.
332. In custody disputes, little or no weight is assigned to the views of very young children, but adolescents’ preferences are virtually dispositive under normal circumstances and are
subject to a legal presumption in some states. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children’s Preference in
Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1988). See also Linda D. Elrod &
Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM.
L.Q. 577, 618 chart 2 (2002) (describing the role of the child’s preferences in custody disputes
between parents).
333. The two rationales often are different only in emphasis. A teenager benefits when
her preferences for custody are given substantial weight and may be harmed if they are ignored.
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ise to serve their interests. 334 Further, rights granted to minors—such as the
right to consent to treatment for substance abuse and to obtain contraceptives—can mitigate the harms of risky adolescent behaviors and thereby
promote minors’ wellbeing. 335
Sometimes, when rights are granted to minors, they are defined and limited in ways that promote minors’ wellbeing, because it is assumed that immaturity may lead to impetuous choices in the exercise of an otherwise
beneficial right. For example, restrictions on minors’ driving privileges represent efforts to define the privilege in a way that maximizes child wellbeing
and minimizes harms associated with immaturity. 336
2.

Social Welfare

Our interpretive framework similarly invites inquiry into whether promotion of social welfare has supported the granting and withholding of
rights to legal minors, reinforcing the goal of promoting child wellbeing. The
answer is yes, but to a lesser extent than in the realm of juvenile justice reform. To be sure, social welfare concerns are at work in rationalizing the
withholding of many rights until the age of majority; rights are not granted to
minors if substantial societal costs are anticipated. 337 Social costs may be
minimized by conferring rights as a package with other markers of adult status, such as withdrawal of parents’ support responsibility. 338 This approach
has societal benefits as it is administratively convenient and signals clearly to
those who deal with young people that their legal status has changed. Withholding some rights until the age of majority ostensibly serves society’s interest in other ways. Conferring the right to vote at age eighteen, for
example, arguably promotes society’s interest in a mature electorate more
effectively than would a younger voting age. 339 But these restrictions are justified largely on social welfare grounds with little attention to child wellbeing. 340 Many rights that are restricted to legal adults, however, arguably do fit
within the framework. The infancy doctrine in contract law 341 and the min-

334. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.c.
335. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1.a.ii, IV.B.1.a.iii.
336. See, e.g., Anne T. McCartt et al., Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of
Teenage Drivers: A National Study, 11 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 240, 246 (2010); Teenagers,
IIHS-HLDI (last updated Mar. 2020), https://www.iihs.org/topics/teenagers [https://
perma.cc/UNT4-22MD].
337. See infra Section IV.B.2.
338. See Scott, supra note 61, at 576–77.
339. See S. REP. NO. 92-26, at 5–6 (1971) (justifying eighteen-year-old voting on the bases
of maturity and adult treatment under the law).
340. Id.
341. See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Scott, supra note 61, at 553.
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imum age of marriage, 342 described below, can be defended on both childwellbeing and social-welfare grounds. 343
Social welfare can also figure in the calculus of whether children should
be granted adult rights. A brief description of two examples highlights the
convergence of child wellbeing and social welfare. Minors’ Consent statutes
target conditions for which effective treatment benefits not only the minor
but the larger community as well. Many statutes aim to facilitate treatment
for substance abuse and STDs and to provide sexually active teens with the
means to prevent pregnancy, thereby promoting their wellbeing. 344 Lawmakers also recognize that serious social costs are incurred if a minor fails to obtain treatment for these conditions. 345 A second example involves the
minimum-age requirements for obtaining a driver’s license (younger than
age eighteen in all states) and for obtaining alcohol (age twenty-one). This
combination creates a policy that aims to benefit adolescents, while minimizing the costs to society of granting them the right to engage in a valued, but
risky, activity. By separating the minimum ages for driving and drinking,
lawmakers recognize that young drivers are more inclined toward risktaking than older adults and will pose an even greater threat to society if they
have ready access to alcohol. 346
Finally, some rights benefit minors substantially with modest social cost.
For example, free speech rights benefit students and create a social benefit in
encouraging future citizens to engage in political discourse. As defined by
the Supreme Court, this right has minimal social costs, because student
speech that threatens the state’s ability to fulfill its educational function is
not protected. In general, both child wellbeing and social welfare likely play a
significant role in defining and limiting children’s rights. 347
3.

Developmental Research

Because the maturity of minors constitutes a key consideration in granting, withholding, and defining children’s rights, it is not surprising that
lawmakers in recent decades have turned increasingly to developmental science to inform their decisions in this domain. Scientific knowledge provides
a more sophisticated understanding of minors’ capacities and vulnerabilities
than was available in earlier times, when these judgments were based on
common sense and intuition. Developmental research has enhanced understanding of maturation in adolescence, allowing for more informed judg342. See infra Section IV.B.2.
343. See infra Section IV.B.2.
344. For further discussion, see infra Section IV.B.
345. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.02 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
346. See ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 108–10.
347. See generally Emily Buss, Developing the Free Mind, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
U.S. EDUCATION LAW (Kristine L. Bowman ed., 2020) (describing how according rights to students in school can contribute to healthy development).
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ments about when rights can promote minors’ wellbeing, when paternalistic
restrictions inflict harm, and when restrictions actually offer protection to
minors and are justified in a system that aims to further child wellbeing. Research can also clarify when doctrines withholding rights from minors are
not justified on this ground, and thus can only be supported, if at all, on the
ground that they serve some societal interest and not the interests of children
subject to the restrictions. Lawmakers’ inclination to draw on empirical
knowledge suggests that children’s rights doctrine increasingly is integrated
into the contemporary framework.
Several examples evidence the growing importance of scientific
knowledge in this area. Research on adolescent brain development and on
decisionmaking in children and adults has been invoked to demonstrate that
adolescents are capable of making informed medical decisions. 348 These
studies have played a key role in abortion-rights discourse and other reforms
authorizing minors to consent to healthcare treatment. 349 Lawmakers have
also turned to research that sheds light on the link between developmental
immaturity and children’s functioning in the justice system. For example,
analysis of juveniles’ competence to assist their attorneys and to participate
in legal proceedings has been influenced by developmental and other social
science research. Important studies have found that younger juveniles are far
less able to understand criminal proceedings or make competent decisions as
defendants than are their adult counterparts. 350 This research has influenced
courts and legislatures to recognize the importance of developmental maturity as a key factor in evaluating the competence of minors to participate in
delinquency and criminal proceedings. 351 Other key studies have found that
juveniles have a poorer understanding of their rights in interrogation and are
more vulnerable to coercive police tactics than adults. 352 Growing evidence
indicates that minors, under the pressure of interrogation, are far more likely

348. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological Ass’n in Support of Appellees,
Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673); Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990) (No. 88-1125); see also Laurence Steinberg et al., supra note 121, at 584.
349. See supra note 348; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (discussing the role of research showing that juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement).
350. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 356–57
(2003).
351. Questions of competence in a criminal court have traditionally focused on mental
illness and disability. See id. at 334.
352. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1153–55 (1980) (finding that deficiencies in comprehending Miranda rights are significantly related to age and intelligence and are substantial in youths under
age sixteen and severely deficient under age fourteen); Scott et. al, supra note 167, at 36.
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than adults to give false confessions. 353 Courts have cited this research in cases holding that juveniles failed to make knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
Miranda waivers. 354 Some states and the Restatement of Children and the
Law have relied on this research to create categorical restrictions on rights’
waivers by juveniles. 355
Empirical research supports other restrictions on minors’ privileges,
even when it has not played a direct role in their enactment. Motor vehicle
accidents cause many deaths each year, and a high percentage of accidents
involve young and intoxicated drivers. 356 Statistics on the correlation between motor vehicle accidents, alcohol, and drivers’ ages were invoked in the
debate surrounding the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, leading Congress to set the minimum age for access to alcohol at twenty-one. 357 Although child-development research did not play a prominent role in the
debates, the regulation receives strong support from research showing that
risk-taking behavior, including fast driving and excessive drinking, peaks in
late adolescence, and also from more recent developmental brain research
indicating that teenagers are more inclined toward sensation seeking and
impulsivity than are adults. 358 Some states have restricted the driving privilege for minors to minimize these risks: common restrictions include limits
on the number of nonadult passengers and on nighttime driving. 359 Limits
on minors’ ability to drive while accompanied by peers are supported by

353. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011) (discussing the risk of
false confession and citing amicus curiae brief submitted by Center on Wrongful Convictions
of Youth).
354. See, e.g., id. at 269, 277.
355. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 2014) (requiring consent of parent, custodian, or guardian for Miranda waiver of juveniles under age sixteen; notice required to parents of older juveniles); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101 (LexisNexis 2017) (requiring
presence and advice of parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney of juvenile under age sixteen
for custodial admission or confession to be admissible); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-26
(LexisNexis 2016) (requiring provision of counsel to child not represented by parent, guardian,
or custodian at custodial interrogation); In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312–13 (Kan. 1998) (requiring that parents, guardian, or attorney be given opportunity to consult with juvenile under
age 14 before interrogation); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114–15 (N.J. 2000) (statement
taken during custodial interrogation of juvenile under age fourteen is inadmissible in the absence of a legal guardian or parent, unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable; for older juveniles, officers must use their best efforts to locate a parent or legal
guardian before beginning the interrogation); see also RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE
LAW § 14.22 cmt. b, Reporters’ Note cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (requiring consultation with counsel for juveniles ages fourteen and under).
356. Teen Drivers: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers_factsheet.html
[https://
perma.cc/4PPG-6PNP].
357. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 10 (1983) (citing
statistics about the “direct correlation between the minimum drinking age and alcohol-related
crashes” for drivers ages eighteen to twenty-one).
358. See Scott et al., supra note 168.
359. See Teenagers, supra note 336; McCartt et al., supra note 336.
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many studies showing that teenagers are more likely to engage in risk taking
in the presence of peers. 360 Although this regulatory scheme emerged in the
late twentieth century, it is reinforced by recent research and likely will gain
even greater traction.
To be sure, developmental research has only begun to play a role in
shaping children’s rights doctrine, and other factors often are, and will be,
more important. Congress, in debating the proposed Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowering the voting age in federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen, emphasized the maturity of young adults. 361 But if developmental
research were dispositive, lawmakers would likely confer voting rights on
sixteen-year-old citizens. By this age, adolescents are as capable as are adults
of understanding and processing information and of making rational decisions in neutral settings, like a voting booth. 362 At this point, research is unlikely to result in reform on this issue. 363 However, to the extent that
judgments about the link between child wellbeing and maturity play a role in
the granting and withholding of rights to minors, research will likely be of
growing importance. 364
4.

Racial Equality and Children’s Rights

Concerns about racial fairness have played a less explicit role in the conferral of children’s rights than in other domains. 365 Thus, this feature of the
Child Wellbeing framework is less prominent here than in other domains.
And yet, in some contexts, the granting of rights to minors can be understood as serving a function similar to that of parental rights—protecting
children of color against overreaching by biased state actors. Due process
and Fourth Amendment protections in public school, if sufficiently robust,
could serve this protective role. Recent evidence indicates that students of
color are more likely to be subject to harsh discipline than other students;
this inequity has raised policy concerns and supports meaningful protection
against corporal punishment in schools. 366 It also has elevated concern about
360. See Teenagers, supra note 336; Scott et al., supra note 168.
361. S. REP. NO. 92-26, at 5 (1971).
362. See Steinberg et al., supra note 121, at 586.
363. See infra Part IV.B.2. Lawmakers may also anticipate high administrative costs in
evaluating readiness for political participation.
364. But see Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009) (cautioning against the use of research on
children’s capacities as locking in legal responses).
365. One reader, Susan Appleton, pointed out that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), could be understood as a children’s rights case grounded in racial fairness.
366. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON THE
NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2014) [hereinafter Obama
Dear Colleague Letter], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401title-vi.html [https://perma.cc/KP8R-32J2] (directing the tracking of disproportionality in use
of school discipline under the Obama administration and using corporal punishment policies,
which allow schools to physically punish students, as an example of a school policy that can
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the school-to-prison pipeline. Also, procedural rights conferred in police interrogation and in delinquency proceedings have special value to youth of
color who are likely more vulnerable to coercion 367 and more subject to bias
by justice system actors. 368 Some reforms have been undertaken to identify
contexts in which rights could provide special benefits to youth of color, 369
but commitment is tentative and progress is limited to date. 370 Nonetheless,
although race consciousness is muted in the context of children’s rights,
some rights accorded to minors can function to promote racial fairness.
B. The Framework in Practice
In this Section we examine several rights and privileges held by minors
and argue that the interpretive framework we offer provides a logic and
structure to both the conferral and withholding of rights. As explained
above, some rights directly advance the wellbeing of affected minors, and
(sometimes) social welfare; and some rights indirectly advance wellbeing because the paternalistic approach toward minors inflicted harms. We provide
examples of both categories. We then look at rights withheld from minors
and analyze specific legal restrictions on children, showing that these, too,
often fit within the framework.

raise disparate racial impact concerns). But see KENNETH L. MARCUS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. &
ERIC S. DREIBAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2018) [hereinafter
Trump Dear Colleague Letter], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201812.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH6P-85TB] (withdrawing Obama-era tracking directive by
Trump Administration).
367. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 14.20 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (“A minority youth particularly may be instructed by parents to show
deference to law-enforcement officers for the youth’s personal safety, and may be especially
unlikely to feel free to terminate an interview.”).
368. In the case of the so-called Central Park Five, for example, law enforcement used
coercive and deceptive interrogation tactics against five youths of color to coerce them into
falsely confessing to an attack on a woman in Central Park in 1989. See Miriam S. Gohara, A
Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 792 (2006); see also Sydney H. Schanberg, A
Journey Through the Tangled Case of the Central Park Jogger, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 19, 2002),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2002/11/19/a-journey-through-the-tangled-case-of-the-centralpark-jogger/ [https://perma.cc/VW4D-4UXV].
369. See Obama Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 366. Corporal punishment has been
abolished in school districts in large cities. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW
§ 8.10 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
370. See Trump Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 366 (withdrawing the Obama Dear
Colleague letter on tracking racial disproportionality in school discipline).
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Rights Granted to Minors
Healthcare Decisionmaking

In general, parents have the authority to consent to medical treatment
for their children until age eighteen, and minors lack the authority to make
their own healthcare decisions. In most medical treatment situations, it is
assumed that the interests of parents and children are aligned—that parents
will seek treatment needed by their children, and that children will share
their healthcare needs with their parents. But in some situations, the requirement of parental consent creates obstacles to treatment. Lawmakers
have recognized three exceptions to the general requirement of parental consent, all directed at adolescents. 371 For each exception, the right granted
promotes the minor’s wellbeing and social welfare as well. For most, parental
authority is not undermined because parents likely would approve of the
welfare-promoting treatment.
Mature Minor Doctrine. Under the common-law mature minor doctrine, a minor capable of making an informed medical decision can give valid consent to routine, beneficial treatment if no parent is available to give
parental consent. 372 The treatment ordinarily cannot be one that carries serious health risks, except in an emergency, and it must offer potential health
benefits for the minor herself. 373 In other words, the treatment cannot be
cosmetic, and it cannot be for the purpose of benefiting another person. 374
Scrutiny of mature minor doctrine indicates that the authority of minors
to consent to treatment functions primarily to promote child wellbeing.
Without the mature minor doctrine, physician liability could arise on the basis of treating a patient without valid (parental) consent, deterring physicians
from providing treatment to minors. 375 By removing this obstacle, the doctrine facilitates beneficial treatment of the minor. That minors lack authority
to consent to cosmetic treatment and treatment that benefits another person
reinforces the doctrine’s underlying purpose of promoting child wellbeing.
Although advocates have heralded the mature minor doctrine as a victory for
children’s rights, 376 it does not apply if a parent is available, and it seems un-

371. These are embodied in the mature minor doctrine, minor consent statutes, and the
right to make reproductive health decisions.
372. See, e.g., Rowine Hayes Brown & Richard B. Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical
Treatment, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 294 (1979).
373. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
374. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a fifteenyear-old could not consent to a skin graft for the benefit of his cousin who had suffered severe
burns).
375. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (discussing rationale for mature minor doctrine).
376. This is particularly true when it served to underpin minors’ reproductive privacy
rights. See Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adoles-
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likely that courts developing the doctrine were concerned with advancing
minors’ interest in self-determination. Moreover, courts seldom recognize a
right of mature minors to refuse beneficial medical treatment, although
adults have this right. 377 In general, the mature minor doctrine fits comfortably in the framework as a doctrine primarily directed at serving the wellbeing of minors that does not conflict with parental authority or the state’s
interest.
The mature minor doctrine is supported by contemporary research, another convergence with the Child Wellbeing framework. The cases involve
minors age fifteen or older, an age at which research indicates that adolescents are capable of making basic medical decisions independently. 378 The
requirement that the minor herself must be able to consent to treatment precludes application to younger children. 379 Moreover, the requirement that
the treatment be routine and involve minimal risk limits the application to
situations in which the mature minor will understand the treatment choices
and the consequences. 380 The doctrine assumes that parents should be involved in more consequential medical decisions for their children.
Minors’ Consent Statutes. A substantial majority of states in the late
twentieth century enacted statutes under which minors are deemed adults
for the purpose of consenting to treatment for substance abuse and sexually
transmitted diseases, contraceptive services, 381 and outpatient mental health
services. 382 Typically the statutes designate no minimum age of consent, but
given the nature of the targeted conditions, only adolescents are likely to be
afflicted or to desire treatment without involving parents. The conditions are
the product of risky adolescent behavior or of emotional issues that may
arise in this turbulent developmental stage. Moreover, statutes typically presume that minors seeking treatment are competent to give valid consent, a

cents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1590 (1982); see also Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979) (rejecting the lower court’s determination that the common-law mature minor doctrine had been legislatively overruled as to abortions and holding
that the instant statute was unduly burdensome on the exercise of a minor to seek an abortion
since it did not permit even a mature minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent).
377. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01, Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (citing cases).
378. See id.; see also Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 376, at 1595.
379. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(providing that a minor’s consent can be effective if the minor is “capable of appreciating the
nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct consented to”).
380. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01(a), cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
381. For a discussion of contraception, see infra text accompanying notes 385–387.
382. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-8 (2012); MO.
REV. STAT. § 431.061(4) (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 32.003, 32.004 (West 2013); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969 (2013). In both cases, some states place limitations on age or type of
care that may be provided to minors.
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presumption supported by developmental research when applied to adolescents. 383
Minors’ Consent statutes respond to contexts in which the law’s paternalistic approach requiring parental consent was harmful to minors’ wellbeing. There is no evidence that legislatures gave much attention to minors’
autonomy interests in enacting Minors’ Consent statutes. Instead, the statutes aimed to facilitate beneficial treatment that minors might otherwise not
seek if parental consent were required, due to the sensitivity of the covered
conditions. 384 Moreover, the conditions targeted pose risks to public health
as well as to the child’s wellbeing, and facilitating treatment offers societal
benefits. Analyzed in the framework, it is clear that Minors’ Consent statutes
give minors the right to make medical decisions to promote their wellbeing
and to promote social welfare. Moreover, while some parents might object to
their child having the right to seek treatment independently (as well as to the
behavior that led to the need for treatment), few would want their child to
forgo treatment.
Reproductive Health Treatments. The right to obtain contraceptive and
prenatal services is often part of Minors’ Consent statutes and is justified on
both child-wellbeing and social-welfare grounds. Minors have a right to obtain contraceptive services in almost all states as part of public health initiatives to prevent teenage pregnancy. 385 These statutes are not motivated by a
concern that minors enjoy a right of reproductive privacy, the foundation of
adults’ right to obtain contraceptives. 386 Instead, lawmakers recognize
(grudgingly) that many teenagers are sexually active and that ready access to
contraception can avoid the harms of unprotected sex. The research shows
clearly that the personal and social costs of teen pregnancy are substantial. 387
383. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to
Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1838 (2007) (concluding that “[t]o the extent that the
patient . . . can clearly communicate her decisions, understands the information about her
condition, appreciates the consequences of her choices . . . and can weigh the relative risks and
benefits of the options, she should be considered competent”).
384. For example, statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia expressly authorize minors to consent to STD or venereal disease treatment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.20.025; D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 22, § 600.7 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.30 (2014); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-10-104 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-18 (LexisNexis 2019).
385. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.02 Statutory Note (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019); Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, GUTTMACHER
INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services
[https://perma.cc/4G6F-RW6R].
386. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (explicitly extending this right to
reproductive privacy beyond marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)
(recognizing a constitutionally protected zone of reproductive privacy for adults).
387. See Saul D. Hoffman & Rebecca A. Maynard, The Study, the Context, and the Findings in Brief, in KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN
PREGNANCY 1 (Saul D. Hoffman & Rebecca A. Maynard eds., 2008) (documenting health and
social risks for both adolescent parents and their children more onerous than those experienced by their adult counterparts: teenage mothers are more likely to drop out of school and be
relegated to low-paying jobs than other adolescents, and teenage fathers also experience finan-
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The state thus has an important interest in protecting both sexually active
minors and society from these costs. To be sure, while some parents likely
support these laws, others may object to their children’s ability to access contraceptives, and the parental rights of these parents are correspondingly diminished. But lawmakers have concluded that the benefits for teens and for
society of pregnancy prevention trump the objection of these parents, whose
stance threatens harm to their sexually active children.
The Child Wellbeing framework enriches our understanding of a minor’s right to terminate a pregnancy as well, although this right does not fit
as neatly in the Child Wellbeing framework as do other rights of access to
treatment. 388 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that a mature minor has a right to make an abortion decision without involving a parent. 389
However, the Court also directed that a state could require the minor to
demonstrate her maturity and ability to make the decision. 390 The minor’s
right to abortion implicates a liberty interest in reproductive privacy that is
analogous to that of a pregnant adult. The decision to continue or terminate
a pregnancy is both urgent and peculiarly adult in nature, in that the minor
who carries the child to term will bear the responsibilities of parenthood. But
the child-wellbeing principle lends particular weight to minors’ interest in
access to abortion. 391 The obstacle of a parental consent requirement likely
would lead some teenagers to delay abortion, increasing personal and public
health costs. 392 Courts also note that pregnancy and childbirth are riskier for

cial and educational costs; children of teenage mothers also do more poorly than other children on many measures of child wellbeing).
388. Minors’ right of access to abortion fits more squarely in the realm of constitutional
liberty interests held by citizens against the state (and in the case of minors, against parents),
but, as explained in the text, this right also is justified in part on the ground that it serves the
wellbeing of pregnant minors. See infra text accompanying notes 391–395.
389. 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979).
390. For a minor not mature enough to make her own decision, the Court indicated that
a determination should be made of whether the abortion without parental consent or involvement is in the minor’s best interest. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44. In response, many states
have created judicial bypass proceedings to determine the pregnant minor’s maturity. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 26-21-4 (LexisNexis 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (2018); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904 (LexisNexis 2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55 (2018); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (2000); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (West 2015); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.375 (West 2009). Other jurisdictions authorize minors, like adult women, to
consent to abortion without state-imposed restrictions. These include Connecticut, Maine, and
Washington D.C. See An Overview of Consent to Reproductive Health Services by Young People,
GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-minorsconsent-law [https://perma.cc/G35N-BA94].
391. Emily Buss makes a similar argument. See Buss, supra note 10, at 762 (arguing that
allowing adolescents access to abortion “allow[s] them to continue to grow up without taking
on the massive financial, emotional, and social burdens of teen parenting”).
392. See Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 589, 641 (2002).
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teenagers than for adults, 393 and, as suggested above, the consequences of
having an unwanted child are particularly costly in adolescence. 394 Teenage
parenthood is virtually never beneficial, and the harm seems particularly
acute if the minor objects. 395 Although this justification is seldom front and
center, the minor’s wellbeing and liberty interests merge in the context of
abortion rights. Thus, concern for the welfare of the pregnant minor and
recognition that deference to parental authority may generate serious harm
are embedded in the Bellotti framework.
b.

First Amendment Rights in School

The free expression and free exercise rights of public-school students also exemplify rights that benefit minors and promote social welfare. 396 Allowing students to express their political views as maturing individuals in the
school setting offers substantial benefits both to students and society because
it prepares youths for political participation and other activities associated
with citizenship. Providing a context for expression in which students can
learn lessons about civility and tolerance when their ideas are tested serves
students’ interests. Further, lessons learned in an educational setting could
improve political discourse generally, a benefit to society. Arguably, many
teenagers are beginning to engage with and comprehend larger political and
social issues and are motivated to explore and debate with peers and teachers. Thus, although speech rights are not formally limited on the basis of age,
it is not surprising that claims are brought almost always by middle- and
high-school students. 397 Courts might be less likely to view the interest of
younger children as substantial. 398
393. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1981) (acknowledging risks
of teenage pregnancy in upholding statutory rape statute).
394. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; see also Hoffman & Maynard, supra note 387.
395. In many jurisdictions, judges typically order an abortion even when a minor is
found to be too immature to make her own decision, reasoning that the best interest of an immature minor cannot be served by forcing her to bring the pregnancy to term. E.g., Robert H.
Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW
REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
396. See supra text accompanying notes 103–106 (describing these rights); Buss, supra
note 364, at 57–61.
397. E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007) (upholding suspension of high
school student for displaying pro-marijuana banner); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273–74 (1988) (upholding censorship of material in high school newspaper); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684–85 (1986) (upholding suspension of high school
student for assembly speech with lewd innuendo); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d. Cir. 2011) (rejecting authority of school officials to punish eighthgrade student for off-campus web posting).
398. For example, in Tinker, the younger Tinker siblings, who, at age eight and eleven,
participated in the same anti-War demonstration at issue in the case as their fifteen- and thirteen-year-old siblings, were not petitioners. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 516 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the protesting students); id. at 504
(describing the petitioners); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 166; see also Muller v. Jefferson
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Another dimension of both free expression and free exercise rights is
compatible with our framework: children’s rights in this setting are usually
convergent with those of parents, belying the account of inherent competition. Recognition of students’ First Amendment rights often supports parents’ interest in inculcating their children in their own political values and
religious beliefs; the cases suggest that the views of students who have successfully challenged school restrictions on speech align with those of their
parents. 399 Conversely, when parents have favored restrictions imposed by
the school, courts have been less protective of student speech. 400 Also, parents have often joined students in curricular and other challenges on the basis of shared religious beliefs. 401 These constitutional challenges have had
mixed success, but many school systems accommodate parents’ and students’ religious beliefs in various ways. 402
As this doctrinal description illustrates, the Child Wellbeing framework
aids interpretation of constitutional jurisprudence in this area. First
Amendment rights are generally conferred on students in contexts in which
exercise of those rights might be deemed beneficial to their development as
citizens, but rights are defined with limits that courts find appropriate to
protect society’s interest in education. Applying a cost-benefit calculus, the
benefits to students of free speech rights are substantial and the social costs
are minimal. Usually parents support and sometimes advocate for these
rights as well.
We end this discussion on a critical note: If, as we argue, recognition of
free expression rights is justified on the ground that it promotes the interests
of both students and society in citizenship development so long as the state’s
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996) (questioning whether Tinker extends to
elementary school students).
399. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay
on the Supreme Court’s Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 785 (1978) (arguing that Tinker
was really about “family rights”); Hafen, supra note 100, at 646 (arguing (before Bellotti) that
“none of the Supreme Court’s children’s rights cases provide authority for upholding the exercise of minors’ choice rights—particularly against contrary parental claims”).
400. Compare Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275 (upholding censorship, citing principal’s concern about offending parents), with Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, 514 (permitting student speech,
noting in facts that parents held the same views).
401. See e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 538 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting First Amendment claim by high school students and their parents against compelled attendance at anti-AIDS assembly); Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070
(6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting objection of parents and children to textbook series).
402. See e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 26.003–26.010 (West 2006) (authorizing parents
to petition on behalf of their children to add or change a course, graduate early, or to withdraw
from a class or other school activity that conflicts with religious beliefs); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 246–47 (1990) (applying state law to require high school to provide student
Christian club equal access to school facilities); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir.
1999) (upholding state law authorizing a four-day Easter holiday against Establishment Clause
challenge and finding that “[t]he Board’s desire to economize scarce educational resources that
are wasted when classes are held on days with a high rate of absenteeism provides a plausible
secular purpose” for the schedule).
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educational function is not sacrificed, courts have been excessively restrictive
in deferring to school authority, often exaggerating the cost to the educational process of student speech. For example, some courts have allowed
punishment of students for expressions on private social media not intended
for school dissemination, 403 while others, including the Supreme Court, have
authorized censorship by school authorities of innocuous student material in
school publications, where little burden on education is implicated. 404 Allowing students freedom to express their opinions in venues such as school publications can provide opportunities for experimentation in a setting in which
instructive guidance and feedback are possible. While some courts have been
quite supportive of student speech, 405 the Supreme Court often has been
willing to authorize the stifling of expression offensive to school authorities. 406 These policies may result in undesirable lessons about government
repression of speech and do little to offer positive citizenship lessons. Our
framework thus offers normative guidance for reforms in this area.
c.

Procedural Rights in Delinquency Proceedings

Courts granting procedural rights to youths in the justice system have
emphasized concern for their wellbeing, sometimes recognizing that the paternalistic approach threatened harm to those it ostensibly aimed to protect.
In granting procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings, the Supreme Court recognized that the rehabilitative model of the traditional juvenile court inflicted harm on youths and that procedural rights provided
protection from those harms. 407 In Gault, the Court observed that adjudicated delinquents seldom received the promised services to support rehabilitation and often were confined in institutions that functioned like prisons. 408
At the same time, youths faced adjudication without the tools that could aid
them in defending against the state’s charges. 409 Thus, the aim of the court in

403. E.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–53 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding suspension
for off-campus posting targeting school principal as offensive and potentially disruptive). But
see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting
school officials’ authority to punish student).
404. For example, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275, can be criticized as heavy-handed, authorizing censorship of innocuous material, foregoing instructional potential in official response.
405. See supra text accompanying note 103.
406. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007) (speech advocating legalization
of marijuana); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684–85 (1986) (sexual innuendo).
407. See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing In re Gault). To be sure, a juvenile court adjudication implicates the youth’s liberty interest much like the adjudication of guilt in a criminal
trial, indicating the need for protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the Court was moved to grant juveniles rights in part because of the harms
inflicted by the paternalistic regime. See supra text accompanying note 71.
408. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 n.30, 27 (1967).
409. Id. at 29.
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granting procedural rights was to promote the wellbeing of youth in the adjudicative process. 410
Concern for the wellbeing of youths in the justice system also has influenced the way in which procedural rights are defined and applied. Some
children’s rights advocates hold that the rights of youths, such as the right to
waive counsel, should be similar to those of adult defendants. 411 But lawmakers increasingly have realized that youths may have limited capacity to
exercise their rights, and that their immature choices can have harmful consequences. This concern, well supported by developmental research, has led
to reforms that protect juveniles through restrictions limiting their freedom
to exercise and waive procedural rights. For example, adults can freely waive
their Miranda rights in police interrogation, but some states have imposed
restrictions on minors’ freedom to waive these rights, either altogether or by
requiring consultation with counsel. 412 This constraint is justified on the
ground that minors, particularly youth of color, 413 are particularly vulnerable
to coercive police tactics and that younger teenagers often lack comprehension of the meaning of Miranda warnings. In general, youths are far more

410. See generally Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV 39
(2003) (arguing that the Court’s attempt in Gault to reform the juvenile justice system because
it was unfair for children was a “botched rescue”).
411. See e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1490–92 (2009) (contending that arguments against waiver of the right to
counsel are not supported by empirical evidence); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1282 (2000) (arguing that right
to waive is implicit in Gault). The National Juvenile Defender Center, for example, assumes
that juveniles have the right to waive counsel in delinquency proceedings but advocates that
waiver must follow consultation with counsel. See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ENSURING
ACCESS: A POLICY ADVOCACY TOOLKIT 41–42 (2018), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads
/2018/05/Ensuring-Access.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5GL-VBR6]. Other scholars contend that
youth need a completely different process. E.g., Buss, supra note 410.
412. The Restatement of Children and the Law requires consultation with counsel as a
condition of waiver for younger juveniles. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 14.22
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (section entitled “Consultation with Counsel for
Younger Juveniles”). A few courts have prohibited waiver altogether for younger juveniles or
unless advised by counsel. See, e.g., In re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that a juvenile may only validly waive her right to counsel after that right is satisfactorily explained to her by a non-adversarial attorney or judge); State v. Doe, 621 P.2d 519, 521
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a juvenile facing a delinquency petition cannot waive the
initial appointment of counsel to defend her); State ex. rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199, 204
(W. Va. 1981) (holding that a juvenile’s waiver of right to counsel cannot be knowing and voluntarily waived unless the waiver is made on the advice of counsel). For more examples, see
George L. Blum, Annotation, Validity and Efficacy of Minor’s Waiver of Right to Counsel—
Cases Decided Since Application of Gault, 101 A.L.R. 5th 351 (2002).
413. See supra text accompanying note 367 (describing how youths of color are taught
compliance with authority, particularly law enforcement). See also RESTATEMENT OF
CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 14.21 Reporters’ Note cmt. h (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
1, 2018); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 14–20 (2015).
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likely than are adults to waive their Miranda rights in interrogation 414 and to
confess to crimes, sometimes falsely. 415 Also, in delinquency proceedings, juveniles in most states do not have the right of self-representation, although
adult defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel and represent
themselves. 416 Moreover, some jurisdictions go further and strictly limit or
prohibit self-representation by juveniles, acknowledging that immaturity
precludes competent waiver of counsel. 417
In general, procedural rights in the justice system aim to protect juveniles, like adults, from the power of state prosecution and from wrongful
deprivation of liberty. But lawmakers confer these rights on minors and define them with an aim to promote their wellbeing. This protection is particularly critical for youth of color, who disproportionately interact with the
justice system. In recent years, reforms have been guided by developmental
research showing that youths are more vulnerable than their adult counterparts and less capable of exercising their rights in a self-interested way. In
this domain as in others, the new framework provides an interpretive guide
that clarifies the rationale of children’s rights.
2.

Rights Withheld from Minors

The Child Wellbeing framework provides interpretive tools that clarify
why other rights, outside the justice system, are withheld from minors as
well. As we have shown, the conferral of rights in recent decades has enhanced minors’ wellbeing in many settings. But paternalism continues in
many modern laws, and sometimes the underlying premise is that children’s
interests are well served by restrictive regulations or surrogate decisionmakers. Moreover, restrictions can also promote social welfare. Two examples—
restriction on the right to marry and the infancy doctrine in contract law—
demonstrate that often the withholding, as well as the granting, of rights fits
within the framework.

414. Grisso et al., supra note 350, at 353–56 (finding in laboratory study that children
fifteen years or younger are more likely than older teenagers to comply with authority and confess to an offense); Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005) (finding of defendants questioned by the police, only 7.96 percent of those aged fourteen and under remained silent).
415. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 14.21 Reporters’ Note cmt. h (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018); Viljoen et al., supra note 414, at 263.
416. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizing criminal defendants’ right to
waive counsel); RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 15.21 Reporters’ Note cmt. a & b
(AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 3, 2019).
417. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(1) (2018) (“[T]he child shall be represented
by counsel at all critical stages: detention, adjudicatory and disposition hearings; parole or probation revocation proceedings; and post-disposition matters.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-214(H) (2009) (“[T]he child shall be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings on a
delinquency petition,” and if counsel is not retained, “counsel shall be appointed for the
child.”).
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Restrictions on minors’ right to marry provide an interesting example of
a right withheld from minors out of concern for their wellbeing—a concern
that is informed by ample research. 418 Under common law, relatively young
minors were permitted to marry, primarily to avoid their children’s illegitimacy. 419 But, although the right to marry is a fundamental constitutional
right for adults, the law has become more, not less, restrictive in the era of
children’s rights. 420 In recent decades, the minimum age of marriage has increased in many states, 421 a trend that is best justified on the ground of child
wellbeing. Developmentalists concur that most adolescents lack the maturity
to establish a stable marriage or raise children competently, and other research finds many harmful consequences associated with teenage marriage,
including disruption of education and social development, and high divorce
rates. 422 Thus, it is apparent that deterring teenage marriage furthers social
welfare as well as that of minors themselves. Lawmakers have responded by
restricting a right that minors once held and also by limiting the parents’ authority to consent to their minor children’s marriages.
The infancy doctrine in contract also restricts minors’ freedom with the
purpose of serving their wellbeing. Under the doctrine, minors can renounce
most contracts, giving them limited ability to enter enforceable agreements. 423 This restriction limits minors’ freedom of contract, but it is under418. See Guggenheim, supra note 242, at 942 (noting that New York’s raising of the age
of lawful marriage from fourteen to eighteen was touted as a children’s rights victory, even
though the legal change actually further restricted those rights, as, while “[a]dult rights are organized around the principle . . . of ‘liberty’ . . . . Children’s rights . . . mostly presum[e] children ought to be denied autonomy”); Jonathan Black, Advocates Are Fighting to Outlaw Adult
Marriages to Minors, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2018, 3:25 AM), http://www.abajournal.com
/magazine/article/adult_marriages_minors_law [https://perma.cc/SG7V-B7S8].
419. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 28 S.E.2d 785, 786 (S.C. 1944) (“The common law establishes
the age of consent to the marriage contract at fourteen years for males and twelve years for females . . . .”).
420. Compare Ragan v. Cox, 194 S.W.2d 681, 684–85 (Ark. 1946) (describing recent Arkansas law raising marriage to eighteen for males and sixteen for females from the common
law fourteen and twelve), with Encinas v. Lowthian Freight Lines, 158 P.2d 575, 575 (Cal. App.
1945) (noting that in California, males can legally enter into a contract of marriage at twentyone, and with parental consent at eighteen, versus eighteen and sixteen respectively for females); see also Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1830–31 (2012).
421. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., UNDERSTANDING STATE STATUTES ON MINIMUM
MARRIAGE AGE AND EXCEPTIONS (2018), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/11/FINAL-Oct-2018-State-Statutory-Compilation.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VLV-T34W] (indicating that most states now require that both parties be at least eighteen to marry without parental consent or judicial approval, though many have statutory exceptions which can lower
that age, sometimes including in cases where the minor female becomes pregnant).
422. See Hamilton, supra note 420; Gordon B. Dahl, Early Teen Marriage and Future
Poverty, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 689, 691 (2010) (describing substantially higher divorce rate, younger age of childbirth, and lower educational attainment of women who marry before age nineteen).
423. This doctrine has its roots in English common law. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 47, at
115–17.

1450

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1371

stood to serve their interests by protecting them from entering ill-considered
agreements. 424 In this context, children are presumed to be vulnerable to
overreaching adults and to their own poor judgment. The infancy doctrine
serves as a deterrent, signaling to adults who might be tempted to deal with
minors in a commercial setting that the contract cannot be enforced against
the minor. The doctrine also reinforces parental authority in a context in
which the risk of parent-child conflict of interest appears to be minimal.
*

*

*

In this Part, we have shown that the rationale for granting and withholding of rights often fits comfortably in the Child Wellbeing framework. This
analysis brings greater coherence to the doctrine and clarifies the underlying
logic of dispersed legal reforms often adopted in a piecemeal fashion. Children’s rights are sometimes understood primarily as expressions of the legal
personhood of children as individuals with liberty interests that trump the
authority of parents and the state over their lives. 425 This Part has shown that
this understanding is incomplete. This is not to say that lawmakers make optimal judgments about rights granted and withheld. It seems probable that
rights will not be granted to minors if doing so seems likely to incur any substantial social costs, even if the benefits to minors would exceed those costs.
Moreover, lawmakers likely sometimes resort to paternalistic views about
minors, declining to extend beneficial rights and privileges, even though the
social costs are minimal. Finally, other political and social attitudes likely often shape legislative and judicial judgments about granting or applying children’s rights. 426 But our analysis has shown that, in a way insufficiently
understood, the conferral and withholding of rights to minors can be rationalized on the basis of child wellbeing.
Children’s rights doctrine is thus consistent with the legal regulation of
children and families discussed in Parts II and III. Taken together, these

424. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) (“The
underpinnings of the general rule allowing the minor to disaffirm his contracts were undoubtedly the protection of the minor. It was thought that the minor was immature in both mind
and experience and that, therefore, he should be protected from his own bad judgements as
well as from adults who would take advantage of him.”); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 115–
17.
425. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
426. There is evidence, for example, that judges’ anti-abortion attitudes may distort their
determinations of minors’ maturity to make abortion decisions. See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous,
803 So. 2d 542, 547 (Ala. 2001) (upholding denial of an abortion without parental consent for a
seventeen-year-old student who worked part-time to save for college, and who had considered
alternatives to abortion and researched the procedure); In re Jane Doe, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184–
85 (Ohio 1990) (upholding denial of an abortion without parental consent for a seventeenyear-old student who worked and planned to go to college, even though a physician testified
that she understood the risks, because she had had a prior abortion as a result of pregnancy
with a different man and had discontinued her birth control). Traditional views about parental
authority could also lead courts and legislatures to reject beneficial children’s rights.
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Parts support our claim that the competitive triadic framework of state, parents, and children is outmoded and that the Child Wellbeing framework better describes the current state of the law. Concern for child wellbeing inincreasingly defines the state’s role in regulating youth crime, and is reflected
in recent investments in family support and marginal efforts to reorient the
child welfare system away from its crisis orientation; but it also goes far to
justify parental authority and illuminate the patterns by which children’s
rights are granted and withheld. Further, we have shown that the advancement of society’s interests, a goal that has been obscured historically in the
regulation of children, has often converged with and strengthened child
wellbeing. In each domain, to varying degrees, observers and (sometimes)
lawmakers have identified racial bias and inequity in the law’s relationship
with children and families of color as a threat to the legitimacy of the regime
and have elevated this concern as a policy goal. Finally, developmental science, which shapes the state’s role in contemporary juvenile justice and, increasingly, investments in family support, is likely to become more
important in rationalizing parental rights and children’s rights doctrine.
V.

ANTICIPATING CRITICISM

In this Part, we address potential criticism of the Child Wellbeing
framework. We remind the reader that the framework is largely interpretive,
describing the reasoning and goals that animate recent reforms to the juvenile justice system and arguing that the conceptual framework that has
shaped these reforms can inform our understanding of the structure and logic underlying parental rights and children’s rights. We anticipate two types
of criticism: arguments that the framework is descriptively inaccurate and
arguments that, even if it is accurate, the framework is normatively problematic and should be challenged rather than embraced.
Some readers may challenge the descriptive accuracy of the framework,
contending that we are too quick to find coherence across areas of legal regulation and are imposing order where none exists. On this view, the legal regulation of children is extraordinarily complex, and we have sacrificed
accuracy to find common themes linking the three domains. Relatedly, readers may argue that we overstate the integration of the interests of parents,
children, and the state, and that in some contexts there is an inherent conflict. Homeschooling, for example, may be acceptable educationally, but allows parents to inculcate illiberal values, making deference to parental
authority a greater threat to social welfare and child wellbeing than we
acknowledge. In this account, protecting the stability of the parent-child relationship sacrifices the child’s need to develop autonomy and society’s interest in ensuring children are exposed to a range of ideas. Similarly, minors’
right to access abortion necessarily conflicts with parental authority.
These are valid concerns, but they misapprehend the aim of our project.
As we note at several points, the framework does not explain and resolve
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every question about the legal regulation of children. 427 It emphasizes unifying themes across many domains, but it is not a topographical map incorporating all laws and policies. It is in the nature of a project like this to be catecategorical, and some nuance is surely lost when painting with a broad
brush. One value of the new framework, however, is that it identifies these
common themes—themes that are clearly driving regulation in some areas
and are embedded but only faintly visible in others. In so doing, we provide a
blueprint to guide reform-minded lawmakers. And although the depiction of
integrated interests does not describe every issue or case, the framework
provides the tools to identify and narrow the set of hard cases in which tension among parents, children, and the state is likely to persist. There is value
in understanding that, more often than is commonly acknowledged, there is
an integration of interests.
A second descriptive criticism is that we present our framework in a
vacuum, without accounting for the political context of lawmaking and enforcement, which may trump or at least complicate considerations of child
wellbeing. The sweeping, punitive juvenile justice reforms in the 1990s are
but one example of politics subverting a concern for the wellbeing of youth
in the justice system. 428 And access to abortion and contraception are persistent political flashpoints, often distracting from considerations of child and
adolescent wellbeing. 429
To be sure, our framework does not account fully for political and social
forces that shape lawmaking. But while some issues, such as abortion, involve deep value clashes, many others do not. And the approach, with its dual focus on child wellbeing and social welfare, and its incorporation of child
development knowledge, accommodates political differences quite well. This
is evident in bipartisan support for recent juvenile justice reforms and for
investments in prekindergarten. 430 Even the politically sensitive issue of
Medicaid expansion has gained support across the political spectrum, at least
in part due to the evidence about its effectiveness and efficiency. 431 Finally, as
we explain above, even minors’ access to abortion, while controversial, is at
least partly justified in terms of minors’ wellbeing and social welfare. 432 In
the absence of these interests, it is possible that the Bellotti Court might have
ruled differently. In short, while a concern for child wellbeing will succumb
to political forces at times, attention to social welfare and developmental science can help steer the debate towards child wellbeing.

427. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 263.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77.
429. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—And Why It
Matters in Law and Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 210–21 (2018) (contending that many supposedly
pro-life states do not adopt policies that would clearly promote life, including healthcare, income assistance, and workplace accommodations for pregnancy and caregiving).
430. See supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 202–203.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 394–395.
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On a related issue, critics may be skeptical generally of the upbeat account of the Child Wellbeing framework, and particularly unconvinced that
racial fairness is becoming a key policy concern. On this view, the article
minimizes the pernicious influence of racial inequity in contemporary regulation or exaggerates the extent to which lawmakers recognize and aim to
ameliorate this injustice.
As we have acknowledged, progress is at an early stage. In the juvenile
justice system, youth of color have benefited together with their white peers
from developmentally based reforms that have minimized institutional confinement and shifted resources to community programs that support healthy
maturation. But racial disparities in the justice system have not changed. The
system remains racialized and lawmakers have only begun to seriously confront these pernicious problems. Progress in the child welfare system is limited as well. Thus, we acknowledge that while our framework identifies the
reduction of racial inequity as a key policy goal, we are far from attaining
that goal. This reality enhances the importance of the contemporary rationale for strong parental rights to shield families of color from intrusive
state intervention and of procedural protections in the justice system and in
schools.
Readers may also question whether lawmakers should embrace our
framework. One concern is that defining and promoting child wellbeing can
be an uncertain and complex business, given the indeterminacy and capaciousness of the construct. 433 To a considerable extent, child wellbeing is
grounded in values about which there may not be consensus; it is also culturally contingent. Thus, policies and doctrines justified on this basis may
reflect lawmakers’ personal biases and political preferences. Although some
areas of state regulation have clear, largely uncontested goals, 434 others predictably will involve value contests or disagreements about priorities. Is it
better for a child to remain with a parent who sometimes strikes the child or
for the child to live apart from the parent and never be hit? Is it more beneficial for a child to experience a sense of belonging in a family or to grow up
with egalitarian values? And so on. Further, even when the objective is uncontested, it is not always clear how to achieve the goal. Many approaches to
parenting can be effective, and social science research does not—and perhaps cannot—determine the “best” approach to raising a child. Views about
what children need, beyond the basics, have shifted over time, and often
there is little consensus among experts or parents. 435

433. For a classic analysis of the indeterminacy of children’s best interest, see Mnookin,
supra note 12, at 226, 229–30.
434. These include the reduction of juvenile recidivism and promotion of children’s
physical health. See, e.g., supra notes 164, 206 and accompanying text.
435. See EMILY OSTER, CRIBSHEET: A DATA-DRIVEN GUIDE TO BETTER, MORE RELAXED
PARENTING, FROM BIRTH TO PRESCHOOL 171–87 (2019) (describing the conflicting and often
limited evidence for numerous parenting choices, such as whether to sleep train an infant). For
a discussion of the historically contingent nature of parenting advice, see generally ANN
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These concerns are legitimate but exaggerate the challenge posed by the
indeterminacy of legal regulation aimed at promoting child wellbeing. Solid
and uncontested scientific research has established several key lessons about
child development. We know that a strong, stable relationship between a
child and caregiver—often, but not always, a parent—is essential to child development, especially in the first several years of life. 436 We know that ongoing brain development in adolescents can lead teenagers to make impulsive,
risky decisions, heavily influenced by peers, and that most youths outgrow
these tendencies. 437 We know that teenage pregnancy and substance abuse
undermine prospects for healthy adulthood. 438 We know that families need
economic resources to enable the healthy development of children. 439 And
we know that early intervention and access to treatment for a broad range of
conditions are both more effective and cost-efficient than ex post crisis intervention. 440 Regulation in the framework is built on these well-supported,
foundational insights. 441
Relatedly, a reader might question our confidence in the use of science
in the Child Wellbeing framework. It is sobering to consider that Progressives also professed confidence in science. To be sure, scientific evidence is
not always reliable. Biases can distort even the most scrupulous research, and
findings often are not replicable. 442 Even if the studies are reliable and neutral, moreover, they often cannot be translated readily into legal policy, because scientific findings, while informative, are usually narrow and seldom
apply directly and comprehensively to complex legal issues. 443 Finally,
knowledge based on research is not static; it will evolve and our understanding of child development and other relevant issues will evolve. 444
These concerns about the state of scientific knowledge and the challenges of translating this evidence into legal rules argue for caution in applying
research to legal questions. Incorporation of scientific research should be

HULBERT, RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS, AND A CENTURY OF ADVICE ABOUT
CHILDREN 360–70 (2003).
436. See supra text accompanying notes 247–248.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 166–168.
438. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 344, and 387.
439. See supra note 268; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
440. See supra text accompanying note 93.
441. When a legal question relates to an issue on which there is not clear evidence that
rests on foundational principles of child and adolescent development, the Child Wellbeing
framework does not support state intervention. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 322–323
(noting that the Child Wellbeing framework does not condone state intervention for illiberal
but academically sufficient homeschooling); text accompanying note 275 (noting that the
Child Wellbeing framework does not condone state intervention for spanking).
442. See Clare Huntington, Essay, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 227, 272–81 (2018).
443. See Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: A Domestic Violence Typology in Custody Litigation, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 115, 117–19 (2017).
444. See Buss, supra note 364.
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limited to well-established and broadly accepted bodies of research in social
and biological science. Moreover, as the body of scientific knowledge that
informs the law grows, legal policy should reform accordingly. And the
question is, “Compared to what?” Grounding regulation in scientific
knowledge is likely to be superior in many contexts to relying on unsupported common sense and intuition, which is at least as likely to be distorted by
lawmakers’ biases.
A final and serious criticism is that the framework we offer facilitates intrusion by the state in the lives of vulnerable families, despite its contrary
normative commitment. Our argument in Part II—that the framework
points to a more active state role in supporting families—has potential risks.
A lesson of the Progressive Era is that the state, when justified by the goal of
promoting child wellbeing, can impose an overarching view of acceptable
parenting on all families. For example, potentially beneficial state programs
designed to promote children’s health in low-income families often involve
significant intrusions on family privacy. 445 More generally, a system of state
support increases the contact between families and the government, raising
the chance that, in engaging with families, state actors will look for and find
problems. 446
These risks are serious, but not fatal. In the new framework, judges and
state legislators do not have free rein to intervene in the lives of children and
families in the name of child wellbeing, because robust parental rights continue to protect families from even a seemingly well-intentioned state. The
contemporary rationale for parental rights, described in Part III, together
with the constitutional justification based on liberal principles, provides a
bulwark against intrusive state intervention. This check, combined with
heightened concern about racial and class biases, supports voluntary programs that empower parents rather than coercive interventions that require
adherence to any one set of parenting practices. Some of the most successful
programs bear these characteristics, 447 and a strong regime of parental rights
and vigilance about implicit biases should encourage the state to pursue similar efforts.
In short, the framework carries risks, but it seems more promising than
alternative models of regulation. Again, the question is, “Compared to
what?” In the early Progressive Era, law and policy embodied a naïve view of
childhood, combining robust protection of parental rights that lacked inher-

445. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY
SITE OF RACIALIZATION 41–74 (2011) (describing a prenatal program for low-income
women that requires participants to divulge an extensive amount of information, including
immigration status, interactions with the child welfare system, any violent relationships, and
much more); Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support,
25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 331–40 (2014).
446. See ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 32–33.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 217–218 (describing home-visiting programs,
which are voluntary and seek to empower, not direct, parents; further describing the extensive
and strong evidence for these programs).
AS A
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ent constraints. Some more recent proposals by scholars would strictly limit
parental rights, thereby ceding substantially broader authority over families
to the state, 448 a questionable move for the reasons we have articulated. The
framework we identify benefits from the growing body of scientific
knowledge about children and families and recognizes that child wellbeing
and social welfare are interwoven, thus providing a more stable basis for
regulation than the earlier Progressive model.
Notwithstanding the understandable concerns discussed in this Section,
we endorse the new approach, while also arguing for care and caution as the
framework continues to shape the direction of legal regulation of children
and families.
CONCLUSION
To address the complexity, seeming incoherence, and instability in the
legal regulation of children, we have proposed a conceptual framework that
makes sense of this area of the law and unites various strands of legal regulation. Our approach embraces and reimagines the state interest in child wellbeing first articulated in the Progressive Era. We have shown that child
wellbeing continues to be the core animating principle of legal regulation.
But our framework also strengthens this principle in three important ways:
in modern regulation, lawmakers draw on a wide body of scientific
knowledge about child and adolescent development as well as considerable
empirical studies about effective policies. This makes it possible to advance
child wellbeing with greater sophistication, nuance, and confidence than
during the earlier period, when lawmakers relied largely on intuition and observation. Further, legal regulation is bolstered by a clear understanding that
promoting child wellbeing generally furthers social welfare. Finally, lawmakers are beginning to appreciate the importance of addressing the multiple
ways that racial bias and inequality permeate the legal regulation of children.
This framework is clearest in the early twenty-first-century sweeping reforms of juvenile justice, but it also offers interpretive power and normative
guidance for a broad swath of regulation. The framework highlights and encourages nascent reforms to family support policies. It elevates a robust contemporary justification for parental rights. And it provides a logic and
consistency to children’s rights doctrine. It thus offers an integrative regulatory scheme, clarifying that not only the role of the state, but also parental
rights and children’s rights, are defined and shaped by a unifying interest in
child wellbeing. This underlying coherence contrasts with earlier regulatory
models that pitted the state, parents, and the child in competition for control
over children’s lives. The framework also identifies areas of regulation that
do not promote child wellbeing, supplying a guide for future law reform. In
short, as we have shown, the Child Wellbeing framework both explains the

448.

See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text.
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law’s approach to the legal regulation of children and provides normative
guidance for the future.
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